Japan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2024 Article IV Mission
IMF News, February 9, 2024
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- Published: February 9, 2024
Overview
- The Japanese economy continues to recover from the pandemic.
- Inflation: initially driven by cost-push factors, now becoming demand driven with the output gap closed and labor shortages intensifying.
- Near-term focus: tighten fiscal policy and wind down unconventional monetary policy, while maintaining financial stability.
- Medium-term priority: rebuild fiscal buffers, strengthen the fiscal framework, and advance structural reforms, with labor market reforms at the forefront.
Recent developments, outlook, and risks
Findings
- Output gap: estimated to have closed.
- Core inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) seems to have peaked at a high level and is becoming demand driven.
- Measures of underlying inflation show current above-target inflation is broad-based across products and services for the first time in three decades.
- Wages: rising, albeit less than inflation, amid labor shortages.
Projections and near-term outlook
- Growth is projected to decelerate in 2024 due to fading one-off factors that supported 2023 (including a surge in inbound tourism).
- Japan’s preparedness will help mitigate the economic impact of the Noto Peninsula Earthquake.
- Core inflation is expected to decline gradually as the effect of higher import prices wanes.
- A closed output gap and increasing nominal wages will keep core inflation above the two-percent target until the second half of 2025.
- Primary fiscal deficit: will remain sizable in 2024, reflecting the impact of the latest fiscal stimulus package.
- Current account surplus: expected to increase in 2024, supported by higher exports and lower import prices.
- External position: assessed as broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
Risks
- Growth downside risks: slowdown in the global economy, deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, more volatile food and energy prices; domestic risks include continued low real household income growth if inflation outpaces wage growth, more acute labor shortages, and a return to a zero-inflation environment.
- Growth upside risks: additional recovery of inbound tourism and a stronger global economy.
- Inflation upside risks: backward-looking inflation expectations and significantly stronger-than-expected wages following the spring wage negotiations.
- Inflation downside risks: faster decline in global goods and import prices and weaker-than-expected increases in wages in the spring negotiation.
Fiscal policy
Assessments
- Given a closed output gap and high debt-to-GDP ratio, the large, not-well-targeted fiscal stimulus in the November package was not warranted.
- The untargeted income tax cut: expected to have a limited impact on growth and to worsen debt dynamics.
- Energy subsidies: can distort energy consumption and hamper decarbonization; should be replaced with targeted transfers to vulnerable households.
- Under current policies, public debt-to-GDP ratio will increase steadily in the long term to accommodate age-related spending pressures.
- Sovereign risk and debt sustainability analysis: gross financing needs are elevated but rollover risks are mitigated by the large domestic investor base and by the debt profile; overall risk of debt distress assessed as moderate.
Policy priorities
- Fiscal consolidation is needed to rebuild fiscal buffers and ensure debt sustainability, underpinned by both revenue and expenditure measures.
- Limit untargeted transfers with a low fiscal multiplier and phase out energy subsidies while mobilizing revenues to offset additional expenditure.
Revenue mobilization (options listed)
- i) unifying and increasing the consumption tax rate;
- ii) strengthening financial income taxation for high-income earners;
- iii) reinforcing property taxation by eliminating preferential treatment for residential land;
- iv) rationalizing allowances and deductions in personal income taxation;
- v) increasing premiums for social insurance.
Health expenditure reforms (options listed)
- i) an increase in copayments for high-income or wealthy seniors;
- ii) higher usage of generic or over-the-counter drugs;
- iii) increased adoption of prescription refilling;
- iv) enhanced preventative medical care;
- v) more targeted covered services and drugs.
Children-related spending
- Limited evidence that untargeted cash transfers are effective in supporting fertility; enhance efficiency through expansion of childcare facilities and workstyle and labor market reforms to close gender gaps.
SME support
- Some pandemic-related measures and subsidies remain; comprehensive assessment needed to rationalize expenditure and improve productivity.
Medium-term fiscal framework recommendations
- Strengthen the medium-term fiscal framework as part of the review planned in FY2024.
- More realistic assumptions: base fiscal policy planning on realistic assumptions on growth, revenue, and expenditure; consider tasking an independent fiscal council with evaluating macro projections.
- Governance of state funds: set a clear exit plan for each state fund; approximately one-third of state funds do not have a specified termination point.
- Discipline supplementary budgets: reform the budget process so expansionary supplementary budgets are limited to unexpected large economic shocks.
Monetary policy
Findings
- Return of sustained inflation reflects: (i) higher inflation expectations for a prolonged period for the first time in decades; (ii) the highest base wage growth since 1995 amid intensifying labor shortages; (iii) a historical high degree of monetary policy accommodation—with a real interest rate much lower than the estimated neutral rate along with balance sheet accommodation.
- BoJ has been appropriately cautious given Japan’s history of deflation and mixed signals from recent data.
