| Public Information Notices (PINs) are issued, (i) at the request of a member country, following the conclusion of the Article IV consultation for countries seeking to make known the views of the IMF to the public. This action is intended to strengthen IMF surveillance over the economic policies of member countries by increasing the transparency of the IMF's assessment of these policies; and (ii) following policy discussions in the Executive Board at the decision of the Board. |
The IMF Executive Board on July 9, 1997 concluded the 1997 Article IV consultation1 with Turkey.
Background
Following a sharp contraction in 1994, output growth rebounded strongly during
1995–96 (to average about 8 percent annually), reflecting strong export growth and a
recovery in private consumption and investment, and, in 1996, a renewed expansionary fiscal
stance. Growth in 1997 is projected at 5½ percent, again driven primarily by domestic
demand, but with exports also rising strongly. Inflation in the course of 1997 is projected to
remain in the 80–85 percent range.
The interpretation of developments in the balance of payments is complicated by the large
but unrecorded "shuttle trade," mainly with the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Although estimates of the magnitude of this trade vary widely, the Central Bank of Turkey has
made a preliminary adjustment to the 1996 balance of payments data which reduces the current
account deficit from 2.4 percent of GNP on an unadjusted basis to 0.8 percent of GNP, including
shuttle trade receipts. Exports of goods and services grew by 12 percent a year during
1995–96 despite sluggishness in Europe and the rapid expansion of domestic demand.
Turkey’s external debt rose to about US$80 billion in 1996 (43 percent of GNP), of
which almost US$49 billion was public debt (26.2 percent of GNP). Short-term external debt,
mainly private, continued rising strongly in 1996. However, international reserves also increased
almost by the same amount to a level of almost US$17 billion, or 3.8 months of imports, by
end-1996. The government maintained access to external credit, raising US$3.1 billion in 1996
and US$1.4 billion so far in 1997, despite recent rating downgrades. The debt service ratio is
expected to increase from 23.8 percent of current receipts (excluding shuttle trade) to 26½
percent in 1997.
The fiscal position deteriorated sharply in 1996 as the public sector borrowing requirement is
estimated to have reached 11.3 percent of GNP, against 6.1 percent in 1995. Budgetary revenues
stagnated (at 17.7 percent of GNP) and budgetary expenditures rose to about 26 percent of GNP,
led by transfers (especially for social security) and interest payments, with the latter reaching
about 10 percent of GNP, despite a decline in interest rates on domestic borrowing and a
lengthening of maturities during the course of the year. Although domestic borrowing was very
large in 1996, the stock of outstanding domestic and external government debt fell slightly in
relation to GNP, reflecting the central government primary surplus, rapid economic growth, and
below-market interest rates on noncash debt.
IMF staff projections indicate a decline of 1.7 percent in the central government primary
surplus in 1997 (to 0.1 percent of GNP), an improvement of 0.7 percent in the public sector
borrowing requirement (to 10.6 percent of GNP), and continued large domestic borrowing. Over
the medium term, fiscal sustainability is threatened by the costs of an overly generous and poorly
managed social security system whose deficit reached 2 percent of GNP in 1996. In addition, tax
administration is weak and expenditure control hampered by the existence of extrabudgetary
funds, which are included in the budgetary figures.
Privatization is an important means of reducing distortions, improving resource allocation
and a major potential source of one-off budgetary financing. However, the achievement of
ambitious targets for the sale of state assets (a target of 4 percent of GNP underlies the 1997
budget) has been frustrated by the failure to surmount legal and practical obstacles, and the
absence of an adequate legal and regulatory framework.
The central bank has recently followed a monetary policy based on a real exchange rate rule,
with day-to-day operations directed at smoothing fluctuations in overnight lending rates. As a
result, the value of the lira remained substantially unchanged in real effective terms in 1996 while
capital inflows, attracted by high interest rates, contributed to the sharp increase in the central
bank’s foreign assets. These were partially sterilized, resulting in reserve money growth of
some 81 percent in 1996.
