Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly

Author/Editor:

Ling H Tan

Publication Date:

March 1, 2000

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.

Series:

Working Paper No. 00/65

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

March 1, 2000

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451848670/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0652000

Format:

Paper

Pages:

21

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