October 1, 2026
PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
Speaker: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF
*****
MS. KOZACK: Hello everyone. Welcome to this IMF Press Briefing. It's great to see all of you here in person and those of you joining us online.
I'm Julie Kozack, Director of the IMF's Communication Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States. I'll start with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on Webex and via the Press Center.
The Managing Director is in Bahrain today to participate in the annual Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting.
Turning to next week, on Wednesday, October 7th, the Managing Director will deliver her Curtain Raiser speech at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore at 2 p.m. local time. That's 2 a.m. Washington, D.C. time. The speech will help set the stage for the Annual Meetings in Bangkok, and it will be followed by a Fireside Chat with Singapore President Tharman. The event will be live streamed on IMF.org.
Next week we will release the analytical chapters of our October flagship reports. On October 5, the World Economic Outlook chapter on spillovers from corporate income taxation and the Fiscal Monitor chapter on taxation and growth will be launched. On October 6, the World Economic Outlook chapter on lessons from the cost-of-living crises and the Global Financial Stability Report chapter on hedge funds and financial stability will be launched. On October 8, the Global Financial Stability Report chapter on the tokenization of financial assets will be launched.
And finally, a reminder that registration for the 2026 IMF and World Bank Group Annual Meetings, which will be held in Bangkok, Thailand, from October 12 through 18, is still open. If you have not registered yet, please do go ahead and register through IMFConnect.org. We encourage you to submit your registration and visa applications as soon as possible.
And with that I will now open the floor for your questions. For those of you connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. The floor is open. Let's start with you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much for your time, Julie. We have seen yields in advanced economies advance a lot in the last couple of weeks. How does the IMF see this? Is this a change in the structural pricing of capital? Is this something that is going to be structural across advanced economies, or is it more what they're trying to signal on the inflation outlook in the near term? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Thanks. Does anyone else have a question on this particular topic? Okay, let me go ahead and take this one. So, we have seen a rise in global bond yields in both advanced economies and in some emerging economies in recent months. And this has occurred both in terms of short-term and long-term yields.
So, when we've been looking at short-term yields, what we have seen is that they started to they've increased owing to rises in energy prices. And those increases in energy prices changed expectations in the market regarding the path of monetary policy. And we've in fact seen that some central banks have reacted to inflation pressures with monetary policy tightening. So, that is part of what we've seen in terms of short-term yields.
Then when we look at the longer term, in addition to long-term yields reflecting, say, a changing path for Central Bank policy, we've also, our analysis shows they've also been influenced by some concerns about high levels of debt, even though those concerns have been with us for a little bit of time, and also an increase in term premia.
And then if we look at emerging economies, what we have seen is that yields have risen, but that has taken place also as emerging market spreads have been declining. So, in a sense, the increase in the benchmark yields is, to some extent, it's been offsetting a bit the spread compression that we've seen in emerging economies as emerging economies or because emerging economies rather have taken a lot of measures and done a lot of reforms in the last decades, which have really strengthened their fundamentals.
And maybe the last thing I would say is just that globally what we see is that bond markets are continuing to function in an orderly manner. And then I would of course just refer you to the flagship products that we will be releasing in the next 10 days because they will obviously have a much deeper analysis of this. QUESTIONER: I know that the World Economic Outlook is about to be released, but just wondering if it's, if you can give us an update on the inflation outlook because Kristalina Georgieva, the Managing Director, has said before that the economy is still resilient. We know that. But I’m wondering if, as you've seen, central banks tighten much more, if this changes the economy, the inflation outlook not only for this year, but also for 2027.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so on inflation, I mean, as you noted, we'll be having the new inflation forecasts in the October WEO, which will be released during the week of the Annual Meetings in Thailand.
What we've seen on inflation is that, first we've seen that the energy shock, which is part of what's feeding headline inflation, is not over yet, right? So, we have seen that, you know, oil and gas prices remain elevated. We've seen prices for refined products also quite high. And we've seen increased demand for energy coming from AI, for example. And this has meant that in many countries, inflation has remained quite persistent. And so, I don't want to front-run the projections that we're going to be putting out, but we have seen that, in a sense, the disinflation process in some countries has stalled and that inflation pressures are persistent across many economies in our membership.
Did you want to come in? I understand you may have a question on one of these topics.
