| Public Information Notices (PINs) are issued, (i) at the request of a member country, following the conclusion of the Article IV consultation for countries seeking to make known the views of the IMF to the public. This action is intended to strengthen IMF surveillance over the economic policies of member countries by increasing the transparency of the IMF's assessment of these policies; and (ii) following policy discussions in the Executive Board at the decision of the Board. |
The IMF Executive Board on February 11,1998 concluded the 1997 Article IV
consultation1 with
Chile.
Background
Chile’s performance since the beginning of the decade has been remarkably
strong. Through a combination of prudent fiscal and credit policies, stringent financial sector
supervision, structural reforms, an open trade and investment regime, and efforts to improve
social conditions, the country has achieved rapid output growth with a reduction in poverty,
declining inflation, and a solid external position. Real GDP growth averaged 6.8 percent from
1990 to 1997, inflation declined from 27.3 percent to 6 percent during the period, official
foreign reserves amounted to US$17.4 billion at end-1997 (close to ten months of imports of
goods and nonfactor services), and the incidence of poverty fell from nearly two-fifths of the
population in 1990 to less than one-fourth in 1996.
Economic management was complicated in recent years by sharp swings in export
prices— especially copper. After a surge in 1995,
the price of copper declined by over 20 percent in 1996, recovered in early 1997, and fell
sharply later in the year, contributing to sharp fluctuations in the trade and fiscal balances. To
limit the impact of these movements on demand and output growth, the authorities have
periodically adjusted the overnight real interest rate, the central bank’s main
instrument of monetary control, while trying to keep the fiscal stimulus to the economy
broadly neutral. Lower copper export prices also contributed to a decline in the nonfinancial
public sector surplus—from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to about 2 percent in 1996 and
the first half of 1997 (the latest data available). However, the cyclically adjusted fiscal stance
remained broadly neutral in terms of its stimulus to the economy, as an expansion in the
coverage of social programs aimed at alleviating poverty and reducing income disparities,
including through increases in minimum pensions and an ambitious education reform, was
mostly financed through matching tax increases. Output growth is estimated to have slowed
from 7¼ percent in 1996 to 6½ percent in 1997.
The task of disinflation in 1996-97 was complicated by a number of other supply shocks
(mostly weather related) that contributed to temporary but significant hikes in food and
energy prices. Nonetheless, inflation declined to 6.6 percent at end-1996 and 6 percent at
end-1997, in line with the authorities’ targets.
Reflecting the decline in copper export prices, the country’s external current
account position shifted from a small surplus in 1995 to a deficit of about 4 percent of GDP
in 1996-97. Rising profit remittances, reflecting strong foreign direct investment flows since
the early 1990s, also helped widen the deficit. The financing of the current account deficit in
recent years has shifted from debt to sizable inflows of direct and, to a lesser extent,
long-term portfolio investment. Overall, large capital inflows contributed—up to the last
quarter of 1997—to a gradual but steady real effective appreciation of the currency. The
authorities have continued to deal with these pressures through a combination of prudential
fee-based restrictions on inflows aimed at discouraging short-term foreign borrowing, a
progressive liberalization of outflows (the existing prudential regulations apply mainly to
foreign investment by financial institutions), and occasional discrete changes in the exchange
band (including a revaluation in January 1997). In the aftermath of the crisis in Asia, the peso
has come under some pressure, weakening by about 8 percent in nominal terms against the
U.S. dollar since mid-October 1997. However, the authorities have averted an overshooting
of the exchange rate through a tightening in credit conditions, moderate foreign exchange
intervention, and cuts in public expenditure.
There have been important further advances in the area of structural reforms in recent
years, with the approval of bills increasing private sector participation in the upgrading of
infrastructure, as well as improving governance (particularly in the judicial area) and social
equity (including through the above mentioned education reform). The supervisory and
regulatory framework for the financial system has been updated and strengthened. Overall,
bank performance indicators have improved throughout the 1990s along with a process of
modernization (including higher foreign investment in the sector) and continued financial
deepening.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors noted that Chile had a long record of prudent and skillful economic
management, and that recent policies and structural reforms had delivered a very good
economic performance in 1997. The strong output growth, the decline in underlying inflation,
and a sizable buildup in foreign reserves had created the conditions for further sustained
gains in living standards, and had also served to strengthen policy credibility.
Directors considered that Chile’s sound fundamentals, as well as its favorable debt
and debt-service indicators, robust financial system, and ample cushion of foreign reserves
had equipped it to deal relatively well with the recent turbulence in world financial markets.
In this context, they noted the authorities’ prompt actions to tighten monetary policy
when the peso came under pressure. However, Directors cautioned that the country’s
vulnerability to the events in Asia, particularly given the importance of its exports to that
region, as well as the prospects of a prolonged sluggishness in commodity prices and a
possible slowdown in capital flows to emerging markets, required vigilance on the part of the
authorities and a readiness to tighten macroeconomic policies, if needed. Some Directors saw
scope for a rebalancing of the policy mix, with some strengthening of fiscal policy. However,
several other Directors considered that reliance on tight monetary policy was appropriate for
the time being, especially given the recent exchange rate depreciation and the relative
strength of the banking system, which could well withstand the effects of higher interest
rates. They also agreed that continued unrestricted access to industrial country markets was
crucial to solidify Chile’s outward-looking orientation.
