Public Information Notice (PIN) No.
06/02
January 5, 2006
On November 21, 2005 the Executive Board of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the
2005 Article IV Consultation, Second Post-Program
Monitoring (PPM) Discussions, and the Ex Post Assessment (EPA) of
Longer-Term Program Engagement with Jordan.1
Background
Jordan graduated from a series of Fund-supported programs in
2004. Its performance was mixed in the first three Fund-supported
programs following the 1989 crisis, but improved
after 1998. This turnaround reflected greater
ownership by the authorities, combined with a critical mass of
fiscal policy and structural reforms under a medium-term strategy,
supported by substantial external grants and an exit rescheduling
agreement with the Paris Club. The Jordanian economy grew at an
exceptionally strong pace in 2004, with real GDP increasing by
7.7 percent, largely on account of a surge in
domestic demand. Inflation remained low at
3.4 percent and unemployment fell to 12.5 percent. The Amman stock exchange (ASE)
index rose by 62 percent; real estate prices also
increased dramatically. The privatization program
has been accelerated in 2005. In addition, important progress has
been made on the construction of a new natural gas pipeline between
Egypt and Jordan, which will reduce dependence on costly petroleum
products for power generation.
The budget deficit, including external grants, remained low at
1.7 percent of GDP in 2004. Domestic revenue grew
faster than expected on account of the buoyant economic activity
and improvements in tax administration. Despite expenditure
overruns, mainly on capital outlays, the total debt/GDP ratio fell
by 10 percentage points of GDP to
88 percent at end-2004; external debt fell to
66 percent of GDP. However, the fuel subsidy
increased sharply to over 3 percent of GDP.
Moreover, little progress was made in reducing the deficit
excluding grants, which remained high at about
12.5 percent of GDP. Dependence on grants remained
very large at 10.8 percent of GDP.
Although the external current account (including grants)
deteriorated sharply to a small deficit in
2004 from a surplus of 12 percent
of GDP in 2003, official external reserves remained comfortable.
Merchandise export growth remained robust at
26 percent of GDP, but the trade deficit widened
on account of a 43 percent increase in imports,
reflecting strong domestic demand growth as well as higher oil
prices and the high import content of exports. With current
transfers (including external grants) broadly unchanged, the
current account deficit was financed by capital inflows, including
direct foreign investments and portfolio inflows, primarily from
the region. In the process, the Central Bank of Jordan's (CBJ)
gross usable external reserves increased moderately to
US$4.8 billion, equivalent to about
five months of prospective imports and
43 percent of broad money.
During 2000-04, the Jordanian dinar depreciated by about
10 percent in real effective terms, while the
terms-of-trade deteriorated by 13 percent
reflecting mainly higher oil prices. Monetary policy has remained
focused on maintaining the peg of the Jordanian dinar to the U.S.
dollar. The interest rate on three-month CBJ's CDs
was raised by 75 basis points during the course of
2004, in line with U.S. rates. Broad money growth slowed to about
12 percent in 2004, or slightly below nominal GDP
growth. Net domestic assets grew sharply as credit to the private
sector increased by 17 percent, reflecting
economic recovery. The capital of banks increased to
18 percent of risk-weighted assets, and banking
supervision was strengthened; Jordan generally observes
international standards and codes in banking, payment systems,
securities, and insurance. The last remaining bank under temporary
CBJ administration was merged with a larger bank in mid-2005.
Macroeconomic pressures started to build up after the first
quarter in 2005. Macroeconomic policies became expansionary while
external grants started to drop sharply, oil prices continued to
increase rapidly, and the multifiber arrangement (MFA) quotas
lapsed. Driven by domestic consumer demand, the economy continued
to expand at a robust pace (7.6 percent) in the
first half of 2005. However, despite the strong increase in
domestic revenues, the overall fiscal balance did not improve
relative to the same period in 2004 as grants
declined and expenditures rose, in part, to cover payment delays in
2004 and higher oil subsidies. At the same time,
the external current account deficit rose, mainly reflecting a
wider trade deficit and lower external grants. It was, however,
more than financed by private capital inflows, which allowed the
CBJ's external reserves to increase slightly. At the same time,
broad money growth picked up, mainly on account of a sharp increase
in credit to the private sector and government. The ASE index
increased by 158 percent in the 12-month period to
September 2005 and inflation started to increase
from a low base: the CPI rose by 5.7 percent in
September on a 12-month basis.
