Transcript

Speaker:

Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director, African Department, IMF

 

Moderator:

Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng, Senior Communications Officer, IMF

 

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning to everyone here and those joining us online. I am Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng with the Communications Department, and I will be your moderator for today. I am pleased to welcome Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF African Department, who will present the findings of the new Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa titled Holding Steady.

Now, before we turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese in the room and online. The report and related materials are also available on our website at: IMF.org/Africa.

Abebe, the floor is yours.

MR. SELASSIE: Thank you, Kwabena. Good morning and good afternoon to people joining us from outside the U.S. Thank you so much for being here for the release of the IMF's October Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Six months ago, our assessment highlighted the region's strong efforts and that growth had exceeded expectations last year. But we also noted sudden realignment of global priorities and increasing turbulent external conditions marked by weaker demand, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

Today, these global headwinds continue to test the region's recovery and resilience. Sub-Saharan Africa's economic growth, we now estimate, is expected to hold steady at 4.1 percent this year, with a modest pickup expected in 2026. And we, in our view, this reflects ongoing progress in macroeconomic stabilization and reform efforts across the major economies in the region.

Important to note that several countries in the region–Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda–are among the fastest-growing economies in the world. However, we still have quite a few resource-intensive countries and conflict-infected countries continuing to face significant challenges with only modest gains in per capita incomes.
The external environment remains challenging, global growth is slowing, and commodity prices are diverging. Notably, oil prices are declining while the price of copper, coffee, and gold are fairly elevated. And external financing conditions have improved somewhat, allowing a few countries, Kenya and Angola most recently, to access international capital markets.

The global trade and policy landscape has also deteriorated. Tariffs on exports to the United States have increased, and preferential access under the Africa Growth & Opportunities Act (AGOA) has expired. While the direct exposure of most countries to the U.S. is limited, broader trade policy uncertainty is weighing on growth. The projected sharp decline in foreign aid also leaves some lower-income and fragile countries particularly exposed. Affected governments have sought to reallocate budgetary resources, but with limited fiscal space, they have limited room for maneuver.

Notwithstanding these challenges, it's been really good to see the region showing strong resilience, but this will continue to be tested in the coming months. Pressure points include rising debt service costs, which are crowding out development spending, a shift towards domestic financing that has deepened the Sovereign Bank nexus, inflation that has eased at the regional level but remains in double digits in quite a few countries in the region, and external buffers that are under pressure and need to be rebuilt.
Against this backdrop, we see two broad policy priorities. The first is domestic revenue mobilization. This is very important to increase our country's potential. The significant potential to be tapped here also, and the reforms that need to be considered here include modernizing tax systems through digitalization, streamlining inefficient tax expenditures, and strengthening enforcement via targeted compliance strategies.

And importantly, these efforts must go beyond technical adjustments. It will be essential to build public trust in tax institutions, strengthen institution capacity, and conduct careful impact assessment, including distributional analysis, to ensure that these reforms are both effective and equitable.

Second, debt management, enhancing debt transparency, and strengthening public finance management can help reduce borrowing costs and unlock innovative financing. Importantly, publishing comprehensive public debt data and reinforcing budget oversight are key steps forward. These priorities will be important to further enhance resilience and support inclusive and sustainable growth across the region.

You know, for the ultimate goal of making sure that we have growth, reduce poverty, and lots of jobs. The IMF, of course, remains committed to support the region. Since 2020, we have dispersed nearly $69 billion, including about 4 billion so far this year. Our capacity development efforts also remain substantial, with countries in the region amongst the largest recipients of technical assistance.

Thank you for your attention, and I'm happy to try and answer your questions.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Alright, thank you, Abebe. We will now turn over to you for your questions. But before we do that, a couple of ground rules. For those in the room, please raise your hand, and I will come to you. Please stick to one question so that we can take as many questions as possible. And then for those online, please raise your hand or put a question in the chat, and then we will come to that as well. This time around, I think I'll start from my left. Lady in the yellow, please.

QUESTIONER: Good morning, my question is around Zimbabwe. The report highlights that this country has made some commendable progress towards restoring macroeconomic stability. My question is how confident are you that this growth can be sustained?

