Transcript of a Press Briefing On Update Of The World Economic Outlook

January 16, 2017

MS. NARDIN: Good morning and welcome to the presentation of the update of the World Economic Outlook here in Washington, DC. Here with me today are Maury Obstfeld, who is the Economic Counselor and the Director of the Research Department, Gian Milesi-Ferretti, who is a Deputy Director also in the Research Department, and Oya Celasun, who is the Chief of the World Economic Studies Division, also in the Research Department.

This is, of course, an Update of the WEO; the main document, the bigger document that covers all member countries and a number of issues, will be published as usual in April. This Update covers a smaller number of countries, so the team will limit the answers to the global outlook and to the countries that are included in the forecast. We invite all the journalists on line to submit their questions now.

Maury, please, if you want to offer some opening remarks and then we will take your questions.

MR. OBSTFELD: Thank you, Simonetta, and welcome everyone. An accumulation of recent data suggests that the global economic landscape started to shift in the second half of 2016. Developments since last summer indicate somewhat greater growth momentum coming into the new year in a number of important economies. Our earlier projection, that world growth will pick up from last year’s lackluster pace in 2017 and 2018, therefore looks increasingly likely to be realized. At the same time, we see a wider dispersion of risks to this short-term forecast, with those risks still tilted to the downside. Uncertainty has risen.

Our central projection is that global growth will rise to a rate of 3.4 percent in 2017 and 3.6 percent in 2018, from a 2016 rate of 3.1 percent. Much of the better growth performance we expect this year and next stems from improvements in some large emerging market and low income economies that in 2016 were exceptionally stressed. That being said, compared to our view in October, we now think that more of the lift will come from better prospects in the United States, China, Europe, and Japan.

A faster pace of expansion would be especially welcome this year: global growth in 2016 was the weakest since 2008-09, owing to a challenging first half marked initially by turmoil in world financial markets. General improvement got under way around mid-year. For example, broad indicators of manufacturing activity in emerging and advanced economies have been in expansionary territory and rising since early summer. In many countries, previous downward pressures on headline inflation weakened, in part owing to firming commodity prices.

A significant repricing of assets followed the U.S. presidential election. Its most notable elements were a sharp increase in U.S. longer-term interest rates, equity market appreciation and higher long-term inflation expectations in advanced economies, and sharp movements in opposite directions of the dollar—up—and the yen—down. At the same time, emerging market equity markets broadly retreated as currencies weakened.

Of course, asset markets adjust not just to unexpected current events, but to shifting expectations of future events. Most commentators have interpreted the post-election moves as predicting that U.S. fiscal policy will turn more expansionary and require a swifter pace of interest-rate increases by the Federal Reserve. Markets have noted that the White House and Congress are in the hands of the same party for the first time in six years, and that change points to lower tax rates and possibly higher infrastructure and defense spending.

In light of the U.S. economy’s momentum coming into 2017 and the likely shift in policy mix, we have moderately raised our two-year projections for U.S. growth. At this early stage, however, the specifics of future fiscal legislation remain unclear, as do the degree of net increase in government spending and the resulting impacts on aggregate demand, potential output, the Federal deficit, and the dollar. There is thus a wider than usual range of upside and downside risks to this forecast. A sustained non-inflationary growth increase, marked by higher labor-force participation and significant expansion of the U.S. capital stock and infrastructure, would allow a more moderate pace of interest-rate increases in line with the Federal Reserve’s price stability mandate. On the downside, if a fiscally-driven demand increase collides with more rigid capacity constraints, a steeper path for interest rates will be necessary to contain inflation, the dollar will appreciate sharply, real growth will be lower, budget pressure will increase, and the U.S. current account deficit will widen.

This last scenario, one with a widening of global imbalances, intensifies the risk of protectionist measures and retaliatory responses. It would also imply a faster than expected tightening of global financial conditions, with resulting possible stress on many emerging market and some low-income economies. Some emerging and especially low-income commodity exporters could benefit from higher export prices, but importers would then lose. The details of the U.S. policy mix matter; and as these become clearer, we will adjust our forecast and spillover assessment.

Among emerging economies, China remains a major driver of world economic developments. Our China growth upgrade for 2017 is a key factor underpinning the coming year’s expected faster global recovery. This change reflects an expectation of continuing policy support; but a sharp or disruptive slowdown in the future remains a risk given continuing rapid credit expansion, impaired corporate debts, and persistent government support for inefficient state-owned firms.

