Transcript of a Panel Discussion on the Role and Governance of the IMF: Further Reflections on Reform
IMF News, October 12, 2008
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- Published: October 12, 2008
Context and setting
- Event: Per Jacobsson panel discussion, Washington, D.C., October 12, 2008.
- Panelists: Stanley Fischer (via telephone), Trevor Manuel, Jean Pisani‑Ferry, Raghuram Rajan. Moderated by Andrew Crockett.
- Purpose: Re-examine the IMF’s appropriate role, effectiveness, governance, surveillance, lending conditionality, and possible redesign given the 2008 financial crisis and longer-term shifts in the global economy.
Assessment of IMF relevance and credibility
- Historic adaptability:
- The Fund was credited with promoting the removal of exchange restrictions for "a quarter of a century or so" after its foundation and later with helping member countries manage periodic payments difficulties as financial integration advanced.
- Recent performance and perception:
- Views ranged from the Fund being "remote" or "irrelevant" to having "regained intellectual credibility."
- The Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) was cited as having foreseen and warned about many developments leading to the crisis.
- Evidence of regained intellectual credibility includes accurate assessments in the GFSR (April 2007; April 2008) relative to other official institutions.
- Counterpoint: the Fund was seen as failing to exercise visible leadership and to influence major countries decisively.
- Ownership, voice and representation:
- External governance (voice and representation) was flagged as fundamental to ownership and Fund resonance with global decision‑makers.
- The distribution of influence within the Fund was noted as needing reform; the trend that formerly dominant powers would become less dominant was emphasized.
Surveillance, exchange rates, and multilateral consultation
- Surveillance shortcomings:
- The Fund’s recent surveillance, particularly on the U.S. and China exchange rate issues, was criticized as having missed opportunities to influence major‑country policies.
- The 2007 decision on exchange rate surveillance was cited as weakening Fund credibility because it was perceived as unable to resist U.S. pressures.
- Financial sector surveillance tools:
- FSAPs (Financial Sector Assessment Program) were praised as "excellent"; the U.S.’s refusal to invite an FSAP was highlighted as a missed opportunity to identify incoherent supervision structures.
- Multilateral surveillance and consultations:
- Multilateral consultations were described as innovative but not delivering substantial results; the Fund has struggled to translate multilateral surveillance into binding or effective international policy change.
- The Fund’s role as an independent public voice and broker in multilateral discussions was emphasized as important, but difficult when major shareholders prefer exclusive clubs.
Role relative to other international bodies; coordination and leadership
- Proliferation of forums:
- The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), BIS, Basel Committee, IOSCO and other bodies have become central; FSF was described as an effective, loosely structured convenor despite lacking formal legal apparatus.
- Major shareholders often prefer addressing issues in smaller, exclusive clubs (FSF, G‑7) rather than strengthening the IMF’s formal role.
- Proposed positioning:
- Suggested evolution for the IMF: act as a Secretariat or an intellectual repository that provides expertise, fosters intellectual coherence across groupings, and plays a coordinating role without necessarily supplanting specialized bodies.
- Need for closer cooperation between the Fund and FSF/BIS, and stronger backing from industrial country members to enable the Fund to play a larger role in financial stability.
Lending facilities, conditionality, and financing
- Lending toolkit and contingent instruments:
- Board reluctance toward contingent credit lines was criticized; the recommendation was to support actual use of these instruments rather than circumscribing them into ineffectiveness.
- Conditionality:
- Conditionality remains essential but should focus primarily on macroeconomic policy and structural issues critical to macro performance, "not least in the financial sector."
- Financing and burden sharing:
- Anticipation of increased demand: "There will be more IMF programs in the months ahead."
- Enhanced financing and possible intermediation role:
- If IMF resources become stretched, the panel raised the prospect of reallocating global reserves or intermediate financing from surplus countries (Japan, emerging markets) through the IMF.
- Options mentioned include revisiting SDR (Special Drawing Rights) issuance and reallocation as a mechanism to generate global liquidity.
Root causes of the crisis and policy implications
- Macro vs. micro debate:
- Crisis drivers were characterized as both macro (global demand imbalance; persistent U.S. current account deficit) and micro (financial innovation, regulatory failures, export of low‑quality assets).
- U.S. policy response was criticized for being "behind the curve"—misdiagnosing liquidity/solvency and timing of interventions.
- Global imbalances:
- China’s exchange rate policy and massive reserve accumulation facilitated prolonged U.S. deficits; the Fund’s exchange rate surveillance could not overcome political limits to influence China and the United States.
- Need for an independent global voice:
- The Fund should be more candid and independent—even with large shareholders—to influence policies in systemically important countries; current governance and financing dynamics inhibit such candor.
Institutional design and governance reform proposals
- If designing afresh:
- Even if starting from scratch, the institution would resemble the IMF’s core purpose: "to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems."
- Desired features: different vote and power distribution reflecting changing economic weight, greater financing capacity, and a highly professional staff.
- Near‑term governance actions:
- Accelerate agreed changes that reduce dominance of formerly dominant powers and complete ongoing quota/voice reforms "in a much shorter period."
- Consider formalizing the Fund’s Secretariat role vis‑à‑vis other groupings and strengthen the Fund’s mandate to perform broad macroeconomic and financial surveillance.
- Practical institutional steps suggested by panelists:
- Restore Fund mandate over macroeconomic policy framework in surveillance (i.e., change the most recent surveillance decision).
- Treat IMF surveillance results seriously by all countries, including those demanding surveillance of others.
- Support and operationalize contingent credit lines and other crisis‑prevention lending instruments.
- Strengthen system‑wide surveillance (e.g., World Economic Outlook (WEO) style analyses) and integrate macro and financial sector assessments.
Emerging‑market perspective and crisis management implications
- Inversion of center and periphery:
- Emerging markets have stronger reserves, better institutions, and improved policy frameworks compared with the past; the crisis highlights that core countries can become sources of contagion.
- IMF as insurer and protector of peripheral countries:
- The IMF may play an urgent role "to protect the countries at the periphery from the consequences of a storm at the center."
- Credibility of IMF programs and professional monitoring can remain attractive to countries seeking market confidence, reducing the viability of non‑IMF substitutes in serious crises.
Concluding takeaways
- The crisis underscores enduring needs:
- A central, credible international monetary institution capable of candid surveillance, effective coordination across bodies, and an adequate lending toolkit remains essential.
- Political economy constraints:
- Major shareholders’ reluctance to cede influence constrains the Fund’s effectiveness; practical progress requires both internal reforms (governance, voice) and external buy‑in (industrial country support for a stronger IMF role).
- Outlook:
- Anticipated increase in IMF programs and potential for greater reliance on the Fund for crisis assistance if it can harness enhanced financing, preserve professional credibility, and assert a more independent public voice.
Transcript of a Panel Discussion on the Role and Governance of the IMF: Further Reflections on Reform, October 12, 2008.