Directors considered that Chile’s prudential restrictions on external indebtedness
in the form of a one-year nonremunerated deposit requirement had played a useful role in
reducing the volatility of capital inflows and in lengthening the maturity of external
obligations. They noted the prudential character of these regulations, and the fact that they
operated alongside a stringent system of financial supervision. Some speakers noted that their
usefulness in the Chilean case may reflect importantly the country’s strong
fundamentals and progress in restructuring the economy. They also felt that such restrictions
tend to lose effectiveness over time.
Directors were encouraged by the authorities’ determination to slow the increase
in consumer prices to around 4.5 percent in 1998, building on the central bank’s
credibility in successfully lowering inflation since the beginning of the decade. They
welcomed the recent steps to tighten credit, cut certain public outlays, and cushion the
depreciation of the currency through moderate foreign exchange intervention. In their view,
however, the risks to the external outlook heightened the importance of measures to reduce
the country’s reliance on foreign savings, including the maintenance of a strong fiscal
position over the short and medium term. In this regard, Directors noted the importance of
raising private savings, and welcomed the authorities’ decision to examine potential
measures to this end, through the imminent publication of the report of the commission that
is reviewing ways to bolster private savings.
Directors commended the authorities on the impressive progress made in structural
reforms, including the recent measures to significantly strengthen the banking system,
undertake reforms in education, and improve the judicial system. Directors endorsed warmly
the authorities’ plans to deepen structural reforms with a view to diversifying the
economy and reducing the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks, achieving
further productivity gains, as well as further improving social conditions. Directors also
welcomed government plans to further reform financial sector regulations, especially by
introducing consolidated supervision of financial holding groups; upgrade infrastructure with
an increased private sector role; improve the quality of education and other basic services;
and strengthen the regulatory framework for public utilities. In addition, they welcomed the
government’s initiative to seek increased transparency in its own military outlays and
those in the rest of the region.
| Chile: Selected Economic Indicators |
|
| |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Prel. 1997 |
|
| |
In percent |
| Domestic economy |
|
| Change in real GDP |
6.3 |
4.2 |
8.5 |
7.2 |
6.5-6.7 |
| Unemployment rate |
6.5 |
7.8 |
7.4 |
6.5 |
6.1 |
| Change in consumer prices (end of period) |
12.2 |
8.9 |
8.2 |
6.6 |
6.0 |
| |
|
| |
In million of U.S. dollars1 |
| External economy |
|
| Exports, f.o.b. |
9,199 |
11,604 |
16,136 |
15,353 |
16,875 |
| Imports, f.o.b. |
10,181 |
10,879 |
14,655 |
16,500 |
18,218 |
| Current account balance |
-2,077 |
-639 |
147 |
-2,918 |
-3,182 |
| Direct investment |
429 |
950 |
1,185 |
3,094 |
2,532 |
| Portfolio investment |
729 |
908 |
36 |
1,101 |
2,379 |
| Capital account balance |
2,653 |
3,833 |
914 |
4,099 |
5,654 |
| Gross official reserves2 |
9,225 |
12,893 |
14,241 |
14,915 |
17,386 |
| Current account balance (in percent of GDP) |
-4.5 |
-1.2 |
0.2 |
-4.1 |
-4.0 |
| Change in real effective exchange rate (in percent)3 |
0.4 |
5.8 |
1.7 |
3.9 |
9.4 |
| |
|
| |
In percent of GDP1 |
| Financial variables |
|
| Nonfinancial public sector balance |
1.8 |
2.2 |
3.5 |
2.0 |
1.8 |
| Combined public sector balance |
0.8 |
1.2 |
3.0 |
1.3 |
1.2 |
| Change in broad money (M3) |
27.0 |
19.3 |
27.4 |
22.0 |
19.0 |
| Interest rate4 |
6.5 |
6.4 |
6.1 |
7.3 |
6.8 |
| External debt |
47.8 |
46.8 |
36.5 |
34.4 |
33.2 |
| Copper price (U.S. cents per pound) |
86.7 |
104.9 |
133.2 |
103.2 |
103.2 |
Sources: Data provided by the Chilean authorities; and IMF staff
estimates.
1Unless otherwise indicated.
2Gold valued at US$42.22 per ounce.
3Percentage change for the 12 months ended
December; a decline indicates a depreciation of the Chilean peso.
4In percent over monetary correction; 90-day
central bank paper.
|
1Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement,
the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the
country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the
country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a
report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. At the conclusion of the
discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of
directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. In this PIN, the main
features of the Board's discussion are described.
|