Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game
May 20, 2002
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Summary
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).
Subject: Consumption, Tax incentives
Keywords: contract curve, WP
Pages:
13
Volume:
2002
DOI:
Issue:
081
Series:
Working Paper No. 2002/081
Stock No:
WPIEA0812002
ISBN:
9781451850376
ISSN:
1018-5941
