Mission Concluding Statement 

Washington, DC: Saudi Arabia’s economy has demonstrated strong resilience to shocks, with non-oil economic activities expanding, inflation contained, and unemployment reaching record-low levels. While lower oil proceeds and investment-linked imports led to the emergence of twin deficits, external and fiscal buffers remain ample. A higher-than-budgeted fiscal stance in 2025 remains appropriate to prevent procyclicality that could exacerbate the growth impact of lower oil prices. Addressing strong credit growth and associated funding pressures will be crucial in mitigating risks to systemic financial stability. Given the current heightened global uncertainty, continued efforts on structural reform are essential to sustain non-oil growth and drive economic diversification.

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS[1]

Saudi Arabia’s economy has been resilient to shocks. In 2024, non-oil real GDP grew by 4.2 percent, primarily driven by private consumption and non-oil private investment, with retail, hospitality, and construction leading growth. Repeated extensions of the OPEC+ production cuts have kept oil output at 9 million barrels per day (mb/d)—the lowest level since 2011— resulting in a 4.4 percent decline in oil GDP and an overall real growth rate of 1.8 percent. The composite PMI indicates sustained activity in Q1 2025, with the latest Q1 GDP estimate showing non-oil activities expanding by 4.9 percent year-on-year.

The labor market’s strong momentum continues. The unemployment rate for Saudi nationals has declined to a record low of 7 percent in 2024, surpassing the original Vision 2030 target, which has now been revised down to 5 percent. The improvement is broad-based, with both youth and female unemployment halved over a four-year period. Private sector employment surged by 12 percent on average in 2024, while public sector hiring continued to slow, reflecting a redeployment to non-government entities.

Inflation is contained as rent inflation decelerates. Despite a small pick-up to 2.3 percent in April 2025, headline inflation remains low, helped by high real interest rates. Declining prices for transport and communication helped offset housing rent inflation, which has decelerated for the 6^th consecutive month to 8.1 percent y-o-y (the lowest annual rise since February 2023). Real wages have remained stable, albeit with some pickup for highly skilled workers.   

The current account shifted to a narrow deficit, transitioning from a surplus of 2.9 percent of GDP in 2023 to a deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP in 2024. This shift mainly reflects a decline in oil export proceeds, higher imports of machinery and equipment, and stronger remittance outflows—factors that more than offset a surge in tourism inflows. The current account deficit has been financed through external borrowing and reduced FX asset accumulation. As a result, the Saudi Central Bank’s (SAMA) net foreign assets (NFA) holdings stabilized at $415 billion by end-2024—equivalent to 15 months of imports and 187 percent of the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric. 

While spending overruns increased the overall fiscal deficit, the fiscal stance—as measured by the non-oil primary balance—showed a slight improvement in 2024. Additional expenditures related to project financing—partly linked to an accelerated implementation of Vision 2030—and flat oil revenue widened the overall fiscal deficit to 2.5 percent of GDP, approximately 0.8 percentage points above the budgeted target. However, driven by stronger non-oil revenue, the non-oil primary deficit improved, decreasing by 0.6 percentage points of GDP in 2024 compared to 2023. Central government debt rose to 26.2 percent of GDP as Saudi Arabia became the largest emerging market dollar debt issuer in 2024. However, Saudi Arabia remains amongst the lowest indebted nation globally and net debt is relatively low at approximately 17 percent of GDP.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND RISKS

Robust domestic demand—including from government-led projects—will continue to drive growth despite heightened global uncertainty and a weakened commodity price outlook. Non-oil real GDP growth is projected at 3.4 percent in 2025, about 0.8 percentage points lower than in 2024. This reflects the continued implementation of Vision 2030 projects through public and private investment, as well as strong credit growth, which would help sustain domestic demand and mitigate the impact of lower oil prices. The direct impact of rising global trade tensions is limited, as oil products—comprising 78 percent of Saudi Arabia’s goods exports to the U.S. in 2024—are exempt from U.S. tariffs, while non-oil exports to the U.S. only account for 3.4 percent of Saudi Arabia’s total non-oil exports. Over the medium term, domestic demand—including momentum ahead of Saudi Arabia’s hosting of large-scale international events—is expected to push non-oil growth closer to 4 percent in 2027 before stabilizing at 3.5 percent by 2030. Supported by the OPEC+ production cut phase-out schedule, overall GDP growth will accelerate to 3.5 percent in 2025 and 3.9 percent in 2026 before stabilizing at approximately 3.3 percent over the medium term.