MR. SELASSIE: Thank you. Zimbabwe has gone through quite a lot of challenges in recent years, as you know. And one of the things that distinguishes Zimbabwe from other countries in the region has been -- is that they have not been able to access concessional financing to the same degree that others have, helping defray the impact of all of these global shocks of recent years. Against this difficult backdrop, it's been good to see that the country has been trying to put in place the right policies. And in recent months, I think we've seen significant effort being made.

Importantly, I think recourse to Central Bank financing has diminished quite a bit. It will be important to sustain that because it's this repeated recourse to Central Bank financing that has created a lot of difficulties in the past, also with inflation, with exchange rate volatility, and the difficult exchange, foreign exchange environment that the country has. So, we're encouraged by what the government has been doing in recent months, and I think that needs to be sustained.

Like all countries, a combination of current policies and continued refinement in policies will be key to help Zimbabwe move forward. And we're very, very encouraged, as I said, about all of the progress that has been made, and are trying to work as closely as we can to help the country implement the vision that they have for promoting growth.
MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks, Abebe. We'll take three questions together. Gentleman in the grey.

QUESTIONER: Can we know, please, would you mind to say if IMF -- yes -- if IMF can conclude a new program with Senegal, in what terms it will be, in terms of 2025 or the first quarter to 2026. And last, do you acknowledge any responsibility in the case of hidden debt, false declaration, because new authority urged IMF to acknowledge its responsibility in this misreporting case. Thank you.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you. Anybody else on Senegal?

QUESTIONER: Yes. The IMF is set to grant Senegal a new program, we heard this morning. Do you expect at this point that that will require a debt restructuring as part of that program?

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. One more in Senegal, please. Go ahead.

QUESTIONER: How vulnerable are African banks to spillover from global markets, especially given rise in sovereign debt levels and the rise of currency mismatches on their balance sheets?

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Okay, Abebe, you can answer.

MR. SELASSIE: Thank you. So, on Senegal, the first point I want to make is that, we've been working extremely closely with the current administration to try and understand what the situation related to public debt, public finances overall are. And, I think since the first point, the government came and explained. The new government came and explained that they had uncovered problematic numbers. We've been really very grateful and have had very, very intense discussions with them.

So the first point I want to make is that we really, really are appreciative of the effort that this new government has put in to promote transparency to try and come up with public debt numbers that are more accurate. Second, and I think by far most important, is that at this point we are, in a position where we can move forward with program discussions and have actively started engaging in this this week. And there's a team that's going to be going to Dakar next week to advance discussions.

As always, with program negotiations, program discussions, the first starting point is to understand what the government wants to do, what the government's policy priorities are, and how they intend to tackle them. And you know, that's the first point. So, we need to quantify all of that, look at the available financing, and that's when we will be able to determine, you know, what the gaps are, what policy reforms can be undertaken if, going forward. So, we're at that point where we are initiating discussions, and at the end of the mission, we'll be able to be in a better position to inform you about where things stand.

On the issue of domestic banks' vulnerabilities to rising public debt levels, so, you know, again, this is a point that we've been highlighting for several years. At this moment, you know, our estimation is that about half of the total public debt is held by domestic institutions. This has gone up over the years. As always, it's a double-edged sword. As access to external financing has declined over the years. Our countries, our governments, have been able to turn to domestic banks, have had to turn to domestic financial institutions to sustain spending levels, to sustain economies. That has been a source of resilience. But we're now seeing a situation where there are significant vulnerabilities, and in particular, in those countries where public debt is at very elevated levels, risk of distress is higher, we are seeing some pressures on bank balance sheets, or there could be potential pressures on bank balance sheets.

So again, it varies from country to country, the extent to which there are vulnerabilities. But it is an area of some concern in those countries where public debt is high, where interest rates are high. And we're working with governments to make sure that there is a robust regulatory framework, robust capitalization plans for banks, and of course, first and foremost, the first line of defense, making sure that public finances are in a healthy trajectory to ensure that their spillovers are limited.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. We'll go to the side of the room. Lady in the [inaudible] shirt.

QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Kwabena. In recent months, Nigeria's inflation figures have been decelerating. What's your take on that? And especially with the last inflation figures released, there was a sudden steep. What's your take? Do you see it as a credible information and especially as food prices are still soaring in Nigeria? Thank you.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Any other one on Nigeria?

