Budgetary Transparency for Public Expenditure Control

Author/Editor:

Franco Reviglio

Publication Date:

January 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

Free Full Text (PDF file size is 1119 KB).Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper explains why EMU countries seem unable or unwilling to undertake structural reforms of public expenditure. One of the reasons is political. What public expenditure reforms might be pursued without changing the political system? Without political reforms, technical improvements made to increase budget transparency, such as strengthening budget procedure, integrating accrual into cash accounting, and removing accounting gimmicks, could indirectly affect reforms of public expenditure. Removing gimmicks and helping prevent the emergence of new creative accounting techniques may be a partial substitue for political reforms. Implementation of the Growth and Stability Pact should be dynamically consistent with budgetary transparency. Although other EMU countries resorted as well to budgetary gimmicks to bypass difficult fiscal constraints, the Italian case is used as a reference to clarify these issues. Transparency may help discourage the use of gim micks.

Series:

Working Paper No. 01/8

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

January 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451842517/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0082001

Price:

$15.00 (Academic Rate:$15.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

31

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