Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Thomas Helbling
- Published: May 10, 2017
Overview
- Consumption, production, and investment decisions of individuals, households, and firms often affect people not directly involved in the transactions; large indirect effects are termed externalities.
- Most externalities are "technical externalities": indirect effects that impact others’ consumption and production opportunities but are not reflected in the product price.
- When private returns or costs differ from social returns or costs, market outcomes may be inefficient from a welfare perspective.
Negative and positive externalities
- Negative externalities
- Example: pollution. A polluter bases decisions on direct costs and profit opportunities and does not consider indirect costs borne by others.
- Indirect costs include decreased quality of life, higher health care costs, and forgone production opportunities (for example, harm to tourism).
- Result: social or total costs of production are larger than private costs, leading to overproduction when only private costs are considered.
- Positive externalities
- Example: research and development (R&D). R&D adds to the general body of knowledge, benefiting others beyond the firm that funded it.
- Result: private returns are smaller than social returns, leading to underproduction of goods or services with positive externalities.
Market failure, internalization, and Pigouvian taxes/subsidies
- Differences between private and social costs or returns create inefficiencies; neoclassical economics labels these as "market failure."
- Internalization principle: social returns should be maximized and social costs minimized by ensuring households and firms internalize all costs and benefits.
- Pigou’s proposal: governments should tax polluters an amount equivalent to the harm cost to others, and subsidize producers of positive externalities by the amount others benefit.
Bargaining solutions and the Coase argument
- Ronald Coase (1960) discussed resolving externalities through bargaining among affected parties; this work contributed to his Nobel Prize in economics in 1991.
- Conditions required for feasible bargaining solutions:
- Property rights must be well defined.
- Bargaining transaction costs must be low.
- No uncertainty or asymmetric information.
- Institutional frameworks that enable bargaining can be an optimal form of government intervention in some cases.
- Intellectual property rights (patents) can allow firms to capture most returns from R&D, but assigning property rights is harder for basic or general research; government subsidies may be needed for basic research.
Public goods and collective action problems
- Public goods are a special class of externality: nonexcludable and nonrival.
- Nonexcludable: producers cannot prevent others from enjoying benefits.
- Nonrival: one person’s consumption does not reduce opportunities for others.
- If private benefits are small relative to social benefits while private costs are large, public goods may not be supplied.
- Taxes often finance government provision of public goods (Samuelson, 1955).
- Environmental public goods (clean air, clean water, biodiversity, sustainable fish stocks) are largely nonrival and nonexcludable and lack well-defined property rights, creating collective action problems.
Obstacles to market-based solutions
- High transaction costs, uncertainty, and asymmetric information impede bargaining solutions.
- Moral hazard is a form of externality where decision makers maximize private benefits while not bearing full consequences due to uncertainty or incomplete information.
- Verification problems (for example, inability to verify a polluter’s promised preventive actions) make bargaining infeasible.
Climate change and global public goods
- The atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) from human activity is a major cause of global warming; without policies to curb GHG emissions, scientists expect growth in the problem leading to climate change costs such as destruction of capital and lower agricultural productivity.
- Costs and risks from climate change are borne globally, while mechanisms to compel internalization by those who benefit from GHG-emitting activities are limited.
- The atmosphere is a global public good, making private bargaining solutions unfeasible and international internalization policies difficult to identify and enforce (Tirole, 2008).
Policy implications and recommendations
- Externalities create wedges between private and social costs or returns that lead to inefficient market outcomes and can prevent markets from emerging.
- Government intervention is often required to ensure full internalization of costs and benefits, including:
- Pigouvian taxes on negative externalities and subsidies for positive externalities.
- Establishing institutional frameworks and property rights to enable bargaining where feasible.
- Providing subsidies or direct provision for public goods and basic research where property rights are hard to define.
- Developing and coordinating policies to internalize global externalities such as GHG emissions, acknowledging enforcement and distributional challenges.
F&D Magazine — Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs (Thomas Helbling)