Inflation would remain anchored around 2 percent, supported by a credible peg to the U.S. dollar, domestic subsidies, and an elastic supply of expatriate labor, notwithstanding a projected moderate positive output gap over the medium term. Imported inflation from increased tariffs worldwide is expected to remain contained.

The external position will weaken. Investment-linked imports and remittance outflows from an expanding expatriate labor force are expected to widen the current account deficit, which is projected to peak at about 3.9 percent of GDP by 2027 before converging to about 3.4 percent of GDP in 2030. Rising non-oil exports and robust inbound tourism will have a partial offsetting effect. The deficit will be increasingly financed through deposit drawdowns, less FX asset accumulation abroad, and external borrowing. International reserve coverage would remain adequate at about 11-12 month import coverage over the medium term, with foreign assets held by the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and other government-related entities offering strong additional buffers.

Risks to the outlook are mainly to the downside. Weaker oil demand, driven by heightened uncertainty, an escalation of global trade tensions, and deepening geoeconomic fragmentation could dampen oil proceeds. This, in turn, would lead to higher fiscal deficits and debt and costlier financing. An abrupt decrease in spending by the government (including projects recalibration below its baseline) or a slowdown in reform implementation in response to lower oil prices could further hinder private investment growth. Conversely, higher-than-expected oil production/prices and accelerated implementation of reforms could yield stronger or earlier-than-expected growth dividends.

POLICIES

Fiscal Policy

The 2025 fiscal stance—resulting in a deficit twice the budget target—remains appropriate. Given past overruns and the ongoing transformational projects tied to Vision 2030, staff anticipates higher current expenditures than budgeted. Combined with lower oil prices and minimal performance-linked dividends from Aramco, this will bring the overall fiscal deficit to 4.3 percent of GDP. However, this outcome still represents a 3.6 percentage points of non-oil GDP improvement in the non-oil primary balance, effectively frontloading part of the adjustment required by 2030 to uphold intergenerational equity. Given the upfront adjustment and ample fiscal buffers available, staff believes that additional spending restraint in 2025—triggered by lower-than-budgeted oil prices—is not necessary as it would make fiscal policy procyclical and exacerbate the impact on growth.

Over the medium term, the overall fiscal deficit is expected to narrow. After peaking at 4.3 percent of GDP in 2025, it will decline to approximately 3.3 percent of GDP by 2030, driven by ongoing wage bill containment and spending efficiency measures. Under this baseline scenario, the non-oil primary deficit would shrink by about 4.2 percent of non-oil GDP from 2025 to 2030. The fiscal deficit would primarily be financed by borrowing, including through debt issuances, syndicated loans or facilities from export credit agencies, leading to an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio to about 42 percent by 2030.

A gradual fiscal consolidation will remain necessary over the medium term to achieve intergenerational equity. To avoid disruptive adjustments and build buffers, an additional 3.3 percent of non-oil GDP must be generated over the 2026-30 period, mainly through:

