| I. |
Introduction |
|
| II. |
Quotas and Voting Power in the IMF: A System That Calls
for Greater Equity |
| |
Role of Quotas and the Debate on the Quota Formula |
| |
Further Work Toward Correcting Distortions and Enhancing
Equity in Voting Power |
|
| III. |
Checks and Balances in the Governance of the IMF |
| |
The Executive Board |
| |
The Managing Director |
| |
The Staff |
|
| III. |
Consensus Decision Making in a Cooperative Institution |
| |
Size and Composition of the Board: A Global Roundtable |
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General Approach to Consensus Building in the Board |
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Consensus Building and Decision Making in Practice |
| |
Protecting the Consensus Model and Safeguarding the
Rights of Minority Shareholders in the IMF |
|
| V. |
Enhancing Political Oversight of the International
Monetary System |
| |
The Interim Committee: A Mixed Leadership Record |
| |
The International Monetary and Financial Committee:
Toward More Effective Systemic Oversight? |
| |
The Intergovernmental Group of 24: Cohesion
Weakened by Diverging Interests of Members |
| |
The Group of Five and the Group of Seven:
Leading or Overbearing? |
| |
Competing Interests: The United States, Western Europe,
and Japan and the Asian Region |
|
| VI. |
IMF Governance in a Crisis: Mexico, 1994–95 |
|
| VII. |
Implications for IMF Governance of the Financial
Climate of the 1990s |
| |
Distinctive Features of the Crises, 1997–99 |
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Strengthening the Financial Architecture |
| |
Collaboration Between Civil Society and the IMF |
| |
The Pursuit of IMF Transparency |
| |
The Task of Refocusing the IMF |
|
| VIII. |
An Appraisal of IMF Governance |
|
| Appendix I. Voting Majorities in the
IMF |
|
| Appendix II. IMF Executive Directors
and Voting Power |
|
| Bibliography |