A new social contract
The original purpose of social protection systems remains: to prevent
poverty, cover catastrophic losses, help households and markets manage
uncertainty, and ultimately provide a foundation for more efficient and
equitable economic outcomes. These objectives motivated the architects of
the "welfare state," as it has come to be known, and should both motivate
and guide efforts to keep social protection systems relevant and
responsive.
New systems are needed that serve the needs of all people, regardless of
how they engage in the market to make a living. These new policies must
also be more adaptable and resilient to dynamic economic, social, and
demographic forces. In other words, a new social contract is needed.
As we examine the changing nature of work (World Bank 2018), we must take a
closer look at how to better protect people and workers in the new economy.
These are some key findings:
Informality, the share of the population not participating in
traditional social insurance and related protections, is currently
about 80 percent of the labor force in developing economies.
This is a major bottleneck to extending protection. Most workers,
especially the poor, are engaged in informal sector activities with little
or no access to social protection. Given the endemic nature of this
challenge and minimal progress against it, most people would be better off
with a social protection system that does not depend on their work
situation.
Social assistance, which contributes to equity in societies, could be
enhanced.
There are several options. At one end of the spectrum is a means-tested
guaranteed minimum income program, which distributes cash to households,
with benefits gradually declining as income rises. At the other end is
universal basic income, with unconditional cash transfers to all,
independent of income or employment. Both are distributed monthly.
An intermediate option is a negative income tax—a way to provide money to
people below a certain income level—with a relatively high threshold and a
gradual withdrawal of benefits. Since a negative income tax is woven into
the tax declaration cycle, it tends to be paid annually. Another such
option could be a smaller guaranteed minimum income supplemented with other
programs, such as universal child allowances and social pensions. The cost
of such an arrangement depends on the level of benefit, scale of coverage,
and shape of the income distribution graph. But increasing robotization
could reduce fiscal constraints, and this type of benefit may become
important for social as well as economic stability.
For informal economies, greater ability to identify individuals and
households and monitor their consumption—if not income—opens new
possibilities at the nexus of universal basic income, negative income tax,
and guaranteed minimum income, or even a negative consumption tax.
Targeting would be based on proxy indicators for unobserved income from
special surveys and identified by linking administrative databases.
The notion of "progressive universalism" (Gentilini 2018) may help
guide expansion in ways that benefit the poor and vulnerable first.
The principle recognizes that universality in itself does not necessarily
make the poorest better-off than existing provisions. Hence, as countries
expand social protection toward universality, the most vulnerable should be
given priority, special attention, and adequate support.
In addition, the global architecture of social protection as set out by
United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 1.3 aims to "implement
nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all,
including floors." Similarly, strategic partnerships such as the
International Labour Organization–World Bank Universal Social Protection
Initiative help elevate universality as a strategic goal for countries and
organizations supporting them.
The key issue is the need for a more neutral policy stance than many
governments currently take with respect to the factors of production and to
where and how people work. Once basic protections are guaranteed, people
could upgrade their security with various progressively subsidized
programs—mandatory contributory insurance and savings plans where feasible
and an array of voluntary options where the state and markets can offer
them (Packard and others 2018).
The once politically convenient mingling of social objectives—risk pooling,
poverty elimination, and the pursuit of equality through wealth
redistribution—calls for more explicit distinction and different risk-sharing arrangements
and financing channels. To prevent people from falling into poverty, for
example, the largest and most effective risk pool is a country’s national
budget. Ideally, decisions about financing alternatives would follow
consideration of the appropriate policy instrument to deploy (risk pooling,
saving, or prevention) and the proportionate policy response given what is
privately available. A stylized package of protection against losses from
livelihood shocks is illustrated in Chart 2.
The innermost core represents the guaranteed minimum support needed to
cover the most catastrophic losses with the greatest social costs—such as
livelihood disruption that plunges families into poverty—for which there
are no viable or effective market alternatives. Ideally, but not always,
these incidents are relatively rare. Interventions to cover more frequently
occurring, lower-loss events—for example, structural churn in the labor
market and retirement—but with obvious and substantial external social
benefits, could be included in this guaranteed minimum support program. In
the three remaining rings, responsibility for financing and provision
gradually shifts away from purely public resources and direct provision to
household or individual financing and market provision.