Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries
February 1, 2012
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Summary
This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.
Subject: Expenditure, Fiscal federalism, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Fiscal stance, General government spending, Public financial management (PFM)
Keywords: access to borrowing, authorities' access, central government, country, Eastern Europe, Europe, European Union, expenditure share, Fiscal decentralization, Fiscal federalism, fiscal institutions, fiscal rules, Fiscal stance, General government spending, government, government tier, Lagged government debt, national government, WP
Pages:
32
Volume:
2012
DOI:
Issue:
045
Series:
Working Paper No. 2012/045
Stock No:
WPIEA2012045
ISBN:
9781463936464
ISSN:
1018-5941