• Non-oil revenue mobilization. Plans to increase the tax rate on underdeveloped land, introduce a tax on vacant land, and broadening the VAT base (e.g., for e-commerce transactions) are welcome. Additional efforts—including through new tax policy measures and continued efforts to strengthen revenue administration—would be needed. The temporary tax penalty waiver introduced repeatedly since Covid, should not be renewed when it expires in June as it fuels moral hazard and could undermine compliance.
• Removing energy subsidies. Staff welcomes the ongoing energy price adjustments—including a doubling of diesel prices since January 2024—which combined with lower international oil prices have reduced fuel subsidies to 3½ percent of GDP (down from 5½ percent in 2022). With retail fuel prices closer to international oil prices and the envisaged scaling up of the well-targeted Damaan social support program, efforts should be accelerated to reduce energy subsidies, including by removing the cap on gasoline prices.
• Rationalizing other spending. The mission welcomes ongoing spending reviews—including recent assessments on project execution by various government entities—to identify areas for potential savings and efficiency gains. Further rationalization should prioritize reducing current expenditures with a low fiscal multiplier, while preserving medium-term, growth-enhancing infrastructure plans. Greater transparency on how spending prioritization and recalibration aligns with the authorities’ announced investment plans will support investor confidence.

Given the high global uncertainty, staff welcomes the authorities’ contingency planning to safeguard fiscal sustainability in the event of a severe shock. In a scenario where oil prices decline significantly, a more aggressive fiscal consolidation strategy would be necessary. Identifying and prioritizing projects that can be extended or cut, if further adjustments are required, represents a prudent approach to maintaining fiscal sustainability. Staff recommends a partial drawdown of fiscal buffers in the event of a temporary oil price shock, which would help smooth the transition to a steady state and mitigate the impact of short-term oil price fluctuations.

Sustaining the authorities’ ongoing efforts to strengthen fiscal institutions will be crucial in supporting the fiscal adjustment and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 objectives. Enhancing the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework remains a priority, particularly through better integration of its multiyear projections into annual budget preparations to align spending ceilings with fiscal forecasts, including commitments from multi-year contracts. Operationalizing and ensuring compliance with an expenditure-based fiscal rule would help anchor the fiscal stance over the medium term.

Prudent debt management and a proper sovereign asset liability management (SALM) framework becomes increasingly important in a lower oil price environment. The mission encourages the authorities to assess the complex trade-offs between making greater use of central government deposits (currently at around 9¼ percent of GDP) and new bond issuances. The mission also supports the ongoing efforts toward operationalizing a comprehensive SALM framework to enhance the oversight of sovereign balance sheet exposures, which publication alongside the budget statement would support the drive for greater transparency and provide additional tools for fiscal policy analysis and formulation. Additionally, contingent liabilities—such as financing obligations for giga projects, debt guarantees, and Public-Private Partnerships—should be closely monitored.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

SAMA has continued to refine its liquidity management framework to help reduce  overall liquidity volatility. Bank funding conditions in Saudi Arabia are influenced by persistently strong double-digit credit growth, with periodic spikes in the SAIBOR-SOFR spread reflecting episodes of liquidity pressures. SAMA’s standard market-based monetary operations should continue to remain focused on smoothing short-term liquidity imbalances without fueling asset/credit growth. The recent data-sharing arrangement between SAMA and the Ministry of Finance regarding expected government transactions is anticipated to improve the accuracy of liquidity forecasting and should be effectively implemented. Additionally, further enhancements to the reserve requirement framework would strengthen effective liquidity management and monetary policy transmission.

The currency peg to the U.S. dollar remains appropriate. It has provided a credible anchor for monetary policy and is backed by ample external buffers. With an open capital account, it is essential that SAMA’s policy rate continues to align with the Fed’s policy rate.

Financial Sector Policies

The banking sector remains resilient, demonstrating strong capitalization and profitability despite rising funding costs. As of end-2024, the sector’s solvency ratio stood at 19.6 percent. Despite higher funding costs—driven by the increasing share of time and saving deposits—bank profitability is high, with an average return on assets of 2.2 percent in 2024. Non-performing loans have reached their lowest levels since 2016, reinforcing overall financial stability. Liquidity indicators are adequate and within regulatory thresholds, although the ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities has been declining, and the regulatory loan-to-deposit ratio has been on an upward trend.

Strong credit growth is leading to funding pressures and a change in the funding mix of Saudi banks. As credit growth—mostly to corporates and for mortgages—outpaces deposit growth, banks diversify their liabilities by increasing reliance on other forms of financing, especially external borrowings in the form of bonds, bilateral or syndicated loans, and certificates of deposit. High external borrowing turned banks’ Net Foreign Assets (NFA) negative in 2024 for the first time since 1993. This trend is expected to continue in the near term as several banks are in the process of securing additional external funding. However, banks’ exposure to foreign exchange risk remains low.

