Trade-offs in Bank Resolution
February 9, 2018
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Disclaimer: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. Staff Discussion Notes are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
Summary
Subject: Bank resolution, Bank resolution framework, Banking, Financial crises, Financial sector policy and analysis, Financial sector stability, Moral hazard, Spillovers
Keywords: Bail in, Bail-in power, Bail-in process, Bail-in regime, Bail-out expectation, Bank equity, Bank resolution, Bank resolution framework, Bank stakeholder, Central bank, Equity capital, EU bail-in event, Financial regulation, Financial sector stability, Global, Holding company, Moral hazard, Public funds, Recognition clause, Resolution regime, SDN, Spillovers
Publication Details
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Pages:
42
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Volume:
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DOI:
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Issue:
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Series:
Staff Discussion Notes No. 2018/002
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Stock No:
SDNEA2018002
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ISBN:
9781484341001
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ISSN:
2617-6750
