Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997

January 1, 1999

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

A higher degree of de jure autonomy and accountability of the central banks of the Baltic states, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union appears to be positively correlated with lower average inflation. There also seems to be some positive correlation between greater central bank autonomy and higher average real growth, after the initial period of reforms. Central banks with a higher degree of autonomy and accountability have apparently also reformed their operations more aggressively.

Subject: Banking, Central bank accountability, Central bank autonomy, Central bank credit, Central bank legislation, Central banks, Inflation, Prices

Keywords: autonomy, Baltics, BRO central bank law, BRO country, central bank, Central bank accountability, central bank authority, Central bank autonomy, Central bank credit, central bank governor, Central bank independence, Central bank legislation, country, draft central bank law, financial condition, government, Inflation, instrument autonomy, target autonomy, transition economies, WP

Pages:
38
Volume:
1999
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451842029.001
Issue:
004
Series:
Working Paper No. 1999/004
Stock No:
WPIEA0041999
ISBN:
9781451842029
ISSN:
1018-5941

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