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please. First row, yes. Let's stick to one question so that we can get at the same please.

QUESTIONER: All right, thank you very much. Still continuing with Nigeria, I would like to know with interest payments due, swallowing more revenue in Nigeria, of course, $2.3 billion zero bond deal, how sustainable is this high-cost debt strategy, and what reforms could break the growing bank sovereign loop without shaking financial stability? Let me just put this in, if I may? Yesterday, the World Economic Outlook was released -- was it yesterday, or Tuesday -- that many African countries are facing debt distress right now, or debt is even, higher. How concerned are you as the IMF and how close is the region to breaking point where resilience really slips into a debt growth trap? And I would also like you to talk about the tax issue you mentioned earlier. Many Africans are paying taxes but yet not seeing the commensurate value for it. How is the IMF perhaps talking to governments to be able to solve this? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: The Fund has said that you are working with governments across the world to fight illicit financial flows. Itis a major problem for Africa, and interestingly, the flow is going to the global north while leaving this global South Africa, where we really need this money to work for the people. I want to find out what is the framework of the Fund working to see that such funds are blocked, and the ones taken to the global south not already returned to Africa?

MR. SELASSIE: Starting with inflation in Nigeria, we find the decline in inflation consistent with the tightening of policies that have been undertaken in recent years, particularly on the monetary policy front. But also, the effect of the exchange rate adjustment that took place over the last year or so and more having come through the system. So, it is consistent with the policy calibration that we see. We are encouraged by it, but I think still some ways to go to get to the government's target.

Now, to be very clear, what is being reported, of course, is that the rate at which prices are increasing is slowing down. But there's been a level shift in the level of inflation. And this is not unique to our countries. It's also elsewhere, but particularly biting in our countries exactly because, this cost-of-living crisis has hit our people way more than others, with limited capacity to perhaps withstand this shock. So, I don't want to in any way to underestimate the extent of dislocation that has happened in recent years on account of all of these shocks that our countries have been subjected to.

Public debt is high, of course, in many countries in the region. Right now, we estimate about 20 countries to be in a situation of high risk of debt distress. This comprises about 14 countries at high risk of debt distress and another six in actual debt distress. So, that is one metric of debt vulnerabilities. There are other indicators you can look at, and they all show that public debt burdens are high. So, this is exactly why reforms are needed.

First and foremost, of course, is trying to put in place the reforms that will encourage higher economic growth. That is one important input that will contribute to making debt servicing affordable. And beyond that, also in many countries, there is a need to do some fiscal reforms. And the extent to which revenue mobilization or public expenditure reprioritization needs to take place varies from country to country, and, we engage in this in the individual discussions that we have with countries. But I think the broad direction of travel is one where our countries have been investing quite a lot in recent years in infrastructure, in health, in public education, many important areas. Perhaps one area where we have not done as well is capturing the rate of return on all of these investments through the tax system. There's scope, we see potential, we see scope for revenue mobilization.

But this mobilization has to go hand in hand with showing that the money that is being collected is being used for the right reasons, for the right purposes. When you talk about tax levels, people considering tax levels high, it's also because they don't see enough infrastructure services, enough public services in terms of health, education. So also demonstrating that what money is being collected is going to the right areas, minimizing leakages, corruption, are all also part and parcel of the effort that has to take place. And again, this extent of challenge in this area also varies from country to country. But that is, a related agenda, as I also made in my opening remarks.

Lastly, on illicit financial flows, this is the nature of what comprises things that we consider illicit financial flows vary. Some of it is just simple trade leakages to do with capital outflows. Others have related to people trying to circumvent the tax system. Still others are completely illegal flows, related to corruption or other flows. I think, the way to tackle this is to identify what the source of the particular flows are and tackle them through reforms. So again, a lot of the reforms, the direction of reforms that countries are pursuing should go in a way to help address many of these challenges that we are seeing in terms of illicit financial flows.

