Bailout and Conglomeration
August 1, 1999
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Summary
The paper suggests that when firms differ stochastically in their productivity, a bank may find it optimal not to bail out the failed nonconglomerate firms at all, but to bail out conglomerates fully. Expectation of such bailout policy may encourage risk-averse firms to join a conglomerate to minimize the risk of liquidation. Furthermore, in case of private information, bad firms follow good firms’ decision on conglomeration to hide their type. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of conglomeration on the debt-equity ratio and the expansion of existing conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions.
Subject: Bank bailouts, Banking, Productivity, Self-employment, Stocks
Keywords: debt-equity ratio, total output, WP
Pages:
29
Volume:
1999
DOI:
Issue:
108
Series:
Working Paper No. 1999/108
Stock No:
WPIEA1081999
ISBN:
9781451853087
ISSN:
1018-5941
