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Author/Editor:
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Saeed Al-Muharrami ; Daniel C. Hardy
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Publication Date:
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August 26, 2013
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 561KB).
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
Islamic and cooperative banks such as credit unions are broadly similar in that they both share some risk with savers. However, risk sharing goes along with ownership control in cooperatives, whilst Islamic banks share risk with borrowers and downside risk with depositors. Islamic banking is consistent with mutual ownership, which may ease some of the governance and efficiency concerns implied by Shari’ah constraints. Greater risk sharing among cooperative bank stakeholders, using mechanisms embedded in Islamic financial products, may strengthen cooperatives’ financial resilience.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 13/184
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Subject(s):
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Islamic banking | Banks | Financial instruments | Financial institutions | Corporate governance
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English
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Publication Date:
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August 26, 2013
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ISBN/ISSN:
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9781484380833/1018-5941
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA2013184
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Pages:
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31
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Price:
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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