IMF Working Papers

Integrated Ownership and Control in the GCC Corporate Sector

By Andre O Santos

August 3, 2015

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Andre O Santos. Integrated Ownership and Control in the GCC Corporate Sector, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2015) accessed September 20, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

The objective of the paper is to assess ownership and control links in the GCC corporate sector. The analysis focuses on the integrated ownership and network arising from ownership data available in Bloomberg and GCC stock exchanges. The paper finds that ownership is concentrated in GCC public sector institutions, holding companies, financial institutions, and family groups. The paper then considers the effect of different definitions of control on the distribution of consolidated debt. Debt concentration is maximized when the wedge between ownership and control is the largest. This is the case when the largest shareholder has at least 5 percent of total shares as defined in Zingales (1994).

Subject: Banking, Corporate governance, Corporate sector, Crime, Economic sectors, Financial markets, Illicit financial flows, Public sector, Stock markets

Keywords: Africa, Concentration, Corporate governance, Corporate sector, GCC countries, GCC country, GCC shareholder, Illicit financial flows, Integreated ownership, Network analysis, Ownership network, Public sector, Shareholder debt, Shareholder portfolios consist, Stock markets, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    24

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2015/184

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2015184

  • ISBN:

    9781513589459

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941