- BoJ’s recent policy adjustments (allowing 10-year yield to be more flexible) have: (i) helped curb excessive expansion of the BoJ’s JGB purchases and unintended side-effects on bond market functioning; (ii) will support financial institutions’ profitability and stability by potentially reducing incentives for exposure to riskier asset portfolios; (iii) will allow for a smoother exit from unconventional monetary policy in the near future.
Policy recommendations
- The BoJ should consider exiting Yield Curve Control (YCC) and ending Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) now while gradually raising short-term policy rates thereafter.
- Exit the YCC and QQE framework: officially exiting would simplify communication; the BoJ could continue to reinvest maturing JGBs to avoid abrupt shifts in bond market conditions and sharp increases in term premiums.
- Shift to the short-term policy rate as the main policy instrument: if staff’s baseline inflation forecast bears out, the BoJ should gradually raise the policy rate over its policy horizon (i.e., three years).
- Approach: gradual and well-communicated to anchor market expectations while keeping monetary policy and financial conditions accommodative and allowing time to confirm incoming data.
Mitigating risks and operational measures
- The BoJ may need to make state-contingent purchases of JGBs and implement other targeted and temporary measures to ensure sufficient liquidity support for relevant financial markets.
- A clear and effective communication strategy is key to minimize disruption and outward spillovers to other sovereign debt markets.
- Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime will help absorb shocks and support monetary policy’s focus on price stability and maintaining an external position in line with fundamentals.
Safeguarding financial stability
Findings
- Japanese financial system has withstood recent shocks, aided by strong capital and liquidity buffers and policy support.
- Credit provision to the private sector has remained robust since the pandemic.
- Key macro-financial risks: abrupt slowdown in global growth, a surge in inflationary pressures leading to higher interest rates and market volatility.
- Vulnerabilities: sizable holdings by financial institutions of securities under mark-to-market accounting; some banks’ notable foreign currency exposures; signs of overheating in parts of the real estate markets.
FSAP and resilience
- Systemic risk analysis (FSAP): financial system broadly resilient but some institutions may be vulnerable under an adverse scenario (low global growth and high inflation).
- Liquidity risks: contained at the system level but some banks could face pressure due to sizable foreign currency exposures.
- Climate risk: banks have notable exposures to emission intensive sectors but at a system level may be resilient to a transition to net zero emissions by 2050.
Recommendations to strengthen frameworks
- Develop a more advanced risk-based approach to bank supervision.
- Set appropriate minimum liquidity requirements for all banks and tailor capital requirements to individual bank risk profiles.
- Establish a framework of comprehensive risk-based and proactive supervision for insurers.
- Strengthen macroprudential framework: clarify the mandate of the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability and expand the macroprudential toolkit.
- Enhance regulatory and supervisory frameworks for cybersecurity.
- Subject more banks to recovery and resolution planning requirements.
- Continue to ensure an effective recovery and resolution (planning) regime for insurers and central clearing counterparties (CCPs) consistent with international standards and guidance.
- Priority: significantly increase staffing resources to enhance supervision and resolution of financial institutions.
Structural policies
Priority areas
- Need further structural reforms to support fertility, promote female leaders, advance a more equal society, accelerate startups and innovation, and transition to a green economy; labor market reforms are central.
Supporting fertility and female labor force participation
- Expand childcare facilities and resources, particularly for children below the age of two; attract foreign workers (e.g., nursery teachers) to address shortages.
- Facilitate fathers’ contribution to home/child-care; offer stronger incentives for paternity leave.
- Reform employment practices: expand telework and flexible working schedules to support women with young children and allow men to share home-care burden.
- Labor market reforms: reduce labor-market dualism, encourage merit-based promotions, and facilitate job mobility to expand career prospects for women.
Advancing a more equal society
- Market income inequality has increased and is close to the OECD average.
- Redistributive social transfers have lowered income inequality, but with high public debt limiting scope for broad-based spending, social transfers should be better targeted.
- Reforms to reduce labor market dualism and remove disincentives in the social security system that limit working hours are more sustainable ways to achieve equality.
Accelerating startups and innovation
- Japan’s startup ecosystem has grown but startups tend to be smaller with relatively low venture capital equity funding as a share of GDP.
- Better access to equity funding, a more flexible labor market, and a shift away from the lifelong employment system could encourage entrepreneurship and dynamic firm entry and exit.
Transitioning to a green economy
- Additional policies needed to reach climate targets.
- Expanding carbon pricing and introducing carbon credits trading are broadly in line with previous staff advice, but further clarifications on planned measures are needed.
- Protect the vulnerable from distributional effects of carbon pricing.
- Phase out untargeted subsidies for gas, electricity, and fuel to support the transition.
Continuing other reforms
- Continue digitalization and corporate governance reforms: Digital Agency should coordinate public sector digitalization; improve data sharing between central and local governments and standardize local government IT systems to improve targeting of transfers.
- Ensure effective corporate governance practices and improved disclosure standards.
- Work actively with international partners to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system.