At the global level, other vulnerabilities include higher popular antipathy toward trade, immigration, and multilateral engagement in the United States and Europe; widespread high levels of public and private debt; ongoing climate change—which especially affects low-income countries; and, in a number of advanced countries, continuing slow growth and deflationary pressures. In Europe, Britain’s terms of exit from the European Union remain unsettled and the upcoming national electoral calendar is crowded, with possibilities of adverse economic repercussions, in the short and longer terms.

We continue to recommend a three-pronged policy approach relying on fiscal and structural policies alongside monetary policy, but one that is tailored to country circumstances.

Some advanced economies are now operating at close to full capacity, for example, Germany and the United States. In these, fiscal policy should focus, not on short-term demand support, but on increasing potential output through investments in needed infrastructure and skills, as well as supply-friendly, equitable tax reform. Policymakers in these economies should also turn their attention to longer-term fiscal sustainability, while monetary policy can follow a data-dependent normalizing path.

Structural reform remains a priority everywhere in view of continuing tepid productivity growth, although in many cases appropriate fiscal support can raise the effectiveness of reforms without worsening governments’ fiscal positions. Financial resilience is another universal priority and requires stronger financial regulatory frameworks, better focused on key problem areas. Countries can do much on their own to improve financial oversight and institutions, but not everything, and continuing multilateral financial regulatory cooperation is vital.

Social dislocation due to globalization and, even more, to technology change is a major challenge that will only intensify in the future. One result has been wider inequality and wage stagnation in many countries. Rolling back economic integration, however would impose aggregate economic costs without reducing the need for government investment in well-trained, nimble workforces, along with policies to promote better matching of available jobs to skills. On this Martin Luther King Jr. Day in the United States, we do well to acknowledge a key takeaway from 2016: sustainable growth must also be inclusive growth. And with that, we welcome your questions.

MS. NARDIN: Thank you very much. If you can please introduce yourself and ask your question. Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Hello, I was wondering, what makes you so upbeat about the U.S. and why do you think that the Trump administration will not make good on its threat to disrupt trade and to impose retaliatory measures on the Chinese or Mexican imports?

MR. OBSTFELD: We think the prospects of a more expansionary fiscal stance coupled with tax reform justifies some upgrade of the U.S. forecast, mostly for 2018. Now this is the short-term and longer-term we would have to worry about other fiscal repercussions, for example, if world deficits rise.

The possibility of trade disruptions is a downside risk to this forecast; it's an important downside risk. It is not in our baseline scenario largely because we think that at the end of the day countries will recognize that these actions are not in their own self-interest, especially when there's a threat of retaliation by other countries.

On the other hand, this could happen, it would derail our baseline forecast, possibly considerably, because the outbreak of a trade war could be quite disruptive.

MS. NARDIN: The next question right there.

QUESTIONER: And U.S. President Elect Donald Trump is seeking to label China as currency manipulator, and so how is your comment on this issue? And first, okay, in view of China's recent -- the currency depreciation, does the IMF still consider the Renminbi is still in line with the fundamentals? Thank you.

MR. OBSTFELD: You know, nothing I say should be construed on a comment on any statements made during any presidential campaign in any country, but I would point out generally that we, here at the Fund evaluate members' exchange rate policies through our Article IV Consultations and through our Annual External Sector Reports. You know, for China our last ESR released during the summer found that the exchange rate was broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

We will be doing a revised assessment of that, the normal calendar would be to do so this coming summer and see where things stand. You know, that being said, there is a wide range of structural reforms that we recommended for China, especially in terms of corporate debt put in state-owned enterprises on the basis of hard budget constraints that would lead to stronger and more sustainable growth in the future, and of course all of the structural features of economy and trade are interconnected.

MS. NARDIN: Right here

QUESTIONER: I was wondering if you give us some more detail on your markdowns in growth for some of the Latin American countries, particularly Mexico which got big markdowns in both 2017 and 2018. Brazil is not going to recover as fast as you previously hoped. I was wondering if you could explain the forces behind those moves, and is it due to tighter financial conditions or peso devaluation -- the peso falling? Thank you.

