Competition Among Regulators

Author/Editor:

Robert Marquez ; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publication Date:

May 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper shows that competition among regulators reduces regulatory standards relative to a centralized solution. It suggests that a central regulator is more likely to emerge for homogeneous and financially integrated countries. The paper proves these results in a model where regulators concerned with their banking system’s stability and efficiency and with their banks’ profitability set their regulatory policy non-cooperatively. Externalities in bank regulation make the independent solution collectively inefficient. These externalities and the benefits of centralized regulation increase with financial integration, while the costs associated with the loss of independence decrease with the homogeneity of the countries involved.

Series:

Working Paper No. 01/73

English

Publication Date:

May 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451849462/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0732001

Format:

Paper

Pages:

24

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