Transcript

Speakers:

Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund 

Krishna Srinivasan, Director, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund 

Sonali Jain-Chandra, China Mission Chief, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund 

 

Moderator:

Ting Yan, Senior Communications Officer, Communications Department, International Monetary Fund 

 

YAN: Good afternoon, everyone.  Welcome to this IMF Press Conference on the 2025 China Article IV mission, which is our Annual Assessment of the Chinese economy.  My name is Ting Yan, from the Communications Department at the IMF. 

I'm pleased to be joined today by our three speakers.  We have Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF.  Krishna Srinivasan, Director of the Asia and Pacific Department.  And also, Sonali Jain-Chandra, our China Mission Chief. 

We have just published a press release on the preliminary findings of the mission on imf.org.  Today, the Managing Director will first deliver her opening remarks, and then we will be happy to take your questions.

With that, Managing Director, the floor is yours. 

GEORGIEVA: Thank you very much, Ting. And a very good afternoon to everyone in this room.  Thank you for joining us for the 2025 Article IV Consultation Report.  We have done that every year.  It's our annual health check of the Chinese economy.  Over the last two weeks, our team has engaged in constructive discussions with the Chinese authorities, and we would like to express our sincere thanks to them for their attention, their time, and engagement. 

Let me start with our updated assessment of the Outlook.  Despite sizable shocks, China's economy has shown remarkable resilience.  We have upgraded our projections for China's growth to 5 percent in 2025 and 4.5 percent in 2026.  These are upward revisions from our October World Economic Outlook of 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively.  They reflect both strong exports and welcome fiscal stimulus.  This resilient growth has supported household incomes, which is particularly important at the time when consumer confidence is weak.  China is contributing about 30 percent to global growth. 

This outlook importantly provides a conducive environment for the Chinese authorities to address the significant and pressing challenges the economy faces.  The authorities recognize these challenges and are taking steps in the right direction.  We are encouraging them to move more forcefully and with greater urgency. 

Let me elaborate.  Domestic demand in China has been persistently weak, in part because the property sector is still on a shaky footing.  This has depressed consumer confidence, leading to weak consumption and deflationary pressures.  Lower inflation relative to trading partners has resulted in significant real exchange rate depreciation.  And this has made China's exports cheaper, prolonging an excessive reliance on exports and worsening external imbalances. 

As the second largest economy in the world, China is simply too big to generate much growth from exports, and continuing to depend on export-led growth risks furthering global trade tensions.  Add to this the challenges from slowing productivity growth, high corporate and public debt levels, decreasing returns to investment, and an aging population.  Taken together, these factors point to slower growth going forward. 

Against this background, in the 15th Five-Year Plan, the authorities have prioritized increasing consumption as a driver of growth.  They also recognize the importance of reorienting the economy from goods to services.  We welcome this. 

Pivoting towards consumption is the overarching policy priority for China.  The authorities are already taking steps to raise domestic consumption.  They have adopted an expansionary fiscal stance, eased monetary policy, and implemented some targeted measures to reduce excess savings and address involution.  They gradually increased the retirement age, which will help expand labor supply and raise medium-term growth prospects.  And they have raised subsidies for the elderly for child care to boost the services sector. 

Still, more is needed.  In our discussions, we recommended more forceful measures to be implemented with greater urgency.  Let me highlight three key areas of focus.  First, tackling domestic imbalances and, in particular, deflationary pressures.  This would require even more expansionary macroeconomic policies paired with the necessary reforms to reduce excess savings.  We recommend a comprehensive macroeconomic policy package focused on additional fiscal stimulus supported by further monetary policy easing and greater exchange rate flexibility. 

Fiscal policy should prioritize strengthening the social protection system to give people the confidence and security they need to spend more and save less.  Our analysis suggests that raising social spending, especially in rural areas, and accelerating Hukou reforms that provide migrant workers with access to social benefits can boost consumption by up to 3 percentage points of GDP in the medium term. 

At the same time, public investment and industrial policies in support of selected firms and sectors should be scaled back.  This would increase productivity by improving resource allocation and putting market forces in the front seat.  Reducing the size of industrial policy support would also generate fiscal savings, which could be redeployed to increase social spending and resolve the problems of the real estate sector. 

Ultimately, boosting consumption would unlock the potential of China's vast domestic market, resulting in smaller internal and external imbalances and a more durable source of growth. 

