Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?
January 1, 2000
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Summary
This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.
Subject: Bank deposits, Bank soundness, Banking, Banking crises, Deposit insurance, Financial crises, Financial sector policy and analysis, Financial services, Moral hazard
Keywords: Africa, bank deposit, Bank deposits, Bank soundness, Banking crises, deposit insurance, Deposit insurance, deposit insurance design, deposit insurance variable, design feature, design variable, E44, G21, G28, Global, insurance design, insurance dummy, insurance scheme, insurance system, Moral hazard, WP
Pages:
29
Volume:
2000
DOI:
Issue:
003
Series:
Working Paper No. 2000/003
Stock No:
WPIEA0032000
ISBN:
9781451841893
ISSN:
1018-5941
