Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power
IMF Working Papers, April 1, 2007
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Eric Le Borgne, Gauti B. Eggertsson
- Published: April 1, 2007
- Series: IMF Working Papers
Summary
- Paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution.
- Formalizes rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998).
- Delegation trades off:
- the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract; against
- the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) is better insulated from the whims of public opinion.
- Natural application: monetary policy, where the model provides a new theory of central bank independence.
Key findings and theoretical contributions
- Presents a formal model capturing the dynamic incentive trade-off between politician and technocrat.
- Identifies two principal benefits of delegation:
- Increased effort in specialized policy tasks by the technocrat.
- Greater insulation of policy decisions from short-term swings in public opinion.
- Identifies a principal cost of delegation:
- Risk of appointing a possibly incompetent technocrat protected by a long-term job contract.
Application: monetary policy and central bank independence
- The model is applied to monetary policy to provide a new theory of central bank independence, explaining institutional delegation as a response to dynamic incentive problems facing politicians and technocrats.
Publication and metadata
- Authors: Eric Le Borgne, Gauti B. Eggertsson
- Publication date: April 1, 2007
- Series: Working Paper No. 2007/091
- Issue: 091
- Volume: 2007
- Pages: 35
- ISBN: 9781451866551
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Stock No: WPIEA2007091
- DOI: ---
- Subjects: Banking, Central bank autonomy, Inflation, Output gap, Tax incentives
- Keywords: mover accent, WP
Source: Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power, IMF Working Papers, April 1, 2007. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/dynamic-incentives-and-the-optimal-delegation-of-political-power-20427