Questioner: We know that the stability of our currency has come at a greater cost and monitoring discipline. I want to find out from you, does the IMF believe that the current exchange rate framework that Ghana is using with FX management to practice strike the right balance between price stability and external competitiveness? And what should be the path that the country should start when it prepares itself to come back to the market, especially when the program that we are under may be over in 2026?

QUESTIONER: I would want to find out from you, we talked about easing external financial conditions when we were making a presentation. And we know over the past maybe nine, ten months, we've seen a lot more African countries go to the Eurobond market. And then coming back to the point about the debt accumulation, how much of it is a problem? Because we had a situation where a lot of countries, you are saying, are in debt, high distress, and now we are going back to the external market. Is it not a worry for the IMF that for these countries or for a continent that is under a lot of tremendous debt stress, easing financial conditions is forcing or is encouraging them to go back to the market? Thank you.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you. I'll take one more on Ghana. Gentleman over there in the middle, middle row.

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. For the very first half of this year, with the period ending September 2025, the Bank of Ghana says we performed well when it comes to our spending. So, for the period 151 billion, we did 131, that's 14 percent below target. But then the nuances, if you go into the figures, you look at all the categories of spend, and you realize that on capital expenditure, we did way less, nearly 63 percent below target. We are below on every cluster of spend except for compensation. As we look to exiting the program in 2026, we are looking at fiscal discipline. This can be easily celebrated as fiscal discipline being ensured by the country. But is the IMF encouraged by it, this level of fiscal discipline exhibited by the country? Thank you.

MR. SELASSIE: Thanks. So, on the issue of FX market performance in Ghana in recent months, I just had a conversation about this with Governor Johnson also. I think, you know, a year ago, perhaps a couple of years ago, all of the concern in Ghana was about uncontrolled depreciation, a lot of challenges. And that was related to, of course, fundamentals of the economy, where there were a lot of difficulties, the debt issue hadn't been, you know, it was just surfacing and playing out. So it's been generally good to see stabilization returning to the economy in Ghana. The economy is beginning to recover, inflation is beginning to decelerate, and a sign of confidence is allowing the exchange rate cedito stabilize and maybe even begin to appreciate.

Like all such things, of course, you know, there are pros and cons. One is the competitiveness issue that you mentioned. It's not the only thing that will affect, affects, competitiveness. There are many other things. But you know, an excessively appreciated exchange rate can also have a bearing on this. So as always, you know, and this is why we're so full of admiration for policymakers in the region. When you have relatively shallow capital markets, foreign exchange markets, money markets, this kind of volatility can be very disruptive to the real economy also. So, it's about trying to strike a balance. You know, too much interference can itself cause problems when you have a lot of froth, you know, identifying them and trying to calibrate policies to minimize that froth. So, it really is about striking the right balance. But you know, the direction of travel we feel is the right one and the appreciation reflective of some fundamentals. But you don't want, you know, that also to get too frothy.

On the question about, you know, some countries are tending to market access, or you know, in general, we've seen also spreads narrowing. And again, the question was that isn't this a double-edged sword? Could it not lead to more debt accumulation? So, you know, just as always, it's about striking the right balance and being prudent in how favorable conditions are treated. In general, what we advise is that, you know, it's not good for our countries to be in a situation where they don't have any market access. So, in and of itself, generally the fact that spreads are narrowing and our countries have the option to tap markets is something that's positive.

Second is that I think many of our leaders, many of our policymakers, are also cognizant that while spreads have narrowed, the actual terms of borrowing are way higher than they used to be. So, the level of interest rates themselves are, of course, higher. And so, this market access is to be managed very carefully. Ideally, what you want to do is use this and compare it with other forms of financing and only have recourse to more expensive forms of financing if there are no alternatives. And in any event, you know, the medium-term fiscal path is what should anchor public policy rather than the availability of financing. So, in the engagement and the discussion that we have with authorities, we approach it from that level.

Lastly, on Ghana spending patterns within year, you know, as always, the mark of, you know, public policy, the direction of public finances is what happens towards the end of the year and not just one year either, but over two-, three-, four-year trajectory. So, it's been very encouraging to see this government committing to pursue fiscal discipline. And what needs to be seen is this playing out over the next two, three, four years.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. We'll go online now before we come back to the room. I know we have a lot of questions here, so if we could go online.

