Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks

Author/Editor:

Anita Tuladhar

Publication Date:

September 1, 2005

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank.

Series:

Working Paper No. 05/183

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

September 1, 2005

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451862027/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2005183

Format:

Paper

Pages:

27

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