QUESTIONER: Thank you for that. I wanted to ask about diesel and diesel hoarding. The U.S. is talking a lot about a potential export ban. We've got a report today about Chinese refiners perhaps suspending some exports. How concerned is the IMF about that and how big of an impact could it have on the global economy?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so I think in terms of policies or potential policies, I don't want to speculate. What I can say today is just to give you a sense of what we are seeing when it comes to refined products. And you know, I think it's important to remember why are refined products so important. It's actually because households and firms consume refined products, not crude oil.
So, what we've seen is that diesel, gasoline and jet fuel prices are up between 60 and 97 percent relative to their pre-conflict levels, and that reflects limited refining capacity. And we've also seen that alternative refining hubs tend to be operating at near full capacity. So that's creating capacity constraints when it comes to refined products. So what it means, I think for consumers and businesses is that the shock is not only related to supplies of crude and natural gas through the Strait of Hormuz, but also the impact that the loss of some refining capacity in the Gulf means for these refined products, which as we, as I noted, are important for consumers.
QUESTIONER: So, again, I know you're not going to front-run the WEO, but I did want to ask about, with the Iran war obviously prolonged now, we're entering its eighth month today, there were obviously some countries that had more reserves at the beginning, more resilience at the beginning. And the IMF also spoke about this, is that, you know, there'll be different stages to this.
So, are there now countries as we enter the eight months that are entering into that kind of red zone, especially fiscally where they've been offering all of these subsidies and are there conversations ongoing with specific countries about potential arrangements with the IMF for Help.
And then on the WEO front, not asking for specific numbers, but you know, we were in normal, severe and adverse and severe. Are we now in, like, a new phase after that? Is it severe, prolonged, or something else?
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Does anyone else have a question on this kind of global economy? Okay, so maybe the to, if you recall, at the Spring Meetings, you know, one of the things that we talked about quite a lot was the asymmetric impact of the shock. And we talked about that for countries that had limited policy buffers, for countries that were net energy importers. And now I would add, for countries that are not kind of integrated into the AI-related supply chain, which is providing an impetus to the global economy, there are a group of countries that are not benefiting, let's say, from the AI investment boom necessarily, but they are also very much affected by the energy shock and they have limited policy buffers.
So, this group of countries, which tend to mostly be low-income and fragile countries, these are the countries that we're most concerned about still. And some of those countries already have IMF arrangements, and we're working very closely with them. In some cases, we have augmented the size of programs. In some cases, we have rephased programs. In some cases, we have, you know, worked with, well, in all cases we're working with other partners also to see how we can best support these countries in our membership. And I'm sure that at the time of the Meetings in Bangkok, this will be an important part of the discussions.
And then maybe on your second question, when we did the WEO in April, we were at a time of very, very high uncertainty about the way the war would kind of play out, particularly how long it might last and what might be the impact. So, we did come up with three scenarios at that time. In the July WEO Update, we went back to having kind of our more traditional baseline scenario. And so, I think what we've seen in terms of the conflict is a few things. One is it has been kind of persistent, more prolonged, but at the same time, we have seen that the global economy has been actually quite resilient, and that's because of these two opposing forces. We have the negative energy shock, but we also have the kind of positive impetus from the AI investment boom. So, at the aggregate level, the global economy is kind of holding up, but beneath the surface, we still are very concerned about the divergences that I talked about in the beginning.
QUESTIONER: Good morning, Julie.
With Argentina, it was recently revealed that GDP contracted in Argentina in the second quarter, with sharp declines in consumer spending and investment. Economic activity fell. Mass market consumption also dropped year-on-year. Poverty rate rose by almost four points. And unemployment rate also saw a slight increase. Is IMF concerned about these indicators, and based on them, do you believe the Argentine government should make any changes to its economic program? And also, if you could provide any details about the IMF mission to Buenos Aires for the Third Review that concludes this week? Thank you so much.
QUESTIONER: Hi. What is the cause of this negative economic indicator for your opinion or IMF opinion?
MS. KOZACK: Okay. And then online, let's start with you.