- Industrial policies (IP) should be narrow and cautious; avoid favoring domestic producers or creating fragmentation of the global system for trade and investment.
Key statistics (selected; values preserved exactly as presented)
- Nominal GDP: US$ 4,256 Billion (2022)
- GDP per capita: US$ 34,005 (2022)
- Population: 125 Million (2022)
- Quota: SDR 30.8 billion (2022)
- Real GDP growth (2020): -4.1
- Real GDP growth (2021): 2.6
- Real GDP growth (2022): 1.0
- Real GDP growth (2023): 1.9
- Real GDP growth (2024): 0.8
- Domestic demand (2020): -3.3
- Private consumption (2020): -4.4
- Gross Private Fixed Investment (2020): -5.4
- Business investment (2020): -4.9
- Residential investment (2020): -7.7
- Government consumption (2020): 2.4
- Public investment (2020): 3.5
- Output Gap (2020): -2.9
- Headline CPI inflation (2021): 3.3
- GDP deflator (2021): 4.0
- GDP deflator (2022): 3.0
- Government revenue (2020): 35.5
- Government revenue (2021): 36.4
- Government revenue (2022): 37.6
- Government revenue (2023): 36.5
- Government revenue (2024): 35.8
- Government expenditure (2020): 44.5
- Government expenditure (2021): 42.5
- Government expenditure (2022): 41.9
- Government expenditure (2023): 42.1
- Government expenditure (2024): 42.2
- Government expenditure (2025): 39.5
- Overall Balance (2020): -9.1
- Overall Balance (2021): -6.1
- Overall Balance (2022): -5.6
- Overall Balance (2023): -6.4
- Overall Balance (2024): -3.0
- Primary balance (2020): -8.4
- Primary balance (2021): -5.5
- Primary balance (2022): -3.9
- Primary balance (2023): -6.3
- Primary balance (2024): -2.8
- Structural primary balance (2020): -7.5
- Structural primary balance (2021): -4.8
- Public debt, gross (2020): 258.3
- Public debt, gross (2021): 253.9
- Public debt, gross (2022): 248.7
- Public debt, gross (2023): 251.7
- Public debt, gross (2024): 251.6
- Public debt, gross (2025): 250.2
- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2020): 151.8
- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2021): 155.0
- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2022): 159.4
- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2023): 154.3
- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2024): 153.5
- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2025): 153.8
- Current account balance (2020, in billions of USD): 149.9
- Current account balance (2021, in billions of USD): 196.4
- Current account balance (2022, in billions of USD): 84.5
- Current account balance (2023, in billions of USD): 148.4
- Current account balance (2024, in billions of USD): 160.1
- Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2020): 3.9
- Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2021): 2.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2022): 3.7
- Trade balance (2020, in billions of USD): 26.6
- Trade balance (2021, in billions of USD): 16.4
- Trade balance (2022, in billions of USD): -117.5
- Trade balance (2023, in billions of USD): -50.7
- Trade balance (2024, in billions of USD): -24.4
- Trade balance (2025, in billions of USD): -30.4
- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2020, in billions of USD): 630.6
- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2021, in billions of USD): 749.2
- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2022, in billions of USD): 751.8
- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2023, in billions of USD): 708.0
- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2024, in billions of USD): 733.9
- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2025, in billions of USD): 768.7
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2020, in billions of USD): 604.0
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2021, in billions of USD): 732.7
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2022, in billions of USD): 869.4
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2023, in billions of USD): 758.7
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2024, in billions of USD): 758.3
- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2025, in billions of USD): 799.1
- Energy imports (2020, in billions of USD): 89.1
- Energy imports (2021, in billions of USD): 127.8
- Energy imports (2022, in billions of USD): 195.5
- Energy imports (2023, in billions of USD): 162.2
- Energy imports (2024, in billions of USD): 155.1
- Energy imports (2025, in billions of USD): 146.1
- Change in reserves (2020, in billions of USD): 10.9
- Change in reserves (2021, in billions of USD): 62.8
- Change in reserves (2022, in billions of USD): -47.4
- Change in reserves (2023, in billions of USD): 11.5
- Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1348.2 (2020)
- Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1356.2 (2021)
- Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1178.3 (2022)
- Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2020): 106.8
- Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2021): 109.8
- Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2022): 131.5
- Yen/euro rate (period average, 2020): 121.9
- Yen/euro rate (period average, 2021): 129.9
- Yen/euro rate (period average, 2022): 138.6
- Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2020): 75.3
- Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2021): 73.5
- Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2022): 62.0
- Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2020): 77.3
- Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2021): 70.7
- Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2022): 61.0
- Population Growth (2020): -0.4
- Old-age dependency (2020): 48.3
- Old-age dependency (2021): 48.7
- Old-age dependency (2022): 48.9
- Old-age dependency (2023): 49.3
- Old-age dependency (2024): 49.8
- Old-age dependency (2025): 50.3
IMF staff concluding statement, Japan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2024 Article IV Mission (February 8, 2024).