Second area of focus, structural reforms to lift medium-term growth.  We recommend reducing regulatory burdens, lowering barriers to internal trade, particularly in the services sector, leveling the playing field among firms, and implementing labor market measures to reduce skill mismatches and youth unemployment.  These reforms will also help harness the full potential of new technologies, notably in the area of artificial intelligence and energy efficiency.  We know that China's digital infrastructure is well prepared to reap substantial gains from AI, but care needs to be taken to mitigate labor market dislocations and guard against new financial stability risks. 

Third area of focus, addressing high domestic debt levels.  Years of high investment have left China with high public and corporate debt, and that leads to elevated risks.  The government's debt swap program helps in the short term by reducing financing pressures.  But to minimize long-term costs, unsustainable local government debt will need to be restructured, and this should be combined with reforms to further strengthen financial sector oversight and enhance fiscal discipline and transparency. 

What would be the benefit of all this?  We calculate that making material progress in these three essential priorities could substantially raise China's GDP level by about 2.5 percent by 2030, creating some additional 18 million jobs and simultaneously reducing deflationary pressures.  It would also help with an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a smaller current account that deficit.  A better balanced Chinese economy, internally and externally, also means a stronger and healthier global economy.  

To sum up, China has the opportunity to reach a new stage of development.  In which its growth engines switches from investment and exports to domestic consumption, and its economy reorients from goods to services.  It's a great opportunity; seizing it requires brave choices.  It requires determined policy action.  From our side, we see this opportunity as one we strongly support, and we very much look forward to continuing our constructive engagement with the Chinese authorities.  We are at their disposal.  But as of now, we are at your disposal for your questions.  Thank you.

YAN: Thank you very much, Managing Director.

If you have any questions, please raise your hands and identify yourself with name and media organization.  And try to please be brief.  First question, let me go to the lady in the first row here.  This one.  Yeah, in purple.  Thank you. 

QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Managing Director, good afternoon.  I'm with Yicai Media Group.  I wonder, how do you assess China's growth potential for the year 2026?  And more specifically, as China deepens its pursuit of high-quality development, how do you envision this structural transition, adapting to the global trade landscape and boosting world economic growth amid all kinds of uncertainties?  Thank you. 

MS. GEORGIEVA:  Thank you for your question.  As I said in the very beginning, we have upgraded our growth projections both for 2025 and 2026.  For 2026, we project growth at 4.5 percent.  This is below the level we project for 2025.  In other words, we do see a slight slowdown in economic growth in China for two reasons.  First, because we anticipate some falling of exports in the environment of higher trade tensions.  And second reason, it would take time for the domestic sources of growth to kick in. 

The Chinese economy is very big.  It's like a big ship.  Changing course takes time.  And therefore, we see domestic consumption and investments still being somewhat weaker.  And that is the reason why for 2026, we see slightly lower growth.  But let's be clear, 4.5 percent is still way above what we project for global growth.  Our expectation for global growth for 2026 is 3.2 percent.  In other words, the resilience China has demonstrated this year is sustained in 2026. 

YAN: Thank you.  Let me go to this side, the lady in the first row here.  Yes, thank you. 

QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon, Managing Director.  I’m from Xinhua News Agency.  And my question is, China proposed this new five-year plan, and what aspects are your major focus, and what do you expect in the coming five years in terms of new ideas, new opportunities which will shape China's future?  Thank you. 

GEORGIEVA: Thank you.  Great question.  Let's start by reflecting on China's track record.  I admit this is quite impressive.  The 14 Five-Year-old Plan had goal targets and objectives, and when we look at implementation, it has been quite strong.  China has a long tradition of setting up objectives and then creating incentives across the country for these objectives to be met. 

For the 15th Five-Year Plan, China emphasizes three things.  One, high-quality growth.  Two, a process of moving China by 2035 to a moderately developed economy status in terms of GDP per capita.  Three, and this is very important, moving the economy from export investment-driven to domestic consumption-driven economy.  And of course, we will see in the days and weeks to come more elaboration on the objectives of the 15 Five-Year Plan.  And we will totally assess, as details come in, we would assess these objectives. 

We very much support China's determination to change its growth model.  As I said in my opening, China is now too big to rely on exports as a source of further growth.  And China has 1.4 billion people who present a large domestic market.  That can be a big aspiration for growth in years to come. 