Addressing strong credit growth and associated funding pressures would help mitigate risks to systemic financial stability. The mission welcomes SAMA’s ongoing efforts to review its existing prudential toolkits to counter risks stemming from persistent double-digit credit growth amid a credit-to-deposit growth gap and the increased resort to short-term external wholesale funding. As loan demand is expected to remain high relative to deposit-based funding, setting prudential requirements commensurate with the evolving risks is essential. In that regard, the mission welcomes the introduction in May 2025 of a 100 basis points countercyclical capital buffer, which will be effective within a year. Vulnerabilities would be further mitigated by: (i) narrowing loan-to-value and debt burden ratios, which remain elevated relative to international standards; and (ii) tightening loan-to-deposit ratio to discourage excessive short-term foreign exchange funding. The mission welcomes SAMA’s proactive approach to monitoring the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio in foreign currency and encourages consideration of setting these ratios as regulatory requirements, should circumstances warrant.

SAMA’s continued efforts to enhance regulatory and supervisory frameworks are commendable. The new Banking Law has been submitted for legislative approval, a risk-based supervisory framework is being refined, and a monitoring system has been introduced for large construction and infrastructure projects. Additionally, SAMA’s bank resolution function is being operationalized. The authorities have also made good progress in establishing a crisis management framework that includes an emergency liquidity assistance framework, which should be completed without undue delay. Furthermore, improvements in enhancing the effectiveness of AML/CFT supervision—including through thematic inspections—are welcome.

Deepening the capital market is essential to help diversify funding and reduce reliance on bank financing. Although the capital market remains dominated by the large government-related issuers and the trading volumes are low, the recent and ongoing initiatives, such as the Investment Law that came into effect in February 2025 and the ongoing pension and savings reforms, should improve market liquidity and increase foreign participation in the Saudi capital markets. Greater use of asset-backed securities will create a new asset class and contribute to expanding funding in the banking system. The deepening of the domestic capital markets would also help improve the monetary policy transmission mechanism.

Structural Policies

The current environment of heightened uncertainty underscores the importance of continued structural reform efforts to sustain non-oil growth and economic diversification. Since 2016, Saudi Arabia has implemented significant and wide-ranging reforms, particularly in business regulations, governance, labor and capital markets. Several new laws that took effect in 2025—including the updated Investment Law, Labor Law amendments, and the new Commercial Registration Law—will enhance contractual certainty for investors and businesses, while also supporting productivity gains.

The reform momentum should continue irrespective of oil price developments. Ongoing work to strengthen the anti-corruption framework—including by building on the recent Ultimate Beneficial Ownership Rules and By Laws of Nazaha—remains crucial. Equally important is enhancing human capital by aligning the skills of Saudi nationals with evolving labor market needs, improving access to finance and fostering digitalization, all of which are key to advancing the Kingdom’s economic diversification goals that are further enhanced with the integration of AI in government services. In addition to stronger fiscal institutions, pursuing these reforms will help Saudi Arabia build further resilience to oil price volatility.

Targeted interventions through industrial policies should complement—not replace— structural reforms and must avoid crowding out private sector investment. Interventions by the PIF and public entities should continue to focus on areas where private investment is limited, market failures exist, or where they can play a catalytic role in attracting private capital, rather than potentially displacing domestic and foreign investors.  Industrial Policies should have clear exit criteria, claw-back mechanisms, and sunset clauses, to ensure they do not remain in place beyond their intended objective.

 

 

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The mission team would like to thank the Saudi Arabian authorities and the people they met outside the government sector for their close collaboration, candid and informative discussions, and warm hospitality.

 

[1] Numbers referred in percent of GDP are based on the authorities’ new rebasing GDP published in May 2025. The new methodological update is generally consistent with international best practices and the UN’s system of national accounts,