Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions

Author/Editor:

Francesca Castellani ; Xavier Debrun

Publication Date:

December 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central

Series:

Working Paper No. 2001/205

Subject:

Central bank autonomy Expenditure Fiscal policy Fiscal rules Inflation

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451874556/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2052001

Pages:

37

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