And I can say, I look at the audience, I see many of the journalists are young.  Which is to say, China counts on you to be the driver of domestic demand, the younger generation.  As we well know, the older generation in China is very committed to savings.  You need to help your mothers, fathers, grandmothers, grandfathers to change their attitude towards one that says it's patriotic to spend money and lift China's domestic consumption rate. 

YAN: Thank you.  Lady in the second row here in grey.  Yes, thank you.

QUESTIONER:  Hi, this is Bloomberg News.  My question is about the Chinese currency.  So, your latest statement projects that China's current account surplus is going to be 3.3 percent of GDP this year.  And I saw that in the External Sector Reports released earlier this year, the IMF estimated that the yuan was undervalued by 8.5 percent based on last year's current account surplus, which was 2.3 percent.  So, my question is, you know, what does that mean for your current assessment for the undervaluation of the yuan?  And did you -- what kind of recommendation did you make to the Central Bank in terms of the exchange rate?  Did you recommend them to appreciate? 

GEORGIEVA: Yes, you're correct.  In the latest External Sector Report, we concluded that the external position of China in 2024 was assessed to be moderately stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. 

For 2025, as you indicated in your question, indeed, the year-to-date current account has increased further.  We will provide our assessment in the 2025 Report.  It is forthcoming.  I also recommend that you look at the Article IV Report, where we will include some additional analysis when the Report is published. 

We are not seeing a very significant material difference.  And therefore, the policy recommendations are going to be very similar to what we had in the last External Sector Report.  We would like to see China with exchange rate that is flexible, both sides up or down, based on fundamentals. 

And I'm going to ask my colleagues, as they may want to elaborate a little bit further.  But, I mean, just to answer your question directly, we haven't recommended explicitly action to appreciate the Renminbi.  What we want to see is market market-based exchange rate that reflects fundamentals. 

Anything you want to add?  Yeah, this is our Mission Chief, so whenever you want more details, go after her. 

JAIN-CHANDRA: If I could elaborate on what the Managing Director said.  Indeed, the qualitative policy recommendations are very similar to what was contained in the External Sector Report for 2025, which had the 2024 assessment.  And here the key message is that macro policies need to be much more focused, need to focus on forcefully boosting domestic demand with a focus on consumption as well as resolving the property sector.  So boosting domestic demand will reflate the economy, lift inflation, and lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  And this will help close internal and external imbalances.  As the Managing Director said, on the side of the nominal exchange rate, we recommend greater flexibility in both directions.  Thank you.

GEORGIEVA: Basically, create the environment for stronger domestic demand.  Yes?  Who is next? 

YAN: Let's go to the third row here.  The gentleman in the third row.  Yes.  Thank you. 

QUESTIONER:  Thank you very much.  I'm from the Wall Street Journal.  I just have a question about industrial policy, which you alluded to in your own opening remarks.  China's levels of industrial policy are very high right now, including as a percentage of GDP.  They're much higher than many peer nations.  In your conversations with Chinese officials, did you get any indication from them that they were willing to consider bringing down the levels of industrial policy during the next Five-Year Plan?  Obviously, against the backdrop of a self-reliance campaign, science and technology that remains, that's picking up steam, shall we say. 

And related to that if I could just add?  In the IMF's view, Chinese officials indicate whether they think they can do both at once, raise consumption while also carry out industrial policy at a very aggressive level.  In the IMF's view, can they do both at once, or are these two elements basically in contradiction with one another?  Thank you. 

GEORGIEVA: We have done a fairly extensive study of the impact of industrial policy in China.  We have concluded that industrial policies in China need to be scaled down.  They are, in some cases, justified in terms of correcting market failures.  But when we measure the impact on productivity, the result is a loss of 1.2 percent.  That means misallocation of resources is taking place.  It is disadvantaged; it is not an advantage for the Chinese.  It's a disadvantage.  And therefore, we recommend to set a high bar for the application of industrial policy.

More broadly, in the latest World Economic Outlook, we included a chapter on industrial policy that assesses what is going on globally and puts the same recommendation.  Have a very high bar, apply industrial policy when it is justified, and don't use it, it will be -- because you're harming your economy.  You're leading to misallocation of capital and labor. 

