Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?
IMF Working Papers, January 1, 2000
Source details
- Canonical URL
- Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?
Other formats
Bibliographic details
- Authors: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache
- Published: January 1, 2000
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451841893.001
Major finding
- Analysis of panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability.
Heterogeneity of effects
- The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability is stronger:
- where bank interest rates are deregulated;
- where the institutional environment is weak;
- when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive;
- when the scheme is funded;
- when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.
Data and scope
- Sample: panel data for 61 countries.
- Period covered: 1980–97.
Research context and framing
- Publication type: IMF Working Papers.
- Subject and keywords include: Bank deposits, Bank soundness, Banking, Banking crises, Deposit insurance, Financial crises, Financial sector policy and analysis, Financial services, Moral hazard; Africa; deposit insurance design; insurance scheme; insurance system; design feature; design variable; insurance dummy; insurance design; insurance variable; WP; E44; G21; G28; Global.
Publication identifiers (as presented on the source page)
- Pages: 29
- Volume: 2000
- Issue: 003
- Series: Working Paper No. 2000/003
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451841893.001
- Stock No: WPIEA0032000
- ISBN: 9781451841893
- ISSN: 1018-5941
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? — By Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, January 1, 2000 (IMF Working Papers).
Content in this bundle
- Does deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? - WP/00/3