MS. NARDIN: If I may add, we also have a question on Mexico online that adding to these questions asks: what measures should the authority adopt to counter the forecast slowdown?

MR. OBSTFELD: So, I'll turn that over to Oya.

MS. CELASUN: Thank you, much. So, Mexico, you're right, we downgraded our forecast for '17 and '18 by about 0.5 percentage point, and the reason behind that is primarily tighter financial conditions, which has been a trend for all emerging market economies but a bit more pronounced in Mexico, where markets seem to be concerned about the uncertainty related to the future course of U.S. trade policies. And that has -- those tighter financial conditions have weighed on confidence, and therefore we project a somewhat weaker domestic spending.

What Mexico has to its advantage is a strong macroeconomic policy framework. They have a credible inflation-targeting regime, prudent fiscal policy, and they are benefiting from a flexible exchange rate. Their macro policies -- the authority's macro policies seem to be appropriate for the moment. They plan to continue with fiscal consolidation and they are calibrating monetary policy with a view to keep inflation expectation well anchored at their target range.

For Brazil, the reasons for the forecasts of the region are different, it's really what we already know, that in 2016 in the third quarter -- fourth quarter growth has been somewhat weaker than we had anticipated, so we have basically -- our expectations for stabilization and pick-up in growth, in activity are just pushed out a little bit.

QUESTIONER: First of all, I was wondering if you could comment on your latest view on Brexit. There's some concern over the weekend, and today, and it's affecting the pound, that perhaps the U.K. might take a hard Brexit approach, and in your view what would be consequences of that?

MR. OBSTFELD: Now, our view has been that the likely longer term effect of Brexit on the U.K. economy would be to reduce potential output, and therefore be negative. There has been quite a bit of uncertainty about what form the actual separation from the EU would take; how long it would take; what transitional agreements might be in place. And this has created, you know, in itself uncertainty about the outcome. Now, you know, to the extent that there is a quick resolution and that results uncertainty that in itself would be a good thing.

You know, on the other hand, we should recognize that there will be a disruption to trade and relationships. The British economy over the course of decades has become quite integrated with the single market and so there will be definite transitional costs. And to the extent that a hard Brexit restricts the flow of labor into the British economy, and we have to recognize that one of the elements in driving British growth has been, you know, an increasing labor supply. So, that’s likely to be a pretty complex and we will, you know, continue to evaluate what they might be as the ultimate outline of a settlement becomes clearer.

QUESTIONER: Sorry, a quick follow-up on the [U.S.] President Elect's statements on the possibility of an increased border tax. I know you’ve done some work in the past on how increased tariffs might impact the U.S. economy. The Republicans in the House are looking at a border adjustability tax. Have you evaluated some of these scenarios and how they might impact the U.S. and its major trading partners? And what are your thoughts on that?

MR. OBSTFELD: I think it's a little premature to get into the details of that, given where the discussion is now. You know, big picture is that academic economists have looked at forms of the sort of tax, in particular a destination- based cash flow tax, which involves border taxation and, you know, bipartisan analyses point to some positive features in terms of simplification of business taxes which the Fund has supported; and reducing the opportunities for profit shifting.

On the other hand, the devil is really in the details here, and until we know the whole tax picture -- and one of the features of tax systems is they tend to be complex, and the various features can interact in ways that have unintended consequences- we can't really do an evaluation. And additional big issue with border tax, and this is also an issue with tariffs, which is not always thought about, is the macroeconomic impact, and that is really not that well understood, and there hasn’t been much empirical or modeling research on that. You know, we are now in the process of trying to look at those macro impacts under alternative scenarios and see just what they imply for variables like inflation and output in the shorter and longer horizons. And we are not the only institutions that's doing that kind of research, so we hope we can have more. In a few months we have more specifics on what the tax proposals will be.

MS. NARDIN: Let's move to our colleagues that are online now. First from Saudi Arabia, and then on Africa. On Saudi Arabia: can you please elaborate on the reasons behind cutting the 2017 forecast even as the expected rise in oil prices provide room for government spending, and what is the forecast for non-oil economy growth in 2017?

And another question, if we think the slowdown in Saudi Arabia's economy will impact aid to other countries and investments in the region.

MR. MILESI-FERRETTI: Well, clearly, Saudi Arabia relies on oil revenues for a very sizable fraction of its exports and its government revenues, and, hence, the impact of lower oil prices on the economy is very strong. And we have seen, indeed, in 2016 a very sharp slowdown in growth. We had growth just of 1.4 percent.