In our discussions with the Chinese authorities, they have shown understanding that industrial policies also that they bear direct fiscal costs, at the time when using this fiscal capacity can be more effectively done by stimulating consumption and by resolving the property sector problem.  We calculated that to resolve resolutely the property sector problem, China will have to spend over the next three years 5 percent of GDP.  This has to come from a tighter management of fiscal space, including tighter application of industrial policies. 

Anything you want to add? 

SRINIVASAN: No

GEORGIEVA: Okay.

YAN: Let me come back to this side, the second row here.  The lady in the second row. 

QUESTIONER:  Thank you very much.  Speaking of the property sector, my question is that, knowing the property sector is somehow shrinking the residents' wealth in China, and how -- what's the IMF's view on the interactions between the property sector and consumption in China?  And how would you -- how was the discussion with the Chinese authorities on that perspective?  And what is the IMF's advice for China in the future?  Thank you.

GEORGIEVA: Well, we recognize that this has been a protracted problem to solve, and it has been a significant drag on consumer confidence in China.  The impact is twofold.  One people feel more compelled to save because the asset they rely on has lost some value.  And two, the unfinished business means that there are places where there is demand for real estate, and it is hard for this demand to be met.  The Chinese authorities have taken a set of measures to address the property sector.  So, it's not like they don't realize that there is a problem; they do.  And they are taking action. 

Our advice to them is to be more determined, more decisive.  And there are two things we think that they can do more actively.  One, let developers that are unviable exit, and that would be a way to reduce the liabilities related to the property sector program.  And two, be more proactive where it is meaningful to get the completion of unfinished housing.  On the first one, we think that there is still the need for more decisiveness to let unviable developers exit.  And we have been actually urging more attention for closure on this -- this program.   We call them, I'm sure you know, "zombie firms", but let the zombies go away. 

SRINIVASAN: Just to address your point.  If you look at consumer confidence, it's been plummeting since the real estate prices began, right?  So the point here is that if you address the problem in a very comprehensive way, that should revive consumer confidence and help in the consumption pick up.  So that's the whole idea; that spend 5 percent of GDP for the next three years, fix the problem on a permanent basis.  That should provide a flip to consumption going forward. 

YAN: Thank you.  Lady in the first row here in -- yeah, right here.  Thank you. 

QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  I'm from CNBC.  I was wondering if your assessment of China's tech policy plans for the next five years what impact that's going to have on the spillover to other economies, since you mentioned exports and rising global tensions?  Thank you.

GEORGIEVA: China has been determined to invest in R&D and to be an innovation-driven economy.  When we assess preparedness for AI, for example, we have an index at the IMF that measures how well countries are prepared for AI on four indicators:  digital infrastructure, labor market adaptability, how innovation flows across the economy, and regulation.  China is number one among emerging markets.  So we expect that this direction of supporting innovation will continue. 

What we hope to see is to let more market forces determine the expansion of companies, and that -- to let competition play its role more. 

And I want to say that unquestionably, the speed with which technology is impacting the way we work, we live, we interact with each other, would be a major focus here and in other countries.  The risk is to try to determine where technology is going to go and put a bet from the public pocket on it.  What we support is to let private bets more to determine what technology, in what way, is going to develop. 

I want to put a praise for China's advancements in green technology.  Clearly, that is good for the economy, and it's also good for quality of life.  Everybody who lives here in Beijing appreciates the fact that there are more EVs on the road now than before.  So there have been some positive developments.  But there is a risk of determination from the public pocket, from the public, of course, oversized vis-à-vis what normally should be competitive forces and private investments. 

YAN: Thank you.  Next, let's go to the gentleman in the third row here. 

QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon, Managing Director.  My name is Joe Cash from Reuters.  I would like to ask you about China's $1 trillion trade surplus and the fact it's forecast, by some economists, to contribute even more, 40 percent of global growth this year, while its imports have flatlined.  French President Macron last weekend said that he had threatened Beijing with tariffs while he was here.  And supporters of Trump's tariff policy say that they are necessary to push Beijing to boost its domestic demand.  But what does the IMF say to governments that feel they have no choice but to place tariffs on Chinese goods because their manufacturing sectors are being hollowed out by cheap Chinese exports?  Thank you.

