Public Debt Management and Bailouts

Author/Editor:

Torbjorn I. Becker

Publication Date:

July 1, 1999

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper addresses how public debt should be managed to reduce the cost of private sector bailouts. It uses a tax smoothing model to show that bailouts affect the timing of government deficits and surpluses as well as the composition of public debt. In general, public debt managers will have to monitor the private sector’s leverage and portfolio composition in order to design the tax smoothing policy. This contrasts with Ricardian models where households monitor the government’s debt. The moral hazard aspect of defaults is also shown to be important in determining an optimal government debt strategy.

Series:

Working Paper No. 99/103

English

Publication Date:

July 1, 1999

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451852677/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1031999

Price:

$15.00 (Academic Rate:$15.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

23

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