The forecast for 2017 depends, of course, on the behavior of both the oil part of the economy and the non-oil part of the economy.

As in regard to the oil part of the economy, we have the impact of the agreement between major producers which is an agreement to curtail to some extent oil supply, and hence less oil production is going to mean less output from the oil sector even if prices are a little bit higher.

With regard to the non-oil economy, Saudi Arabia is embarking on a very ambitious structural reform program, but also a very sizeable fiscal consolidation because of the decline in oil revenues. So there is a big adjustment in spending downwards. There is an adjustment in taxes upwards, and as a result the non-oil growth is not going to be as buoyant as it was during period of strong oil prices.

Clearly, a bit higher oil prices help on the revenue front, but there is a lot of ground to be made in order to close the fiscal deficit that has opened with the decline in oil prices.

With regard to spillovers, the choice, budgetary choices of authorities that we will have to see in the coming years, but the general trend is clearly a trend towards lower spending given the very sharp decline in revenues.

MS. NARDIN: Thank you, we have a couple of questions from Africa. On South Africa, what are the major factors that the IMF believes will inhibit growth in South Africa, and what would improve this outlook? On Kenya, how exactly would the growth prospects of the U.S. growth affect low income economies in Africa, especially importers such as Kenya.

We also have a question on Zimbabwe which is specific to the country, but Zimbabwe is not covered on the outlook. So South Africa, and then the importers in Africa.

MS. CELASUN: Okay, thank you. On the question on South Africa's outlook, what we saw in 2016 was that growth was stuck in low gear. It's going to improve somewhat next year to a still-weak pace of recovery of .8 percent, and then improve a bit further.

So what's allowing for higher growth will be better power provision, which was a factor holding back growth recently. And going beyond that it will also be the fact that macro policies will be shifting towards a more neutral stance from the contractive stance they've had and they are likely to have in the near term. Beyond cyclical factors including the decline in commodity prices, structural factors have also been weighing on growth and are projected to do so going forward. Those include, importantly, power provision issues which the authorities are addressing, but also an inadequate level and mix of skills in the economy, and more recently also policy uncertainty.

So looking ahead, more inclusive labor market policies, more education, broad-based reforms to education are need to boost growth.

On the question on Kenya and the outlook on low income economies, how that would be affected by developments in the U.S., if I understood the question correctly. Stronger growth in the U.S. means more demand for the products of these economies so that's a positive for their growth.

At the same time, we've highlighted in the report, and Mr. Obstfeld has highlighted in his remarks, that faster than expected tightening of financial conditions is a factor, and it's increasingly a factor, a negative factor, could be a negative for countries like Kenya that are increasingly integrating into global financial markets. So that's another thing to watch.

QUESTIONER: Higher growth in the United States is correct and Dow continues to rise, and interest rates rise in the United States, what will be the impact on the key emerging markets in terms of their growth and their (inaudible).

MR. OBSTFELD: You know, in our forecasts, we actually, our growth forecast for 2017 and 2018 is actually unchanged from October. In October, we also predicted an upturn in 2017 and 2018. We had been downgrading for a while. But just to clarify, the aggregate forecast is the same. We do think more of the lifting will be done by advanced economies and China than by other economies than we did in October, but the forecast is the same.

In terms of the dollar, the more expansionary policy mix in the U.S. if it materializes has two effects on emerging markets. First of all, to the extent that U.S. growth is faster, U.S. demand is faster, I should say, that is going to spill over onto some emerging markets with positive effects.

You know, at the same time, to the extent that emerging market currencies depreciate against the dollar they become competitive, that could help their exports. These things kind of go together.

Where we worry is in two areas. Number one, does a much stronger dollar and the bigger U.S. deficit, and more pressure on the U.S. manufacturing sector lead to more pressures for protection in the global economy as global imbalances rise.

Secondly is what Oya just mentioned, the financial tightening angle - emerging markets facing higher financing costs. Some of them with dollar-denominated debts, particularly emerging market corporates, could find it somewhat higher to pay those debts, and that would be a negative for those countries.

So the factors giving rise to a stronger dollar have effects that go in different ways, and that interact in complicate manner, but we worry, of course, about the downside of that scenario.