QUESTIONER: Good morning, Julie. Following with the question of my colleagues, is the IMF not concerned about the drop of the tax revenue? I mean, don't you think this could affect the fiscal balance, which is one of the anchors of this Argentina program? Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. I was wondering if the IMF is considering a review on the fiscal target and also on the growth target. Considering what [was] just mentioned? And do you see a problem in the recent rise of sovereign risk in Argentina?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Would you like to come in? Okay. We're having a problem with audio, so let me go ahead and take these questions.
So, with regard to the questions, first I can say that a technical mission led by Mission Chief Joyce Wong visited Buenos Aires just recently in September. The dates were September 21st through 29th. So, the mission just ended a few days ago. And this was part of the discussions for the Third Review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. Discussions are continuing, and they will continue in the coming weeks. And those discussions are aimed at reaching a Staff-Level Agreement for the Third Review. So, several of the questions that were asked are obviously going to be part of those discussions that are taking place between the IMF and the team about the potential impact on tax revenues. Things like this will be discussed as part of the discussions between the team and the authorities.
Just stepping back, I think, to answer some of the broader questions. You know, as we've talked about many times before, we see that Argentina has made significant progress in restoring macroeconomic stability in a very challenging environment of what had been, you know, high debt and also what had been very high inflation. So, we've seen a big decline in inflation over the last few years. We've seen a strengthening of the external position as reserves have been accumulated. We've seen quite a lot of fiscal discipline moving from deficit into fiscal surplus. So, all of this stabilization is important, and it is a key foundation for sustainable growth in Argentina. And there is a joint recognition between the IMF and the Argentine authorities of two things on the growth front.
One is that the work to really strengthen Argentina's resilience needs to continue. And the other joint recognition is that it's important to ensure that growth, which so far has been very much in the energy, mining and agricultural sectors, broadens and becomes more evenly distributed across sectors in the economy, but also across workers. So, that means that right now a lot of the focus of the discussions, in addition to the, you know, the kind of the details of the program, it's really on how can Argentina consolidate the gains from the stabilization that has been achieved and broaden those gains across the economy. And this is going to be essential to support, obviously, stronger investment. It's going to be important to support durable economic growth. It's going to be important to support job creation. And ultimately this is all important for better opportunities for the people of Argentina, which is of course the ultimate objective.
QUESTIONER: Thank you for taking my question. So, I want to ask about U.S.-China trade. So, recently, the two sides have decided to lower tariffs on $30 billion worth of products, the so-called non-sensitive products. I was wondering whether you could comment on the development and what do you think it would impact bilateral trade and maybe globally.
MS. KOZACK: So, on U.S.-China trade and the summit, and the outcomes, what I would say is, you know, we very much welcome the extension of the truce or the agreement and the constructive engagement between the U.S. and the Chinese authorities. This is important because it helps enhance the predictability of the trading environment and that's an important achievement. Our understanding is that the arrangement that's been reached or agreed establishes a framework for considering more favorable tariff treatment for certain products. We'll continue to monitor developments in this area, especially as implementation becomes clearer.
QUESTIONER: Thank you for taking my question. A couple on Lebanon. So, the MD hosted Prime Minister Salam earlier this week. Could the IMF sort of characterize how those discussions went? And then secondly, reports later emerged this week that President Aoun made an appeal to the Constitutional Council over one of the articles in the Bank Resolution Law. How is the IMF viewing these latest developments as Lebanon is seeking a new Staff-Level Agreement with the Fund? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. Do you have a question on Lebanon also?
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Anyone online wants to come in on Lebanon?
QUESTIONER: Yes, I had a question also in Lebanon regarding the appeal from President Aoun yesterday or a few days ago. So, this conflicts with the -- he said that this conflicts with the central bank's independence, and yet the Prime Minister says Lebanon wants an SLA soon and that he met, especially after he met the MD a few days ago, and that the Parliament's supposed to debate the Gap law within days. How will this affect the program? I will add to what the gentleman has said that's on Lebanon. I have another question on Saudi Arabia. I don't know if I can say it now, or you would give me the time later to ask about Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
MS. KOZACK: So why don't we take the question on Saudi now, and then I'll come back if I can.
QUESTIONER: All right. For Saudi Arabia, I want to ask what does the IMF or how does the IMF see the projections of a 12.8 percent rise in GDP that was said yesterday in the budget that was issued as a 12.8 percent growth? How does the IMF see this after the decrease in oil revenues in general, given the situation that's in Saudi Arabia? And on Egypt, I would like also to ask what's next regarding the third tranche, I mean the last tranche. And when is the IMF delegation expected to finalize their assessment?
