Search IMF Staff Papers

Advanced Search
Journal Description

Editorial Committee

How to Subscribe

Forthcoming Articles

Staff Papers Archive

Copyright Information

Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view pdf files

Free Email Notification

Receive emails when we post new items of interest to you.

Subscribe or Modify your profile

Staff Papers Logo    March 1998
Volume 45, Number 1
Public Disclosure and Bank Failures
By Tito Cordella and Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Full Text of This Article (PDF 1,191 K)

Abstract: We study how public disclosure of banks' risk exposure affects banks' risk taking incentives and assesses the impact of the presence of informed depositors on the soundness of the banking system. We find that when banks have complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crisis. However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures. [JEL D28,G14,G21,G28]

1998 International Monetary Fund