MS. NARDIN: An online a similar question, focusing on the risk to growth in the U.S from a stronger dollar.

MR. OBSTFELD: Well, again, if a stronger dollar is driven by U.S. demand, then in the aggregate, U.S. economy will be growing faster. The sectoral effects of that may be complicated. More services growth, less manufacturing growth, the current account deficit. But in the aggregate, we will have growth. How it will be distributed is going to be another question.

Where there would be a risk is if bigger global imbalances and sharper movements in exchange rates lead to greater protectionist pressures and a trade war scenario. During that scenario, all countries would lose out.

QUESTIONER: (Off mic) What do the Mexican authorities need to do in order to respond or to -- well, basically, yeah, basically to respond to any event in the U.S. You say that in spite of this revision, Mexico is still a country attractive to foreign investors and it keeps some of the solid macro fundamentals. But we had seen some events that keep nervous towards Mexico, especially the deal with the four companies, the carmakers Obviously, we’re talking about hundreds of job losses. My question is before this situation what did the authorities had to do in order to respond to this? And how careful do they need to be considering that the recent increase in gasoline price was not well received and apparently that was part of the response to the Mexican government to the loss of revenues.

MS. CELASUN: So, you’re right, the uncertainty as we just discussed as a factor -- this could weigh on investment in Mexico. We discussed that that was a factor weighing on our forecast going forward. On the policies, I would just repeat that what’s very important is the framework, and it’s one that allows for negative shocks to be cushioned. The depreciation that we’ve seen over the course of the last year is actually something that helps to cushion the external shock. And it’s coupled with credible monetary policy that keeps inflation at home anchored. So, I think the answer is the same as the one we had before.

MS. NARDIN: I’ll take one question online and then we’ll come back here to the room. There are several questions on Italy They all regard the forecast for Italy. Basically, what can the government do since Italy is the only case among the G7 countries and one of the few Eurozone that has been downgraded.

MR. OBSTFELD: I’ll take that. Italy has had low growth for some years and the Renzi government made some very important structural reforms which are very positive for Italy, but more needs to be done in that dimension for sure.

One issue for Italy in particular is the position of its banks and the banking troubles which if they could be solved more effectively would allow the banks to give more support to the economy and also lead to higher growth.

Once again, the Italian government has made some very important reforms in this area on loan workouts and promoting consolidation in the banking sector. These reforms need to be implemented in full and there is room for more to be done in terms of, for example, promoting out of court loan workouts, assessing the smaller banks not covered under the ECB’s comprehensive assessment, etcetera. There is more room for banking reform in Italy, for dealing with non-performing loans, and if previous actions were built upon that that would be a plus in terms of Italy’s growth.

MS. NARDIN: Thank you. A question here.

QUESTIONER: If I may, I would like to follow up on the U.S. because I’m a bit surprised because for instance the World Bank decided that the uncertainty about the Trump policy were so high that they refuse actually to update their forecast for the U.S. And you at the IMF seem to grant the incoming administration the benefit of the doubt and you seem to say that they are going to make good on their commitments to decrease the corporate tax in their infrastructural plan but not on the trade wars. I was wondering what makes you so optimistic about that actually?

MR. OBSTFELD: Well, the big change in the U.S. is that we now have a presidency and the legislative branch in the same hands. It seemed very clear to us on the basis of past experience that at least some of these promises can and will be delivered on, and therefore we would be ignoring reality to say, well, everything is uncertain. Everything is not uncertain. I think we know the direction of policies. What we don’t know are the specifics of those policies and so we opted for a moderate increase in line with that uncertainty.

There are also great uncertainties not just the policies, but about fiscal multipliers at this stage of the cycle, the amount of slack in the U.S. economy, et cetera. So, this is not necessarily a move to endorse any set of policies. We would have to see what the policies are, how they affect government debt, for example. If the result is a large increase in the U.S. debt, that would go contrary to what we have been advising which is to try to bring down the debt-to-GDP ratio over time.

In terms of trade policy, I would say there is not a similar unity of view within the U.S. government. And some of the polices that have been suggested would actually inflict quite a bit of harm on the U.S. itself even without retaliation. So, we therefore do view those as downsides. Sometimes these things happen. But not nearly as likely to happen as some degree of fiscal expansion.

