Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection Under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws : Empirical Evidence from the United States

Author/Editor:

Michael P. Leidy

Publication Date:

August 1, 1996

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

Antidumping and countervailing duty procedures are governed by specific rules requiring both injury (by reason of imports) and dumping/subsidies, and thus might be expected to be less susceptible to pressures for protection arising from cyclical movements in the domestic macroeconomy. This paper investigates whether there is a connection between the state of domestic macroeconomic activity and pressures for protection under antidumping and countervailing duties. The evidence suggests that pressures for protection under these measures since the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade talks have advanced during periods of macroeconomic weakness and receded during periods of macroeconomic strength.

Series:

Working Paper No. 96/88

Notes:

Also published in Staff Papers, Vol. 44, No. 1, March 1997.

English

Publication Date:

August 1, 1996

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451851113/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0881996

Price:

$15.00 (Academic Rate:$15.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

24

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