QUESTIONERE: Yeah, thank you. Thank you very much, Kwabena. We're seeing a lot more countries trying to raise funding or at least create a bit of fiscal space on their public through novel means. In some cases we're seeing them trying to securitize future revenue streams in order to create in order to attract a lot more capital. In other cases, also seeing countries trying to divert, convert existing currency, or other existing debt into other currencies. We certainly see in Kenya doing that, for example, with $5 billion of debt due to China being converted into yuan. One, are you seeing that happening in a lot more jurisdictions across Africa? And two, are these efforts creating new contingent liabilities that are much, much harder for citizens and institutions like the IMF to keep an eye on?

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We also have another online question that I want to read out. His question is on Kenya. He says, given the lack of a staff-level agreement in Nairobi, when does the IMF anticipate a new deal with Kenya could be realistically reached? Any other question on Kenya, and I could just go back to Abebe. Okay, Abebe.

MR. SELASSIE: Thanks. So, just, I think on the -- maybe I'll start with the second question from Ramah about if we have seen the kind of discussions that I think are still underway or about to be finalized on converting or redenomination of some debt into other currencies that we've seen in Kenya. Have we seen that playing out elsewhere? To my recollection, not. I think Kenya is in the vanguard here, and, we see it as part of active liability management exercise that countries should be exploring to see if they can get any benefit from, the cost of debt servicing. I think, we see countries basically lengthening maturities, we see countries trying to reduce interest rates by issuing in dollars instead of euro bonds or other currencies.

As always, it's important to weigh this against any cross-currency risks and other challenges or the main source of export revenue that countries have, the currency in which that's denominated. But I think it's in the range of active liability management efforts that our countries need to do to try and contain debt service costs. And I think, as long as these factors are weighed, I think it's important and an initiative that we encourage.

Second, on emergence of innovative financing schemes, again, as you said, we've seen these time and again whether it's PPPs or other efforts to try and -- to try and generate more resources. What is fundamentally important is that assessing all of the implications that this can have, including circumventing the public scrutiny, parliamentary scrutiny, et cetera. So, we always encourage, as first order priority transparency. So, beyond kind of just looking at the mechanics of how this is going to generate resources. So, we are working with country authorities that are seeking our inputs on making sure that we can understand the full implication for public finances.

With respect to our engagement in Kenya, we just had a team in Nairobi, for an initial round of discussions. More discussions are continuing here. It's all about trying to see what, understand a bit better, have more clarity on what steps the government wants to take are, what's feasible in terms of reform over the next couple of years. And those discussions are continuing as we speak, and again, as soon as we have any progress, we will be able to report on that.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, let's take some few questions from the room.

QUESTIONER: Yeah, thank you. According to the report, Sierra Leone is listed among 10 countries with declining ODA. Looking beyond Sierra Leone, does the IMF foresee a need for global policy shifts or new international financing architecture to better support low-income aid-dependent countries from these simultaneous shocks of aid reduction and external shocks? So how might these shifts look in practice?

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, sure. Let's take two more.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Given the African triple challenge of rising debts, escalating climate crisis, and a booming youth population, can you talk about how the IMF is evolving its approach to support long-term investments and economic transformation instead of just short-term stabilization?

QUESTIONER: My question, from the IMF's microeconomic diagnostic perspective, what policy mix would you recommend for Nigeria to achieve sustainable growth?

MR. SELASSIE: Thanks. So, starting with Sierra Leone, I think Sierra Leone, I think is very much, what we're talking about when we, when I was earlier referring to the decline in external aid flows, the more difficult financing conditions. Sierra Leone is one of the countries that has been impacted the most. Sierra Leone used to be privy to quite significant amounts of bilateral grant financing, more, into the budgets itself directly, and then quite significant other support via project financing.

But as aid flows have declined, this has put more pressure on the government's balance sheet, and the government has had to resort to borrowing in much more expensive terms, including from domestic markets. So domestic debt has gone up. So, it is exactly emblematic of this difficult environment that our countries have been subjected to.

There's no silver bullet here. I think the way forward is to try and work through a combination of domestic reforms, trying to raise more mobilization, more domestic revenues, trying to see what can be done to prioritize spending, making sure that they continue to be targeted to address the most pressing areas, and then last but not least, as much as possible rely on the most concessional types of financing that's available externally. That's a combination of policies that are needed.

