Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying
January 1, 2006
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Summary
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.
Subject: Competition, Corruption, Crime, Financial markets, Tax incentives
Keywords: Competition, contracts contingent, corruption, elections, lobbying, policy outcome, Vote buying, vote-buying contract, vote-contingent contract, voter behavior, voters vote, WP
Pages:
23
Volume:
2006
DOI:
Issue:
011
Series:
Working Paper No. 2006/011
Stock No:
WPIEA2006011
ISBN:
9781451862713
ISSN:
1018-5941