QUESTIONER: Hi. Yeah, just on Egypt to add to that question, I know specifically the issue of state-owned enterprises in the Egypt program has been a bit of an issue, and there's also been a lack of transparency, it seems like on what's been privatized, how much is left to go and particularly the military-linked enterprises. So, what's the Fund's view on that as we head into basically the final phases of this program and kind of what comes next there? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. All right, so before I answer, let me just give anyone online a chance if they want to come in on any of these three countries: Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. Okay, let me go ahead, and I'll start with Lebanon.
So, on Lebanon, the Managing Director, as was noted, did meet with the Prime Minister on Tuesday. She reaffirmed the IMF's willingness to support Lebanon in developing and implementing a comprehensive economic reform agenda. They also discussed, you know, the recent reform progress in Lebanon. They discussed the fact that Lebanon has, and the Lebanese authorities have managed to maintain, you know, a measure of macroeconomic stability, you know, despite exceptionally difficult circumstances facing the country. And they finally discussed, you know, the path to advancing key reforms that can ultimately support economic stability, which, as we just discussed, is really a key foundation for sustainable growth in the country, jobs and, of course, ultimately better living standards for the people of Lebanon.
There has been recent reform progress, including the approval of amendments to the Bank Resolution Law. Those amendments were approved on August 12th, and that represented an important step forward in advancing the banking sector restructuring strategy. The IMF's view is that the Bank Resolution Law that was approved by Parliament is consistent with international standards, which for us is a critical criteria. We do understand now that the law was referred to the Constitutional Council by the president. And so, as that process plays out, and if any changes are made to the law through this review process, we will assess those, any changes for consistency with international standards, and we would then provide any new advice to the authorities accordingly.
In terms of when we think about, you know, what is the path toward the program, a program or reaching an agreement on a program between the IMF and Lebanon, it will require continued progress on key reforms, including the entry into force of the Bank Resolution Law, an appropriate Financial Gap Law consistent with international standards, a 2027 budget and medium-term fiscal framework that are consistent with debt sustainability for the country. And of course, there will be a number of other reforms that Lebanon will need to take, particularly in the areas of public financial management and governance.
Now turning to the question on Saudi Arabia. Noor, on your specific question, our team of course will be assessing the budget that the Saudis have submitted. And that assessment is still ongoing. So, I don't have anything for you on the specific question. But what I can say more generally on Saudi Arabia is that the country has demonstrated resilience despite disruptions to trade and oil exports. It's diversified oil and logistics infrastructure have been very important, as have the authorities' efforts to reroute trade, that has helped cushion the impact of the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
The other thing I can say on Saudi Arabia is that the resilience that the economy has shown has been supported by the fact that the country has strong macroeconomic fundamentals, and it has had some fiscal response or some government spending that has helped, and private consumption has held up. So, that's what I can share for now on Saudi Arabia.
And then turning to Egypt. First, on where we are with the review, what I can say now is that we recently completed in August the Seventh Review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Second Review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). So those were completed in August, and Egypt received about U.S. $1.8 billion. The final EFF review and the Third RSF review, together, we envisage those in the fourth quarter of 2026, and that would make about U.S. $2.3 billion available to Egypt. And that would be the final review of the EFF. The EFF is currently set to expire on December 15th of 2026. And I don't have yet a mission date, but of course when we have one, we will be sure to share that with you.
Now, on the question about state-owned enterprises, this is a topic that has been a key part of our discussions with the Egyptian authorities. It's been a key objective of the program and has been to reduce the state's footprint in the economy and to create space for the private sector. So, what we will be discussing, we will, obviously, the team will be discussing this with the authorities on the next mission. But our general advice to the Egyptian authorities is to have more decisive implementation of the reforms needed to support a stronger private sector and therefore stronger private sector-led growth.
Why do we care so much about this? Because we see a strong and thriving and vibrant private sector in Egypt as really creating, as being an engine for job creation for the people of Egypt. Some of the priorities for reducing the state's footprint include accelerating the divestment, implementing the state-ownership policy, leveling the playing field between private and state-owned enterprises, strengthening governance in state-owned enterprises, and then some broader reforms to improve the business climate and competition in Egypt.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. My question is about Venezuela.