The banking system displays a number of problem areas. The financial situation of the state
banks, which account for over 40 percent of the system, including the two largest banks, remains
weak. Directed lending at subsidized rates undertaken by state banks subjects them to perennial
liquidity problems, losses, and inadequate capitalization (the risk-adjusted capital asset ratio of
state banks declined to 0.4 percent at end-September 1996). Private commercial banks, for their
part, have strengthened their balance sheets in recent years and currently exceed the Basle
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent significantly. However, they still are exposed to a
significant maturity mismatch on their assets and liabilities and a substantial open net foreign
exchange position.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors observed that output growth remained strong despite continued high
inflation, and that international reserves were at an adequate level. However, Directors
highlighted the adverse effects of high inflation on the sustainability of output growth and on
income distribution. They also expressed concern about the weak fiscal position and the
precariousness of the economy, reflected in the high level of short-term external debt and
continued high domestic interest rates, as well as the recent downgrading of Turkey by major
credit rating agencies. Directors stressed that the realization of Turkey’s economic
potential required the rapid establishment and maintenance of a stable macroeconomic
environment. Accordingly, while welcoming the new government’s intentions, they
strongly urged it to embark on a bold and comprehensive program of stabilization policies and
structural reform to reduce inflation and set the economy on a sustainable growth path.
Directors recommended a bold approach to disinflation in order to establish the credibility
needed to break inflationary inertia. Fiscal consolidation was considered to be the linchpin of any
stabilization effort, and it would require a significant and front-loaded increase in the primary
fiscal surplus. A sustainable fiscal adjustment would necessitate far-reaching reforms in many
areas. Directors emphasized the importance of restraint over discretionary spending, including, in
particular, reductions in the wage bill, transfers and subsidies, and in the expenditures of
extrabudgetary funds. To control the burgeoning deficit of the social security system, increases in
the minimum retirement age and a tightening of the link between contributions and benefits
should be introduced quickly.
On the revenue front, Directors urged the authorities to broaden the tax base, reduce
exemptions, and strengthen tax administration. Suggestions were also made to unify and raise the
value-added tax rate, to raise gasoline taxes, and to increase the share of direct taxes in total tax
revenue. There was also an urgent need to strengthen budgetary control by eliminating the
quasi-fiscal activities of the state banks and state economic enterprises, and by consolidating the
extrabudgetary funds and bringing them into the formal budget to enhance the transparency of the
public finances. Directors also urged the authorities to firmly resist pressures to adopt backward
wage indexation in the public sector.
Directors called for an acceleration in the privatization process, and, in that context, stressed
the importance of developing the necessary legal and regulatory framework. Urgent steps should
be taken to eliminate the various legal and other obstacles to privatization and to foreign
investment, particularly in the energy sector.
Directors considered that the adoption of credible measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, to
limit backward indexation, and to address deep-seated structural problems would permit a
reorientation of monetary policy toward reducing inflation. Greater central bank independence
and the elimination of central bank advances to the treasury would also further bolster the
effectiveness of monetary policy. Some Directors considered that under a bold and credible
adjustment effort, a nominal exchange rate peg could be advantageous. However, a view was
also expressed that given past experience, it would be difficult to be absolutely confident that all
policies needed to underpin an exchange rate peg would be implemented, and that, therefore, a
move to a peg would be risky.
Directors expressed concern about weaknesses in the banking sector, especially the low
earnings, capitalization, and liquidity of the state banks, which required immediate attention.
They urged the authorities to strengthen banking sector supervision and accounting standards,
and to end the preferential lending of state banks to favored sectors, a practice that introduces
distortions and undermines the stability of the banking sector as a whole. Eliminating the
quasi-fiscal activities of state banks would also permit their eventual privatization, a goal that
should be pursued as an essential element of banking sector reform.
