The Political Economy of Economic Policy
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Jeffry Frieden
- Published: June 1, 2020
Overview
- Author: JEFFRY FRIEDEN, professor of international and public affairs and political science at Columbia University and professor of government emeritus at Harvard University.
- Publication: F&D Magazine, June 2020.
- Format note from source: Less than a minute(0 words) Read; Download PDF available.
- Core thesis: Understanding political economy—how politics affects the economy and the economy affects politics—is essential for analyzing policy choices and for those seeking to change governments and societies.
Political dynamics shaping economic policy (illustrated by COVID-19)
- The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the intersection of politics, economics, and public health:
- Policymakers focused on near-term electoral cycles struggle to invest in preparedness for future crises.
- Public resistance to public-health recommendations, business pressure for exceptions and subsidies, and national-level hoarding of supplies complicated optimal responses.
- International cooperation is the economically superior response to a global pandemic, but national political pressures led to resource diversion, export bans, and hoarding—actions that impose costs on other countries and make everyone worse off.
- Historical parallel: National policy responses to the 2007–08 financial crisis varied according to local political economy conditions; national responses to COVID-19 likewise vary for health, economic, and political reasons.
What political economy is and why it matters
- Definitions and three principal approaches over the past 50 years:
- It analyzes how political forces affect the economy (voters, interest groups, institutions).
- It assesses how the economy affects politics (macroeconomic trends and microeconomic organization influencing political behavior).
- It uses economic tools to model political behavior (politicians as firms, voters as consumers, governments as monopoly providers).
- Historical note: Early economic thinkers called themselves political economists; separation of economics and political science in the 20th century reversed in importance by the 1970s due to events like the collapse of Bretton Woods and stagflation.
Institutions, interests, and distributive politics
- Concentrated versus diffuse interests:
- Example: US sugar policy benefits a handful of sugarcane plantations and a few thousand sugar beet farmers while imposing an estimated cost of $2 billion to $3 billion a year on 330 million sugar consumers.
- Political-economy principle: concentrated interests usually win over diffuse interests because concentrated winners have stronger incentives to organize and lobby.
- Trade politics:
- Producers and workers in an industry (e.g., automakers and autoworkers) often share incentives to seek protection from foreign competition.
- Large multinational firms and international banks can be strong supporters of freer trade due to reliance on global supply chains.
- Trade policy is often a contest not just between big corporations and households but among big corporations with differing interests.
- Political institutions shape which groups are decisive:
- Electoral systems determine pivotal voters (example: US Electoral College makes Midwestern swing voters pivotal).
- Legislative and governmental structures (unitary parliamentary vs. separation of powers, federal vs. centralized systems) affect speed and scope of policy change.
- Independent bodies (central banks, public health agencies) can insulate important policies from day-to-day political pressures.
- Selectorate concept:
- Even authoritarian regimes must satisfy a selectorate (economic elites, armed forces); democracies must satisfy voters and interest groups.
Policy implications: first-best vs. second-best
- First-best policies identified by economic analysis may be politically infeasible and pursuing them can provoke backlash that yields worse outcomes.
- Example: Unilateral adoption of free trade by a small country, while economically optimal, would likely face massive opposition and risk government collapse.
- Normative guidance:
- Analysts and policymakers should evaluate both economic merit and political feasibility of policy proposals.
- When first-best is unattainable, designing politically feasible second-best policies may lead to better real-world outcomes than insisting on theoretically optimal but impractical reforms.
- Practical lesson: avoid letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.
Key takeaways and recommendations
- Political economy provides essential insight into why governments often deviate from economically optimal policies and how political incentives, institutions, and interest-group organization shape policy outcomes.
- For effective policy design:
- Incorporate political feasibility analysis alongside economic evaluation.
- Recognize the distributional battles between concentrated and diffuse interests.
- Use institutional design (electoral rules, independent agencies) to alter political incentives and extend policy time horizons.
- In crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, prioritize mechanisms that strengthen international cooperation while accounting for domestic political constraints.
Source: The Political Economy of Economic Policy, JEFFRY FRIEDEN, F&D Magazine, June 2020.
Content in this bundle
- الاقتصاد السياسي للسياسة الاقتصادية
- La economía política de la política económica ● Finanzas y Desarrollo ● Junio de 2020
- The Political Economy of Economic Policy – IMF F&D
- 经济政策的政治经济学 - 《金融与发展》 2020年6月号 - 国际货币基金组织季刊