Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying

Author/Editor:

Felix J Vardy ; John Morgan

Publication Date:

January 1, 2006

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2006/011

Subject:

Competition Corruption Crime Financial markets Tax incentives

English

Publication Date:

January 1, 2006

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451862713/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2006011

Pages:

23

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