Directors urged the authorities to move ahead forcefully with improvements in the coverage,
quality, and timeliness of Turkey’s macroeconomic data. They strongly regretted the
recent failure to release monthly data on budgetary receipts and expenditures, and urged the
authorities to reinstate the monthly fiscal data releases and to improve the transparency of the
fiscal accounts. They also encouraged the authorities to make additional efforts to assess the
magnitude and implications of the shuttle trade and to improve data on the balance of payments
and capital flows more generally.
A few Directors encouraged the authorities to consider an arrangement with the IMF to
underpin a strong macroeconomic and structural adjustment program, and to enhance the
credibility of the stabilization efforts that they regarded as essential for the future growth of the
Turkish economy.
| Turkey: Selected Economic Indicators |
|
| |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
19961 |
19972 |
|
| |
Change in percent |
| Domestic Economy |
| Real GNP |
8.1 |
-6.1 |
8.1 |
7.9 |
5.5 |
| CPI (Dec. to Dec.) |
71.1 |
125.5 |
78.9 |
79.8 |
84.0 |
| WPI (Dec. to Dec.) |
60.3 |
149.6 |
64.9 |
84.9 |
85.3 |
| Unemployment (percent) |
7.7 |
8.1 |
6.9 |
6.0 |
... |
| |
In billions of U.S. dollars |
| External Economy |
|
| Trade balance |
-14.2 |
-4.2 |
-13.2 |
-18.4 |
-21.3 |
| Current account |
-6.4 |
2.6 |
-2.3 |
-4.4 |
-5.7 |
| Current account (adjusted)3 |
... |
... |
... |
-1.5 |
... |
| Foreign reserves4 |
7.7 |
8.5 |
12.6 |
16.8 |
... |
| Total external debt |
67.4 |
65.6 |
73.3 |
79.8 |
82.5 |
|
Medium- and long-term |
48.8 |
54.3 |
57.6 |
59.2 |
58.8 |
|
Short-term |
18.5 |
11.3 |
15.7 |
20.5 |
23.7 |
| Debt service ratio5 |
27.0 |
30.5 |
28.7 |
23.8 |
26.5 |
Real effective exchange rate (1990=100)6 |
107.5 |
80.7 |
86.1 |
87.8 |
... |
| |
Percent of GNP |
| Financial Variables |
| Public sector borrowing requirement7 |
14.9 |
9.3 |
6.1 |
11.3 |
10.6 |
| Consolidated budget deficit |
6.4 |
4.0 |
3.8 |
8.3 |
7.7 |
|
Primary balance |
-0.9 |
3.7 |
3.3 |
1.8 |
0.1 |
| Central government debt |
29.4 |
38.1 |
32.3 |
31.3 |
31.2 |
|
External |
15.6 |
23.2 |
18.6 |
16.4 |
15.4 |
|
Domestic |
13.8 |
14.9 |
13.8 |
14.9 |
15.8 |
Total domestic investment |
26.1 |
21.2 |
23.1 |
23.6 |
24.1 |
| |
Change in percent |
Money and credit (end of year) |
| Reserve money |
66.2 |
82.6 |
84.9 |
80.9 |
77.0 |
| M2X8 |
263.3 |
147.8 |
103.4 |
109.6 |
87.3 |
| Interest rate (percent)9 |
85.8 |
161.0 |
123.5 |
136.2 |
... |
|
Sources: Data provided by the Turkish authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
|
1Estimated.
2Projected
3Adjusted for shuttle trade.
4Gross official reserves at end-of-period; excluded balances of the Turkish
Defense Fund; includes gold.
5Interest plus medium- and long-term debt repayments as percent of current
receipts (excluding official transfers).
6Period average.
7Adjusted for extrabudgetary and quasi-fiscal operations.
8M2 plus resident foreign exchange deposits.
9Three-month treasury bill rate, annual average. |
1Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of
Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team
visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the
country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff
prepare a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion
of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of
directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. In this PIN, the
main features of the Board’s discussion are described.
|