Barry Eichengreen on the Specter of Versailles
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- Authors: BARRY EICHENGREEN
- Published: June 1, 2019
Overview
- The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 29, 1919, failed to achieve its aims: it did not seal an enduring peace, did not inaugurate an era of prosperity in Europe or worldwide, and did not create an effective institutional framework for governing international economic and political relations.
- The treaty’s failure prompted a different post–World War II approach characterized by more forceful US leadership and the construction of encompassing institutions in Europe and globally, producing economic growth in the industrialized countries in the third quarter of the 20th century at a pace never seen before.
- The author argues parallels between the post–World War I inward turn and contemporary US policy, particularly on tariffs and immigration.
Causes and characteristics of the post–World War I inward turn
Findings:
- The United States participated in treaty negotiations but largely washed its hands of the results and refused to join the League of Nations.
- The United States was not an active participant in the 1922 Genoa Conference intended to strengthen the international monetary and financial system.
- The United States did not support the League’s efforts to negotiate a tariff truce and provocatively raised import duties in 1923 and 1930.
- The United States did not forgive the war debts owed by its European allies, compounding the German reparations problem.
- Geographic separation (more than 2,000 miles) contributed to a belief in avoiding entanglement in European affairs.
- The inward turn combined protectionist trade measures and restrictive immigration laws.
- The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 was initially conceived to protect US farmers from cheap imports, although technology (the tractor) was the more important explanation for low US farm-gate prices.
- Immigrant quotas were set by the Immigration Act of 1924 using shares of immigrant groups in 1890 rather than current population shares.
- The Mexican Repatriation from 1929 through 1936 targeted as many as 2 million Mexicans and Mexican-Americans for deportation.
Parallels with contemporary politics and economics
Findings:
- The 1920s, like the early 21st century, were periods of rapid economic change that produced groups feeling left behind and inclined to blame foreigners.
- Then: American farmers (grain growers) suffered from expanded acreage in Argentina, Canada, and elsewhere. Now: declining manufacturing employment is the source of angst, with robotics cited as the culprit rather than motorized farm equipment.
- Identity-politics elements—hostility toward immigrants perceived as culturally different—bolstered isolationist tendencies in both eras.
- Today's inward-looking tariff and immigration policies in the United States have unmistakable parallels with the 1920s.
Exclusion of rising powers and geopolitical consequences
Findings:
- Germany was excluded from the League of Nations until 1926, faced indefinite restrictions on its military, and was prohibited from forming a customs union with Austria; these impositions fueled nationalism that contributed to the collapse of the Weimar Republic.
- A weakened Russia negotiated a separate peace with Germany in 1918; Bolsheviks were excluded from Versailles, and the USSR, which came into existence in 1922, was in no position to participate in reconstruction.
- The Soviet state joined the League of Nations temporarily in 1934 but was effectively kept out of Western economic and financial arrangements, setting the stage for bifurcation of the world into Soviet and Western blocs.
- Today, China is actively seeking a global role; it may choose to exert influence through existing multilateral institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) or through China-designed vehicles (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative).
- If China invests and provides assistance through the IMF and World Bank, it will be subject to existing institutional constraints and its influence can be counterbalanced by other members; if it does not, it will be freer to act unilaterally.
- Reluctance of the United States and other countries to give China a greater voice in the Bretton Woods institutions heightens the danger of China building alternative institutions.
Policy implications and recommendations
Policy recommendations:
- Recognize the indispensability of leadership by the dominant power in crafting and sustaining stabilizing alliances and institutions.
- Incorporate rising powers constructively into existing arrangements to avoid exclusion that fuels destructive nationalism and geopolitical bifurcation.
- Engage rising powers through established multilateral institutions (for example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) so that their influence is subject to institutional constraints and can be counterbalanced.
- Be mindful that isolationist turns in US politics have occurred before; the critical question is whether current inward tendencies will prove temporary or enduring.
Barry Eichengreen, The Specter of Versailles, F&D Magazine, June 2019
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