A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality
IMF Working Papers, October 1, 2008
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- A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, Olivier D Jeanne
- Published: October 1, 2008
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001
Framework and central thesis
- Presents a framework clarifying the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise.
- In the model, traditional conditionality:
- Commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts.
- Facilitates the return of private capital.
- Ensures repayment to the IMF.
Conditions for moral hazard
- Moral hazard can arise if:
- There are crisis externalities across countries (contagion).
- Country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum.
- Or both contagion and excessive discounting occur simultaneously.
Role and types of conditionality
- Traditional conditionality focuses on crisis resolution commitments by country authorities.
- The paper identifies "ex ante" conditionality as a mechanism to avoid IMF-induced moral hazard:
- IMF lending can be made conditional on crisis prevention efforts ("ex ante" conditionality).
Key findings and implications
- Traditional conditionality can align country behavior with repayment and capital return objectives, but is not always sufficient to prevent moral hazard.
- Externalities (contagion) and misalignment between private authorities' discounting of crisis costs and the national social optimum are central drivers of moral hazard risks.
- Conditioning IMF lending on prevention (ex ante conditionality) provides a policy lever to mitigate moral hazard arising from these drivers.
Publication and metadata
- Authors: Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, Olivier D Jeanne
- Date: October 1, 2008
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- Issue: 236
- Volume: 2008
- Pages: 33
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001
- ISBN: 9781451870947
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Subjects: Crisis prevention, Crisis resolution, Financial crises, Moral hazard, Political economy
- Keywords: IMF crisis lending, IMF lending, substitution effect, WP
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, and Olivier D Jeanne. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality", IMF Working Papers 2008, 236 (2008), accessed 9/12/2026, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001
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