On the balance between the need to focus on short-term stabilization versus long-term issues, I think I don't see a trade-off, and I think both are very, very strongly related. So, in recent years, what many countries have been struggling with is the impact of exogenous shocks and, in some cases, more homegrown challenges, resulting in significantly wide macroeconomic imbalances. Without addressing those imbalances, you're not going to have any growth, either near-term or in the long term. Our role as an institution is to help countries improve those imbalances. And we work with governments to do that.

And that is a prerequisite. That's a necessary condition for growth, for job creation. So, the work we do in those countries where microeconomic imbalances are elevated is very much with an extreme and absolute focus to help lay the ground for growth and recovery. And I think that's exactly what we see in places like Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, helping address those imbalances businesses is creating the conditions exactly necessary for growth.

And then lastly on Nigeria, I mean, I think what I can say is that the government has identified domestic revenue mobilization as perhaps the most overriding challenge that the country faces. Extreme reliance on oil resources has been problematic for Nigeria, as Minister Wale has been saying for many years, and many others. And I think, a focus there, the focus there that the government has put in place in recent years is one. I think that's the right one.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, so we have time for two more questions.

QUESTIONER: Thank you so much. And my question is just around with the global growth slowdown, as well as the borrowing conditions still remaining tight, I’m curious to know how Rwanda is able to maintain the microeconomic stability. But also looking at AGOA’s expiry and the rising U.S. tariffs, to what extent will this put pressures, especially on African exporters? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Just a couple of questions to Ghana, Nigeria. We just, we spoke about a lot of the policies that are happening in West Africa, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. But more recently, the stock around the capital gains tax for Ghana and Nigeria. Just curious to know from your point of view what you think that could mean for capital flows into at least two of West Africa's largest economy.

MR. SELASSIE: Thanks. On the challenges related to, you know, the uncertainty on trade on tariff policy in the U.S., I mean, first thing to note is that the fallout from the higher tariffs that have been imposed in the U.S. have not been as bad as we had feared back in April. You can read the World Economic Outlook, the other analysis that we've put out. So the global economy has weathered, and importantly, we've not seen other countries, going in the same vein of raising tariffs. So that's encouraging.

Second, countries that are exporting to the U.S. and that are relying on significant exports to the U.S., and they're thankfully in the region, they are limited. They will be facing higher, higher barriers to trading to the U.S. So, some thinking about, how to reorient these flows, finding different ways to address this challenge will be needed in those countries.

I think more generally, though, this is also, I think, as others have been saying, also an opportunity for our countries to think about, what is needed to promote intra-African trade. Of course, the AfCFTA is in place, the framework is in place, but there remain quite a lot of non-tariff barriers, even tariff barriers, structural, physical barriers to trade in our region.

I think there's a lot more work we can do so that we can trade more. What we've done and shown in previous analysis, one of the striking things about African trade is that when we trade with each other, increasingly we tend to trade in more manufactured goods, more higher value-added goods, when we trade with the rest of the world, with exporting natural resources. So, there's actually a big plus in terms of trading with each other.

There's a big benefit to be had from promoting intra-African trade. So, I think this is also an opportunity to work in those kind of areas on the capital gains tax. Honestly, I'm not familiar with what the proposals are. So, I will ask my colleagues to follow up with you, if I may.

MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I know we have a lot of questions, but we are almost out of time. So Abebe, if there is one last thing you want to say, you can go ahead. If not, we can go ahead and close. So, I mean, this brings us to the end of this press briefing. For those of you who we could not get to your questions, please send them to me, please send them to our Press Team. We will make sure we get back to you; I know we have a lot. We will do that as much as possible. The report is still available on IMF.org/Africa.

You can download that there in English, Portuguese, and French as well.

The Annual Meetings continue at noon. Today, there is the G20 press briefing, and then tomorrow we have our press briefings for the Middle East, Central Asia Department, European Department, Western Hemisphere Department, and the IMFC, as well as the African Finance Ministers. On behalf of Abebe, the African and Communications Department, thank you all for coming, and we will see you next time. Thank you.

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