Transcript of the Background Briefing on the Short-term Liquidity Line
IMF News, May 8, 2020
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Transcript of the Background Briefing on the Short-term Liquidity Line
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Published: May 8, 2020
Overview and context
- Event: Background Briefing on the Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL).
- Date: May 8, 2020.
- SLL approved by the Executive Board on April 15, to further strengthen the global financial safety net as part of the Fund's COVID-19 response.
- Embargo: documents and the call were under embargo until 12:30 p.m. on the day of the briefing.
Purpose and principal features of the SLL
- Designed as a liquidity backstop for members with very strong policy frameworks and fundamentals.
- Intended to address moderate, short-term liquidity needs arising from external shocks that can come suddenly and without much warning.
- Revolving facility: the line can be drawn on repeatedly and repaid as liquidity needs abate.
- Signal value: SLL approval serves as an endorsement of a country’s current policy framework to domestic and international financial markets.
- Intended use: to be one instrument among a range of financing options countries pursue (e.g., capital markets, other facilities).
Eligibility, qualifying characteristics, and target universe
- Qualification mirrors aspects of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL): countries with established market access and high-quality policy frameworks.
- Exclusions cited: concessional-lending countries and countries with easy access to reserve-issuing currencies (for instance, Euro Area countries are excluded).
- Order-of-magnitude estimate for the potential universe of qualifying countries: "somewhere between 10 and 20."
- Emphasis on "platinum quality" policy frameworks as the target profile.
Relationship with other IMF instruments and external facilities
- SLL complements existing toolkit (including FCL and emergency instruments):
- FCL: for countries facing very large potential or actual balance-of-payments shocks.
- SLL: for short-term, moderate-sized liquidity pressures; cheaper than the FCL and revolving.
- Transition possibilities:
- Countries could move from FCL to SLL when large risks abate.
- Countries could move from SLL to FCL if shocks prove larger than anticipated, subject to Board decision and qualification.
- Interaction with central bank swap lines and other external facilities was a topic of past debate; members raised questions on how SLL would interact with swap lines.
Expected demand and take-up considerations
- Blog post mentioned potential demand of "up to 50 billion."
- Management reported ongoing discussions with several potential clients and openness among countries to dialogue with the Fund.
- Historical uptake reference: FCL had limited take-up (noted recipients included Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco for precautionary and liquidity lines at the time of discussion).
- Stigma concerns:
- Acknowledged that stigma had affected uptake historically (e.g., FCL uptake limited).
- SLL design elements intended to reduce stigma: revolving nature, offer-based approach, and under certain conditions the agreement could be signed by the central bank only.
Governance, Board deliberations, and speed of adoption
- SLL concept had been discussed several years earlier (referred to as a short-term liquidity swap) but lacked prior consensus.
- Membership debate covered novelty, potential users, and interaction with other instruments.
- Rapid adoption in 2020: concept moved from prior work to Executive Board endorsement in a matter of two weeks.
- Internal remark: comparable institutional innovations are rare; last similar instrument change was "10 or so years ago, maybe even longer."
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), PRGT, and broader liquidity strategies
- SDRs remain part of the broader discussion on liquidity provision:
- Voluntary trading/exchanges of SDRs continue to be facilitated by the IMF.
- Precedent exists for countries loaning SDRs to the PRGT to support concessional lending.
- Challenge identified: many SDRs are held by developed economies that may not need them; mobilizing those SDRs for poorer countries is a policy objective.
- PRGT resource needs:
- Management noted more than "a hundred" countries have approached the IMF for emergency financing.
- The PRGT needed additional resources to meet expected demands; a call for PRGT resources was made and "some are materializing quickly."
- No specific new SDR-allocation decision was announced; membership debate on a new SDR allocation remains robust and some members are skeptical.
Debt sustainability, countries with unsustainable debt, and Argentina example
- For countries where lending may be infeasible because debt is unsustainable, IMF management will "look for solutions that can unlock critical financing."
- Argentina:
- IMF engagement with Argentine authorities has been ongoing and described as "productive."
- IMF officials emphasized hope for a debt-agreement with private creditors that would restore debt sustainability.
- Officials declined to comment on specific negotiations or to disclose the details of ongoing discussions.
Operational and communication details from the briefing
- Moderator: Maria Candia, Communications Department.
- Participants identified generically as IMF Official #1 and IMF Official #2 (SLL expert).
- Media rules: discussion conducted on background with comments attributable to IMF Official; embargo in place until 12:30 p.m.
- A request to extend embargo to 1:00 p.m. was denied; embargo remained 12:30 p.m.
Transcript of the Background Briefing on the Short-term Liquidity Line, May 8, 2020, IMF Communications Department.