The IMF's Role in Asia: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? Remarks by Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, IMF
IMF News, July 10, 2002
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- Published: July 10, 2002
Overview and context
- Prepared text for remarks at the Institute of Policy Studies and Singapore Management University Forum, Singapore, July 10, 2002.
- Speaker: Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, International Monetary Fund.
- Central question: Is the IMF part of the problem or part of the solution in East Asia following the Asian crisis?
- Key framing: many changes at the IMF were undertaken in response to lessons learned from the Asian crisis; the institution is attempting to be "part of the solution."
Causes of the Asian crisis (as presented)
- Crisis resulted from interaction of several factors; academic work (including Professor Tan) cited.
- Criticism identified:
- Alleged zeal by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF in encouraging opening to short-term foreign capital in the mid-1990s.
- Entry and hasty exodus of foreign capital into economies whose financial and supervisory structures were ill-equipped.
- IMF response/clarifications:
- The IMF did not encourage countries to liberalize short-term flows through the banking sector.
- Many countries liberalized for domestic reasons (example cited: Thailand's desire to become an international financial center).
- Quote from the Bangkok Post (as cited): "it was the (Thai) Democrat party that opened up the Pandora's box with the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facility, a pompous name for a good idea that went wildly wrong."
IMF operational shortcomings identified during the crisis
- The IMF had issued private warnings ("yellow flags") to Thailand but did not forecast the extent, speed, or virulence of the downturn.
- Almost every aspect of core IMF operations "came in for scrutiny and criticism."
- The IMF "had not kept up with the rapid developments in international capital markets," prompting institutional changes.
Institutional reforms and surveillance enhancements
- New and strengthened measures implemented:
- Creation of an International Capital Markets department.
- Issuance of a quarterly Global Financial Stability Report on risks and vulnerabilities in capital markets.
- Regular informal dialogue through the Capital Market Consultative Group (CMCG) with internationally-active private institutions; CMCG meetings held in various financial centers, including in Asia.
- Development of standards and codes to assess countries against international benchmarks.
- Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), conducted jointly with the World Bank, using outside experts for international peer review.
- Production of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) to enhance coverage of institutional issues: data dissemination, fiscal transparency, monetary and financial policy transparency, and financial sector issues.
- Key statistic on ROSCs:
- "As of end-March, over 200 ROSC modules had been completed for over 70 countries (including 33 for APEC members), three-fourths of which had been published."
Crisis resolution framework improvements
- Three-pronged effort to strengthen crisis resolution:
- Better-informed and more systematic judgments about debt sustainability to decide between major debt restructuring and IMF/other support to restore confidence.
- Work to establish clearer definitions of conditions for and limits to access to IMF financing; recognition that the IMF "is not a global lender of last resort with the ability to create liquidity by issuing money."
- Development of ways to facilitate debt restructuring with less destruction of asset values and economic disruption:
- More ambitious use of collective action clauses; active effort to design model clauses.
- Complementary proposal by Anne Krueger for a new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).
Regional self-help and cooperation
- Recognition that IMF resources are limited; support for regional mechanisms:
- Asian initiatives cited: APEC, the Manila Framework Group, ASEAN, and the "Chiang Mai" initiative.
- These initiatives promote information exchange and policy dialogue as useful complements to global institutions like the IMF.
- Quote from deputy managing director Mr. Sugisaki (as cited): these efforts "can play a very useful role in helping to foster regional and global financial stability."
Macroeconomic policy advice—fiscal and monetary guidance
- Fiscal policy:
- Example: Thailand in July 1997 had a huge and growing current account deficit ("more than 8 percent of GDP") and large, unrecognized fiscal liabilities to recapitalize the financial system.
- IMF initially recommended a "roughly-unchanged fiscal position" for Thailand; once crisis scope became evident, IMF-supported programs featured large budget deficits, including increased spending on social safety net programs.
- Post-crisis fiscal advice emphasizes allowing automatic stabilizers to work and shielding vulnerable segments of the population.
- Monetary policy debate:
- IMF position: a temporary increase in interest rates may be necessary to restore financial stability during a crisis; this view has supporters and detractors.
- Quoted perspectives:
- Larry Summers: trade-off between raising interest rates to restore external confidence and providing liquidity for financial repair; "a classic problem of a single instrument and multiple targets."
- Rudi Dornbusch: "investors will take confidence and bring money back when they see fiscal conservatism and high interest rates. Do that for a few months and you are on the right track."
- Michael Mussa (cited): advocates of lowering interest rates at crisis onset are smoking something "not entirely legal".
- Ken Rogoff (current chief economist at time of remarks) contributed vigorously to the debate.
- Professional consensus (as characterized): "the costs of letting the exchange rate go are much higher than that of a temporary increase in interest rates."
- Conclusion: issue remains unsettled and requires honest debate and closer empirical work.
Conditionality reform
- Criticisms from Asian policymakers about the extent and intrusiveness of conditions attached to IMF-supported programs:
- Example: Philippines—"20 IMF programs in the last 40 years" and the 1998 program had "over 100 conditions in 8 areas"; some conditions were critical, others better handled by multilateral development banks.
- Indonesia example: certain structural measures "could have been postponed until our head was above water" (quote from Mr. Boediono).
- IMF responses:
- Movement toward streamlining conditionality: fewer and less intrusive conditions limited to areas critical to program goals.
- Exploration of "outcomes-based conditionality": disbursement tied to attainment of certain outcomes to reduce micro-management and give governments flexibility in policy choices.
- Effort to make programs flexible enough to allow countries choice in achieving agreed goals, invoking Deng Tsiao-Ping's advice: "it does not matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice."
- Process of review:
- Conditionality review involved open debate: conferences in Tokyo and elsewhere, invitations for comments through IMF website, reliance on staff experience and Executive Board judgment.
Conclusions and characterizations
- The IMF acknowledges missteps and surprises during the Asian crisis and has taken multiple steps to reform surveillance, crisis prevention, and crisis resolution.
- Reforms are recent and ongoing; they have not "transformed the IMF's way of doing business completely" but indicate a significant institutional effort to be part of the solution to Asia's challenges.
- Emphasis on measuring risks, better debt-sustainability analysis, clearer financing-access rules, regional cooperation, improved conditionality, and continued debate on monetary policy during crises.
Prepared text for remarks at the Institute of Policy Studies and Singapore Management University Forum, Singapore, July 10, 2002 — Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, International Monetary Fund.
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References
- Philippines and the IMF
- Singapore and the IMF
- Thailand and the IMF
- United States and the IMF
- Conditionality
- Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs)
- Speeches
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