Districting and Government Overspending
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Summary:
The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto powers, break the link between districting and government size.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/096
Subject:
Expenditure Income Income inequality Labor National accounts Personal income Population and demographics Public employment
Frequency:
Annually
English
Publication Date:
August 1, 2001
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451851915/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA0962001
Pages:
48
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