Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
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Summary:
Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/208
Subject:
Budget planning and preparation Econometric analysis Expenditure National accounts Personal income Population and demographics Probit models Public financial management (PFM)
English
Publication Date:
December 1, 2001
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451874709/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA2082001
Pages:
30
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