The authorities have intensified fiscal adjustment in the second
half of the year under a strategy centered on eliminating fuel
subsidies and maintaining expenditure restraint.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the budget and the external current account
deficits (including grants) for 2005 are estimated
at over 6 and 14 percent of GDP,
respectively. These compare with a budget deficit of
1 percent of GDP and an external current account
surplus of almost 12 percent of GDP in 2003. At
the same time, while the terms-of-trade have deteriorated, mainly
reflecting higher oil import prices, the real effective exchange
rate is expected to appreciate. Under current policies, the fiscal
and external current account deficits are projected to remain large
over the medium term, growth is expected to decelerate and
inflation is likely to pick up further. In these circumstances,
pressures on the exchange rate peg could emerge.
Executive Board Assessment
At the outset, Directors expressed their deepest sympathy to the
government and people of Jordan on the recent tragic bombings.
Directors noted that significant progress has been made in Jordan
over the past several years toward macroeconomic stabilization and
economic restructuring, supported by external debt rescheduling.
Directors commended the authorities for the impressive economic
performance in 2004, with an exceptionally strong economic recovery
and fall in unemployment, low inflation, and a continued strong
external reserves position. This favorable outcome
reflected the pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies and strong
ownership of the reform efforts, as well as the positive impact of
large external grants. Directors emphasized that, notwithstanding
these achievements, there is a need to sustain strong policies as
the economy remains vulnerable to external shocks.
Directors noted that, in 2005, some of these vulnerabilities
have materialized and that the macroeconomic situation is likely to
deteriorate in the near term under unchanged policies. Although the
economy has continued to grow briskly in the first half of 2005,
mainly on account of higher domestic consumption, the rapid
increase in oil prices and the sharp decline in external grants
have significantly weakened the macroeconomic outlook. Jordan has
suffered a durable terms of trade loss. The budget and the external
current account deficits (including grants) are set to widen
significantly in 2005, and could deteriorate further in the medium
term if external grants decline further and oil prices remain high.
Against this background, adjustment to the sharply reduced level of
foreign grants and reducing fiscal rigidities remain the key
challenges for Jordan going forward.
Directors commended the authorities for their determination to
address the emerging challenges. They welcomed the thrust of the
authorities' new reform strategy that was launched in
July 2005. The strategy aims at containing
aggregate demand by eliminating politically sensitive subsidies for
petroleum products by March 2007, curbing government expenditures,
and mobilizing revenues in order to gradually reduce the fiscal
deficit over the next four to five years, supported by a tighter
monetary policy. At the same time, a number of Directors noted that
the new strategy may not be sufficient to address simultaneously
the emerging imbalances and sustain high growth. These Directors
noted that, in the absence of additional external financing,
further expenditure cuts and intensified revenue mobilization might
be required to meet the official plans for containing the fiscal
deficit. They also considered that a tighter fiscal stance and
monetary restraint would help to provide the basis to keep the
economy growing at a fast pace with price stability. A number of
other Directors, however, considered the authorities' medium-term
reform agenda broadly appropriate and that it strikes the right
balance between short-term macroeconomic goals and long-term growth
objectives. They welcomed the authorities' intention to take
additional measures as warranted by future developments.
Directors supported the authorities' bold plan to eliminate
petroleum product subsidies by March 2007, but a number of them
considered that the price adjustments should be rules-based and
more frequent. These Directors encouraged the authorities to adopt
a quarterly, or even monthly, formula-based automatic petroleum
product price adjustment system in place of semi-annual
discretionary increases. A number of other Directors, however,
considered the authorities' gradual approach to adjusting fuel
prices to be appropriate given the associated social and political
constraints. Directors broadly agreed that, in order to mitigate
the likely adverse effects of such reforms on the poor, the social
safety net should be reformed expeditiously as recommended by Fund
technical assistance and with the support of the World Bank to
better target support through the National Aid Fund to the most
vulnerable segments of the society.
