Cooperation, Emergence of the Economic Agency Role of Government, and Governance

November 1, 1997

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Format: Chicago

Omotunde E. G. Johnson Cooperation, Emergence of the Economic Agency Role of Government, and Governance, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1997) accessed September 18, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper focuses on the emergence of the economic agency role of government and its relationship with cooperation and economic management. It distinguishes emergence under war, domination or capitulation, perfect cooperation, and strategic bargaining. Good governance is a consequence of constraints designed by principals with the incentive and ability to do so. The incentives are related inversely to the expected relative frequency of controlling government and directly to the expected relative share of costs of poor agency. The ability is directly related to bargaining power in determining the agency role. There are implications for the evolution of cooperation in the society and for macroeconomic performance.

Subject: Corruption, Tax incentives

Keywords: Economic activity, Government corruption, Government-civil service-business coalition, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

45
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 1997/150
Stock No:

WPIEA1501997
ISBN:

9781451923247
ISSN:

1018-5941

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