Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?

Author/Editor:

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma ; Xavier Debrun ; Franc Klaassen

Publication Date:

November 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

It is widely argued that Europe's unified monetary policy calls for international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved in such coordination in the perspective of macroeconomic stabilization. A simple model identifies the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. Coordination is beneficial when the cross-country correlation of the shocks is low. However, given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix), fiscal coordination is likely to prove counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and the governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-à-vis the ECB.

Series:

Working Paper No. 01/178

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

November 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451858952/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1782001

Format:

Paper

Pages:

46

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