While the authorities have made commendable efforts to reduce
and rationalize capital outlays, Directors noted that there is
scope for significant further reductions in current expenditures
through early civil service reforms and limiting capital spending
to projects with firm financing and high economic returns.
Moreover, concerted efforts are needed to improve expenditure
management, macro-fiscal forecasting and analysis, and to
strengthen fiscal management through the introduction of a
government financial management information system and closer
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies.
Directors noted the importance of additional revenue
mobilization, including through specific excises on selected
petroleum products, realignment of the General Sales Tax (GST) rate
with the standard rate, elimination of GST exemptions, and an early
reform of the income tax as envisioned by the authorities.
Consideration should also be given to improving real estate
taxation. Continued Fund technical assistance in improving the tax
system and expenditure policies will be helpful. Directors also
emphasized that the momentum of privatization should be maintained
in order to improve resource allocation and support market-oriented
private sector-based economic growth.
Directors supported the CBJ's efforts to tighten monetary policy
since 2004, in view of the rapid growth of domestic credit, and
consistent with maintaining the dinar peg to the U. S. dollar. They
welcomed the CBJ's intention to take further action as necessary to
support price stability. Directors stressed the need for improved
coordination of monetary and fiscal policies.
Directors discussed Jordan's exchange rate policy and expressed
various views on the role of greater exchange rate flexibility in
helping the country to adjust to external shocks. The prevailing
view was that while the peg has served the country well, the
authorities should continue to develop institutional capacity
regarding monetary policy with the help of Fund technical
assistance, which might facilitate a future shift toward greater
exchange rate flexibility. Such a shift should be preceded by
careful consideration and preparation, including in order to assess
the effects of exchange rate movements on inflation and debt
levels. Some Directors considered that the peg should be
maintained, pointing to various factors that can be expected to
help safeguard competitiveness and improve the external position,
including the recent pick up in productivity growth, and the
benefits to the export sector of the ongoing trade liberalization
and other reforms.
Directors commended the authorities for the progress made in
consolidating the banking sector. They supported the CBJ's cautious
approach toward the licensing of new banks, and agreed that
stricter regulation of concentration ratios and a better assessment
of guarantees-in addition to safeguards on personal consumer
loans-would help further improve risk management. Directors
recommended closer supervision of commercial banks' balance sheets
to protect against the impact of negative wealth effects in the
event of a correction of asset prices and a migration of private
capital. They called for an early enactment of the anti-money
laundering/counter financing of terrorism legislation, which would
fill an important gap in the regulatory system.
Directors considered the deepening of domestic financial markets
as essential for sustained growth. While sound and sustainable
macroeconomic policies will be a critical element in the
development of the domestic financial markets, the volatility of
capital flows and asset prices would need to be addressed through
strengthening domestic financial institutions. In addition, the
development of Jordan's securities markets will be crucial to serve
as an alternative source of funding and managing of the financial
risks associated with asset price volatility. In this context, Directors supported the authorities' plans to develop new instruments and to lengthen the maturity structure of government
debt that will facilitate the development of the much needed
secondary market and a longer yield-curve. The regulatory system
should be simplified and modernized to encourage investment in
productive, tradable activities.
Directors recognized the progress made in the development and
dissemination of economic data and urged the authorities to
subscribe expeditiously to the Special Data Dissemination
Standard.
Directors were in broad agreement with the staff's Ex Post
Assessment of the Fund's engagement in Jordan. They agreed that, in
a difficult geo-political situation, significant progress has been
made in macroeconomic stabilization, but long-standing
vulnerabilities to external shocks remain. While noting that the
authorities have chosen to discontinue the use of Fund resources,
Directors echoed the staff's recommendation that the authorities
continue to collaborate closely with the Fund in tackling the
remaining challenges. They supported the EPA's emphasis on
adjustment to the sharp decline in grants, addressing fiscal
rigidities, and reforming petroleum pricing. Directors also
endorsed the staff's call for further technical assistance in the
areas of tax administration, fiscal policy, financial sector
issues, and exchange rate policy. They agreed that improved
ownership had been a key factor in turning around Jordan's
performance in the late 1990s, and underscored, more generally, the
importance of striking a balance between ownership and sufficiently
ambitious objectives in Fund programs.