QUESTIONER: Could you provide an update of the consultations with the authorities and have there been any advances, including to reopen an office in the country?
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Venezuela. I would like to ask, now that you have several missions in the country, how do you assess, so far, first, the quality of the data that they're sharing with you and also the quality of the institutions on the ground that are gathering that information? I know that the relationship right now is more focused on technical assistance, but if you could give us an update of what you have seen on the ground.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thanks. And would anybody else want to come in on Venezuela, including anyone online?
QUESTIONER: So, on Venezuela, there's talk about the country going the IMF route anyway and seeking a program and going through that whole routine. Is that something the authorities have signaled to IMF Staff there as well?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thanks. Anyone else on Venezuela? Okay, let me give the update on Venezuela.
So, the Managing Director met with Acting President Delcy Rodriguez on September 21st on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. In that meeting, they exchanged views on Venezuela's economic situation, including the recovery from the earthquake. They discussed progress on the reengagement between the IMF and Venezuela. And they also discussed how the IMF can continue to support Venezuela through capacity development and policy advice. And then, just talking about some of the other engagements we've had with Venezuela, a Staff team visited Caracas from late August to early September to discuss again capacity development priorities for capacity development and data provision that followed an earlier visit by the head of our Western Hemisphere Department.
And what we're really focused on now with Venezuela is to identify the key areas for technical cooperation. And the areas that so far have been identified are macroeconomic statistics, monetary operations, foreign exchange operations, treasury operations, and tax administration. These are the areas that we're sort of converging on with the authorities for where we can provide capacity development and technical advice. The Fund and the Venezuelan authorities are considering a local presence in Venezuela to facilitate this technical cooperation and capacity development. The timing and modalities are still being discussed, but we'll keep you updated as those discussions continue.
And maybe, finally, just to say that the Venezuelan authorities have not requested an IMF program, nor have they requested financing from the IMF. Any financing that would be provided would be only at the request of the authorities.
Okay, let's go online.
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. Good morning. Thanks for taking my question. I have two questions. One, with the UN General Assembly wrapping up earlier this week, there have been calls once again from Small Island States, especially those within the Caribbean, surrounding moving away from GNI to more the Multidimensional Poverty Index. And they basically alluded to the IMF and the World Bank as institutions. I just want to get your thoughts on that and whether or not this is something that's under consideration for maybe implementation sometime down the road.
And also going back to the question surrounding inflation. I know the full details will be released later this month during the Meetings. But for small states that are governments that are still trying to rebuild their buffers and the challenges surrounding the global inflation and the war, what recommendation would the IMF give to these countries that have basically started to reduce the taxes or also remove taxes on oils and oil and gas and so forth when it comes to preparing budgets for 2027?
MS. KOZACK: On the first question, on the shift from gross national income to, like, a Multidimensional Vulnerability Index. These are discussions that are happening at the UN. A few years ago, I think in August 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing governance arrangements for moving to a multidimensional vulnerability index. Some work has started, but there has not been a broad consensus on what the index would look like, what would be the components of the index. And so those discussions are underway. And so far, no development finance has been tied to this particular index.
When it comes to the way the IMF thinks about vulnerability, we take vulnerability of small and developing states, into account already in our core functions. And I can just point to one area where we recognize that some small states, if you look at, you know, just per capita income, for example, that that one measure doesn't adequately reflect their vulnerability. So, for example, at the IMF, small and developing states can qualify for concessional financing even though their per capita income is at a higher threshold than other larger members. So, we do already tailor our policies in a way to the needs of small and developing states. But we'll of course follow the discussion of the multidimensional vulnerability index carefully.
And then on your second question on the energy shock, the impact on inflation, and what does it mean for small states, at least for the Caribbean countries. What we have seen, and I think what you alluded to, is that fiscal buffers are limited in many, many of these countries. So, what that means is that for governments that find themselves in a position where they do need to provide support to their people, it's important that fiscal policy is really prioritized and targeted, right? So that there's a priority on protecting the most vulnerable members of society, that fiscal support is targeted and temporary. And it's important to also to avoid broad-based measures that can be very fiscally costly, but that also don't provide incentives for the better-off segments of society to conserve energy or to use energy more wisely.
