Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain

Author/Editor:

Teresa Daban Sanchez ; Steven A. Symansky ; Gian M Milesi-Ferretti ; Enrica Detragiache ; Gabriel Di Bella

Publication Date:

November 14, 2003

Electronic Access:

Link to Abstract

Summary:

Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.

Series:

Occasional Paper No. 225

English

Publication Date:

November 14, 2003

ISBN/ISSN:

9781589062160/0251-6365

Stock No:

S225EA

Price:

$25.00 (Academic Rate:$22.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

46

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