Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?

IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2006

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Canonical URL: Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries.
A board is defined as "the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target."
The empirical analysis uses a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.
Key empirical finding: larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Dataset scope: de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003.
Paper length: 46 pages.
Series: Working Paper No. 2006/281, Volume: 2006, Issue: 281.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865417.001
ISBN: 9781451865417
ISSN: 1018-5941

Determinants associated with larger central bank board size:
- Larger countries.
- More heterogeneous countries.
- Countries with stronger democratic institutions.
- Countries with floating exchange rate regimes.
- Independent central banks with more staff.
The paper discusses possible determinants of a board's size and examines their empirical relevance.

Subject: Banking; Central bank autonomy; Central bank organization; Exchange rate arrangements; Floating exchange rates.
Keywords: exchange rate; implementation board; monetary policy; MPC member; MPC size; WP.

This content unit: Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (IMF Working Papers, 2006, Issue 281).

_wp06281 — References / Appendices
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- _wp06281 — References / Appendices (PDF)