IMF Working Papers

Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers

By Paul R Masson, Allan Drazen

May 1, 1994

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Format: Chicago

Paul R Masson, and Allan Drazen. Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1994) accessed September 19, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker, and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on data for the interest rate differential between France and Germany and find support for our hypothesis.

Subject: Inflation, Labor, Prices, Unemployment, Unemployment rate

Keywords: Anti-inflationary policies increase, Critical value, Expansionary policy, Government debt accumulation, Inflation, No-devaluation rule, Objective function, Policy convergence, Policy credibility, Policy instrument, Policy stance, Second period problem, Tough government, Unemployment, Unemployment rate, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    28

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 1994/049

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0491994

  • ISBN:

    9781451971811

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941