I also just want to make the point that our advice to the Caribbean is very similar to our advice to many of our members, which is that fiscal buffers do need to be rebuilt after many years of shocks in many countries, in many parts of the world, fiscal buffers have been depleted. So, the rebuilding of those buffers does need to continue. And we're working closely with our members in the Caribbean on ways to strengthen fiscal frameworks, improve revenue mobilization, and improve the efficiency of government spending so that rebuilding those buffers can take place. And of course, we're always standing ready to support this very important group of our membership in whatever way that we can.
Okay, let's stay online for a little bit. I see you have your camera on.
QUESTIONER: Sure. Thanks a lot, Julie. I wanted to ask two questions. One is on Zambia. I know that I think there's a mission there, but so there may be limits to what you can say. But their program ran out, and there's talk there about reforms being, demanded or encouraged in exchange for a new program. I just wanted to know what you have on Zambia.
And the second question is a bank regulation question. In the U.S., it seems like the three bank regulators are going in different directions. The FDIC is trying to kind of make it easier for banks to merge. The Federal Reserve hasn't followed. They also differ on something called the Community Reinvestment Act. And I wanted to know what the IMF thinks about -- most countries may have only one bank regulator, but should there be a unified position among countries and bank regulators? And if you have any insight into the interplay between what you work on and banks merging. Thanks a lot.
MS. KOZACK: Great, thanks. So, let me start with Zambia. So, I can confirm that we do have an IMF team currently in Lusaka. The team is there to continue discussions with the Zambian authorities on a possible successor IMF-supported program. The discussions are focused on policies that would safeguard the fiscal and debt sustainability in Zambia, strengthen reserve accumulation and support more inclusive and private sector-led growth. So, that's where we are in terms of Zambia. I'm not, you know, the discussions are ongoing. We do expect that the team will publish a press release at the end of the mission. We'll have further information for you then.
And on your question on bank regulation and particularly the way regulation is organized within the U.S., I don't have anything for you on that right now. I would refer you either to the press conference upcoming the week of the Annual Meetings on the Global Financial Stability Report, which will cover bank regulation globally, or to the Press Conference of the Western Hemisphere Department, which will cover the United States. And I think that's a place where you could get an answer to that question.
I'm going to now go to a question that we received online on Ukraine. I'll read it out loud. It's from Jorge from Euronews. And the question is, "Ukraine has identified a $32.6 billion shortfall in its 2027 budget. Have you identified the same number or a different one? Do you have an updated assessment on Ukraine's financing needs for 2027 onwards? What sources of assistance could be deployed to fill the growing gap” So, that's a question on Ukraine.
Does anyone else have a question on Ukraine?
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. The next program review, we understand, is coming up in November. Curious for the key requirements that the Fund will be looking at during that review.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, if nobody else on Ukraine, I will go ahead and answer these. So, on Ukraine, we completed the First Review of the program in July, and we had a team visit Ukraine in early September. The mission ended on September 2nd. We've continued to have constructive engagement and discussions with the authorities and donors. So, that's continued. And that includes a bilateral meeting between the Managing Director and President Zelensky in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.
And the Managing Director also met with Finance Minister Marchenko in Dublin during the ECOFIN meeting. Our Staff is working to bring a combined Second and Third Review to the Executive Board by December. Bringing the review to the Board is subject to securing sufficient and credible financing assurances to close a projected financing gap on terms that would be compatible with debt sustainability in Ukraine.
Now, in terms of the potential size of the financing gap, we're in close discussions, as I noted, with the Ukrainian authorities and their international partners. Those discussions are aiming to confirm Ukraine's financing needs and to secure financing assurances to help with timely completion of the program reviews. I don't have specifics on the numbers for you now and beyond 2026. The specific financing gap is going to depend on, of course, the very importantly, the evolution of the war, the implementation of reforms by the authorities, economic developments, and continued support from Ukraine's international partners.
Let me continue online. I thought I saw somebody else online.
QUESTIONER: Yes. So, Julie, I just want to follow up on what you have said about Lebanon and the SLA or the -- with regards to the Constitutional Council and the appeal. So, will the SLA to Lebanon be -- would Lebanon be delayed because of the appeal? And will the IMF increase its presence inside Lebanon if an SLA is signed with the government?