GEORGIEVA: The focus of our engagement with China during these two weeks and the focus of our analytical work that led to this engagement has been to support China's reorientation of the economy from export-led to a domestic consumption-based economy.  Indeed, when we look at the data for this year, net exports contribute 1.1 percent of the 5 percent growth rate I talked about.  Now, clearly, 3.9 percent comes from domestic activity, but net 1.1 percent is significant. 

And in our engagement with the Chinese authorities, we also brought up the issue of China is choosing to be an open economy.  Therefore, China should be supporting a global economy that does not lean towards protectionism.  And that is to say that China has an interest to accelerate its growth transformation, so as to not provoke other countries to take measures to curb down Chinese exports.  And that is what we stand for.  We have been very clear in our engagement that we think it is beneficial for China, it is beneficial for the world economy, for China to accelerate a transformation that is now long overdue. 

YAN: Thank you.  Lady in the second row.  Thank you. 

QUESTIONER:  Thank you, Director Georgieva.  I'm Lanxu from China Daily.  So, as you just mentioned, a better internal and external balance of the China economy is not only good for China, but good for the world.  So, looking at the coming five years, how do you think the China economy will contribute to global growth, both directly and indirectly?  And can China's transition in development mode also offer valuable references to other developing economies?  Thank you.

GEORGIEVA: In a rapidly changing global environment.  One of the important ingredients of economic policy is agility and flexibility to reflect changing circumstances domestically and globally.  We just talked about the importance for China to recognize that no more it can rely on an export-led growth, including because continuous reliance is likely to lead to actions of trading partners that would go against China's stated objective to have an open, integrated world economy. 

We see the criticality for China to approach economic policy comprehensively.  And I listed the factors that would determine success.  Would they be addressed?  We believe China can come out with a stronger growth position and better employment environment.  But they have to be -- it has to be implemented comprehensively in terms of fiscal policy, in terms of monetary policy, in terms of sectoral policy, labor market policy.  And that is not an easy task.  But this is what the Chinese authorities ought to embrace for success. 

We project China to continue to contribute to global growth in a positive way.  Over the next couple of years, very likely there would be around 30 percent contribution to global growth.  It may go down a bit, but still, China remains a positive contributor to global growth. 

YAN: Thank you.  Lady in pink here on the -- in the first row.  Thank you. 

QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon, Managing Director.  I'm from China Daily.  The 2025 Central Economic Work Conference is going to be held in Beijing.  And I want to ask how do you assess China's achievements during the 14th Five-Year Plan period?  Thank you. 

GEORGIEVA:  The 14 Five-Year?

QUESTIONER:  Yes.

GEORGIEVA: Okay.  The 14th Five-Year Plan overall has met the objectives set in terms of growth.  It has also shown that the Chinese leadership is able to adapt to changing circumstances.  And this is particularly relevant for year 2025, when we have seen significant change in the context of trade tensions.  What we find most significant is that in the last year, in 2025, the Chinese government has more systematically approached the question of change in the growth model from export-led to consumption-led model.  And as I said in the very beginning, we strongly support this reorientation. 

YAN: Thank you.  Second row. 

QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon --

GEORGIEVA: And by the way, meeting the broad targets in 2025 was not an easy task.  And yet, with the attention paid to engaging with key trading partners, we have seen a positive outcome this year. 

QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon, Managing Director.  I'm from Global Times.  My question is, what does the IMF see as the main driver of China's economic growth in this year and going forward?  We know that China has announced a more proactive fiscal and monetary policies for next year recently.  And how does the IMF see the effectiveness of China's macro policies in supporting stable growth?  Thank you. 

GEORGIEVA: In 2025, the main factor for reaching 5 percent growth rate remains exports.  What we have seen is China increasing exports across the board in all regions with the exception of the United States and doing so on the basis of favorable conditions, including the real exchange rate depreciation that helped Chinese exports to be more competitive. 

In 2025, consumption did not contribute positively to growth.  Consumption remained somewhat weak.  And similarly, investments in this year have seen somewhat weaker performance.  In 2026, as we project growth to slow down from 5 to 4.5 percent, most of this -- oh, I'm sorry.  And in 2025, one thing that helped tremendously for good economic performance were supportive fiscal and monetary policy measures.  In 2026, we project somewhat slower growth, going from 5 to 4.5 percent, mostly because we anticipate somewhat less favorable external performance. 

