Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game

Author/Editor:

Eduardo Ley

Publication Date:

May 20, 2002

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).

Series:

Working Paper No. 02/81

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

May 20, 2002

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451850376/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0812002

Format:

Paper

Pages:

13

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