Directors supported the authorities' intention to continue their
Post-Program Monitoring with the Fund.
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Jordan: Selected Economic
Indicators |
|
| |
|
|
|
Prel. |
Proj. |
| |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
|
|
Real sector |
(Changes
in percent) |
|
Real GDP |
5.3 |
5.7 |
4.1 |
7.7 |
6.3 |
|
CPI (period average) |
1.8 |
1.8 |
1.6 |
3.4 |
3.8 |
|
Unemployment rate (in percent) |
14.7 |
15.3 |
14.5 |
12.5 |
... |
|
Gross national saving (in percent of
GDP) |
21.0 |
25.8 |
32.4 |
24.5 |
8.3 |
|
Gross capital formation (in percent of
GDP) |
21.1 |
20.1 |
20.8 |
24.6 |
23.4 |
|
Public finance |
(In percent of GDP) |
|
Central government revenue and grants |
30.3 |
29.6 |
34.9 |
36.3 |
32.3 |
|
Of which: grants |
4.3 |
5.1 |
11.7 |
10.8 |
5.4 |
|
Central government expenditure and net lending 1/ |
33.9 |
34.5 |
35.9 |
38.0 |
38.7 |
|
Central government overall fiscal balance |
-3.6 |
-4.9 |
-1.0 |
-1.7 |
-6.4 |
|
Net public debt 2/ |
94.9 |
97.3 |
98.1 |
87.6 |
83.4 |
|
Money and credit |
(Changes
in percent; unless otherwise indicated) |
|
Reserve money |
-3.6 |
4.8 |
20.7 |
3.3 |
1.1 |
|
Broad money |
5.8 |
7.0 |
12.4 |
11.7 |
12.4 |
|
Credit to the private sector |
11.5 |
3.2 |
3.5 |
17.3 |
21.8 |
|
Interest rate on CBJ 3-month certificate of deposits |
3.9 |
3.0 |
2.1 |
2.9 |
... |
|
Balance of payments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Merchandise exports |
20.8 |
20.7 |
11.2 |
26.0 |
9.9 |
|
Merchandise imports |
5.6 |
4.6 |
12.8 |
43.0 |
27.2 |
|
Current account balance (in percent of
GDP) |
-0.1 |
5.6 |
11.6 |
-0.1 |
-15.1 |
|
Gross usable international reserves |
|
|
|
|
|
|
(In millions of U.S. dollars) |
2,565 |
3,474 |
4,745 |
4,755 |
4,393 |
|
(In months of prospective import cover) |
5.3 |
6.7 |
6.5 |
5.3 |
4.5 |
|
Exchange rates |
|
|
|
|
|
|
U.S. dollar per Jordanian dinar (end-period) |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
1.4 |
|
Real effective exchange rate (end-period) 3/ |
6.0 |
-7.2 |
-7.6 |
-5.4 |
1.7 |
|
|
Sources: Jordanian authorities; and IMF Staff estimates and
projections.
1/ Includes spending in nontreasury accounts and from
privatization proceeds.
2/ Includes government-guaranteed external debt. Domestic debt
is net of government deposits with the banking system, and external
debt excludes collateralized Brady bonds.
3/ A positive number indicates an appreciation of the real
effective exchange rate. |
1
Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds
bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. Particular
focus is placed in these consultations on policies that have a
bearing on external viability. A staff team visits the country,
collects economic and financial information, and discusses with
officials the country's economic developments and policies. On
return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms
the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion
of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board,
summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is
transmitted to the country's authorities. Post-Program Monitoring
provides for frequent consultations between the Fund and members
whose arrangements have expired but who continue to have Fund
credit outstanding. Ex post assessments were
established by the IMF's Executive Board in
2003 to provide an opportunity for the IMF to step
back from the program context in member countries with longer-term
program engagement. The latter are defined as members that have
spent seven or more of the last 10 years under upper credit tranche
arrangements (including those that have precautionary arrangements
and those that have a mix of resources from the General Resources
Account and the PRGF/ESAF), and members that have had two or more
multiyear arrangements under concessional facilities such as the
PRGF or ESAF.