Decentralization and Macroeconomic Management
November 1, 1997
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
The literature on fiscal federalism has amply discussed both the potential efficiency and welfare gains from decentralization and the potential trade-offs between decentralization and income redistribution. By contrast, it has generally put less emphasis on the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic management, although policymakers worldwide increasingly have to grapple with these effects. This paper examines the constraints that a high degree of decentralization can place on the ability of the central government to carry out its traditional macroeconomic management functions and explores various ways to minimize these constraints.
Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Debt financing, Debt service, Expenditure, External debt, Public debt, Public financial management (PFM)
Keywords: a number of country, approval power, borrowing controls, Budget planning and preparation, central government, country, Debt financing, Debt service, decentralization, experiences point, financial operations, fiscal federalism, Global, government, government interference, government intervention, government purpose, government savings, subnational government, WP
Pages:
16
Volume:
1997
DOI:
Issue:
155
Series:
Working Paper No. 1997/155
Stock No:
WPIEA1551997
ISBN:
9781451857276
ISSN:
1018-5941