And one of your colleagues asked a question:  what would other countries do if China continues to be a source of significant supply of cheaper goods?  So that is going to be a factor affecting China.  And therefore, we strongly support the government coming up with fiscal and monetary policy measures to secure the performance of the economy and to support the shift towards more domestic consumption. 

YAN: Thank you.  I think we have time only for one last question.  I'll go to the gentleman in the second row here.  

QUESTIONER:  I want to ask what you mentioned twice, which is youths.  And I want to go after both you and Sonali.  You mentioned in the second area recommending that China implement labor market reform to address skill mismatch and youth unemployment.  We know, as you explained, youth unemployment in China is perhaps exacerbated by AI in addition to China's macroeconomic imbalance.  And we see, both in the U.S. and also in India, there is more hiring freeze than outright layoff due to AI.  And given China's bigger public sector and SOEs, layoff is perhaps more difficult in China, which could in turn put bigger pressure on recruiting younger graduates.  So, a two-part question.  So, for China, what specific labor market reform IMF have in mind when writing that recommendation, and, in general, how to counter this challenge to AI for all countries?  Thanks.

GEORGIEVA: Thank you for your question.  I can tell you this is one of the questions that make me wake up in the middle of the night because it is not easy to answer.  The generic answer is do two things:  labor market flexibility combined with securities, flex security.  So you provide some security to people, they don't find themselves in desperate situations if there is an impact on employment.  But you also make it easy for people to move from one job to another, from one location, location, physical location to another.  And then provide support on skills so people can take on new jobs that will become available. 

When we assess the impact of AI on the labor market, globally, we see about 40 percent of jobs being impacted.  Either enhanced, the job becomes more productive, changed, or eliminated.  40 percent is like a tsunami hitting the labor market.  And our recommendation to governments is, don't underestimate the significance of what is going to be happening.  The more you can equip people with skills, easy to move from one activity to another, and the more you're prepared to provide some social security, the more likely it is that you would survive the tsunami. 

But let me ask Solani, she may have some additional specificity for China.  What do you recommend to China? 

JAIN-CHANDRA: Yes.  So in terms of youth unemployment, as you alluded to, it is indeed elevated at 17 percent in October.  Again, elevated youth employment is not a feature uniquely of China, as you alluded to.  There are other countries facing this now. 

Our recommendation in terms of reducing youth unemployment in China is twofold.  There's the macro aspect, and there are specific labor market policies. 

In terms of the macroeconomy, as we've been saying during this press briefing, more forceful macro policies are needed, and also opening up of the service sector because the service sector employs disproportionately more people.  It's very, you know, it's a job-rich sector, and it also employs the youth.  So, these are the macroeconomic policy recommendations. 

In terms of labor market policies, we recommend active labor market policies, including job search and matching assistance, retraining program, and, as Managing Director said, specific things to reduce, the skills mismatch in the labor market.  So, I think both sets of policies will be needed to reduce youth unemployment.

GEORGIEVA: In China, there is tremendous opportunity for development of the services.  It is still an area of growth.  But it's not going to happen on its own.  It does require thoughtful thinking and policies in place.  So, it can happen. 

And if I can conclude our presentation today, when we think of the future of many Chinese economy, this is a very critical moment.  It is a moment of stepping on a new platform for growth, a new growth model for China.  And we very much urge China to swiftly and decisively move in this direction.  More consumption-oriented, more services, job-rich activities, more support for people who would find that the labor market is more dynamic than it used to be. 

I'll finish with a small anecdote.  When I was your age, I was a young professor in Bulgaria, and I was confident that I will become more senior professor, maybe a dean of my faculty, and I would retire at the age of 55 at the same place where I started to work.  This was, how many, five, six jobs ago, in different continents and different activities.  The world is very different today, and we have to accept that dynamism and unpredictability.  I don't know what you would do in five years' time.  Probably something very different than in 10 years, something that didn't exist as a profession today. 

So, I wish you all the very best of luck.  We enjoyed very much being in China for our engagements, and we are very grateful to all of you for your attendance today and for your questions.  Have a great afternoon.  (Applause)

YAN: Thank you so much, Kristalina, Sonali, and Krishna, and thank you, everyone, for joining us today.  This concludes the Press Conference.  We will post the transcript and video recording of the Press Conference later today, and we wish you a very pleasant rest of the day.  Thank you. 

 

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