QUESTIONER: I just had a brief follow up. If you would talk to the Trump administration, or the incoming administration, they would hope for a much bigger growth from that sort of fiscal stimulus than the 2.5 percent that you’ve forecast for 2018. Just wondering if you could comment on the size of the fiscal stimulus that you have assumed here. Is it quite a bit less than sort of what we might otherwise expect from the administration?

MR. OBSTFELD: Yes, I mean, we looked at a range of scenarios here. Different tax policies have different multipliers and lead to different changes in the fiscal impulse. Our assessment, based on where we think we are in the U.S., business cycle is that most of what it is reasonable to expect in terms of policies would end up being around what we have projected.

Now, that leaves upsides as well as downsides, but of course there are all those who will be more optimistic about the amount of slack in the economy and those that will be less optimistic. And the fact is we are uncertain. The forecast reflects our view of what is most likely to happen.

MS. NARDIN: Let’s go back online What are reasons for downward revisions for India’s economy and when do you expect the economy to bounce back?

MR. OBSTFELD: The big factor in the short term has been the currency reform which apparently has led to some cash shortage in the economy. When people are short of cash and don’t know when they can get it, they tend to hoard, they tend to spend less, the economic wheels are less greased. Even with our downgrade, India’s growth rate remains substantial. We think some of this will persist into the following year’s forecast with a strong bounce back after that, because this is likely to be a temporary factor.

That being said, the government can help by ensuring that cash supplies are adequate for the transactions the economy needs to carry out. You know, we do agree with the general goal that motivated this which is reducing the extent of illicit transactions in the economy.

MS. NARDIN: Thank you very much. One question here

QUESTIONER: Yeah, question about Fed policy. Obviously lot is changing in Washington these days. And one of the proposals that seems to be on the table on the republican side is for the Fed to, at some point, apply the Taylor Rule in a stricter fashion.

Just wondering what your thoughts are on that? What would be the benefits and disadvantages of that approach?

MR. OBSTFELD: You know, it -- it’s a little bit disingenuous to speak about the Taylor Rule because, you know, the basic idea of the Taylor Rule is to respond to output gaps and inflationary expectations and that’s precisely what the Fed does. Doing so with legislated or predetermined weights, I think, would tie them in a way that would prevent them from responding to structural changes in the economy that their research indicated were ongoing. So, you know, we think the Fed has become much more transparent in terms of its goals, its objectives, which are, of course, those embodied in its dual mandates and how it attains them. You know, there have been many innovations in the past few years, such as press conferences by the Chair, et cetera, which increased transparency.

It’s very important that the Fed’s independence from the political process be maintained because allowing more political control of the Fed, would unfortunately as history shows, not necessarily lead to better performance in terms of inflation and output.

MS. NARDIN: Thank you very much, I’ll take one last question online which mentions the very high level of global debt and with interest rates rising - is this pointing to problems ahead and in which countries and sectors are the problems most pronounced.

I also wanted to acknowledge questions on Australia, Argentina, Malaysia. These are countries that are not covered in the outlook so we will follow up with these colleagues separately.

MR. OBSTFELD: Okay, the Fiscal Monitor that we put out in the fall surveyed the global debt scene and it was a somewhat worrying perspective in terms of both government and privates sector debt.

There is a lot of debt out there. It does present an overhang to the world economy. The surest way to ease the burden is to through structural reforms that increase growth, through smart fiscal policies that are growth friendly and equitable, and prudent fiscal frameworks might help also keep debts from rising further over time, unless justified by output growth.

This will put the debt to GDP ratios on a declining path and as I said in my remarks, some countries, those where the immediate output gaps have been reduced sufficiently really need to start worrying about demographics and how that will impact fiscal sustainability in the longer term.

You know, in terms of corporate debt, our main worries would be those cases in which we have, for example, emerging market corporates with significant foreign currency debts which might make them vulnerable to the financial tightening that could occur and is one of our downside risks.

I think one important fact to keep in mind in this whole discussion is that in many countries, tax systems favor debt finance over equity finance and the -- it’s hard to justify that in terms of the economics. Reform in that area would certainly help to mitigate the problem.

MS. NARDIN: Thank you very much. This concludes the press conference for this wheel update. I wanted to thank Maury, Gian Maria, and Oya and all the colleagues here in the room and online and the next wheel will be published as usual. Thank you all very much.

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