IMF Working Papers

Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions

ByFrancesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun

December 1, 2001

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Francesca Castellani, and Xavier Debrun. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions", IMF Working Papers 2001, 205 (2001), accessed 12/7/2025, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451874556.001

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central

Subject: Central bank autonomy, Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Inflation

Keywords: CB governor, CB independence, inflation rate, monetary policy, WP

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