MS. KOZACK: So, on the Staff-Level Agreement, well, so what I can say, I think I was, I believe I was fairly clear that the path toward reaching an agreement requires a few different ingredients. So, particularly, I put it under the guide, you know, the name of continued progress with reforms. So, the first is the entry into force of the Bank Resolution Law. Another is the appropriate Financial GAAP Law, which is consistent with international standards. Another important area is a 2027 budget and a medium-term fiscal framework that are consistent with debt sustainability in Lebanon. And the fourth area would be an agreement on structural reforms, particularly focused on public financial management and governance. So, in order to reach an agreement, a Staff-Level Agreement, we would need to see progress on, in those areas.
For Lebanon? Yep. Senegal. Okay, we'll take Senegal and then we'll wrap up. Go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. Senegal. I would like to ask if you can give us an update on how is the IMF considering the TRS liabilities on the debt restructuring? Our understanding, of course, is that that's part of the external debt. But now, as the country is aiming to restructure its debt under the G20 Common Framework, would it be a case in which these liabilities will need to be part of the comparability of treatment under this potential debt restructuring treatment? Yeah, that's all.
MS. KOZACK: Thanks. Anybody else on Senegal? Go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Details on what an enhanced common framework might entail, or any kind of timeline for the either the IMF program or the audit that the government has talked about that will determine to keep payment arrears.
MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Senegal? Yeah, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Yeah, I was just. I wanted to check about the call next week that the IMF is hosting on behalf of Senegal or with Senegal. You've decided to make the call private, which I thought was interesting considering the enhanced -- the call for enhanced transparency and the, you know, the TSDR also really stresses better transparency from all parties. So why are you making this call private?
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Senegal? Okay, let me answer these questions, and then we will bring the Press Briefing to a close.
Maybe just talking a little bit about where we are on Senegal. The Managing Director met President Faye here at IMF headquarters on September 15th. She reaffirmed the IMF's commitment to supporting Senegal's reform agenda, including efforts to restore fiscal sustainability, advance with its debt treatment, and foster stronger growth and job creation in Senegal.
In terms of some of the more specific questions, maybe I start with the debt. I think, as we know, the authorities intend to pursue an external debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework. The goal is to address Senegal's elevated debt vulnerabilities. The authorities have held initial bilateral meetings or meetings with bilateral creditors, and there has been an agreement to form an official creditor committee in the coming week.
From our side, from the IMF side, we have offered to provide our good offices, which are aimed at facilitating information sharing and engagement, stronger engagement between the creditors, but also between the creditor and the debtor country, in this case Senegal. On October 6, under the IMF's good offices, the authorities, the Senegalese authorities will convene a meeting to brief external creditors on Senegal's economic and financial situation, on Senegal's reform program and on its debt treatment. And the IMF will attend this meeting.
As I noted, we will outline the staff-level agreement and some elements of the IMF's lending policies as part of that discussion. But I want to be clear that this is part of the IMF's provision of good offices. The ultimate discussions around the details of the debt restructuring, including comparability of treatment, are between the debtor and the creditors.
There was a question on enhanced common framework. So, here I want to just clarify there's one common framework under the G20. Recent experience and the work of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable have helped to improve processes, coordination among stakeholders and timeliness in terms of debt restructuring. But it's one common framework that is in place in terms of timeline. I don't have a timeline yet for exactly when we will be able to bring the program to our Executive Board for consideration, but we will certainly keep you posted.
And then finally, on the question on the total return swaps. On total return swaps, as a general principle, these instruments are treated as debt for the purpose of our debt sustainability analysis (DSA). And in Senegal's case, because the creditors of the total return swap are non-residents, the operations are classified as external debt in the DSA.
And with this, I'm going to bring this press briefing to a close. Thank you all very much for your participation today.
As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States. A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org. And if we did not have time to get to any of your questions, please reach out to the media team at media@mf.org or via the Press Center, and we'll follow up with you bilaterally.
We look forward to seeing many of you in Bangkok for the 2026 IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings. Wishing you all a wonderful day and safe travels for those of you who will be joining us in Bangkok. Thanks very much.
* * * * *
© 2026 International Monetary Fund. All rights reserved.
