Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?

Author/Editor:

Steven T Phillips ; Timothy D. Lane

Publication Date:

October 1, 2000

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

The view that the IMF’s financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on this hypothesis. While some element of moral hazard is a logical consequence of the IMF’s financial support, such moral hazard is difficult to detect in market reactions to various IMF policy announcements and there is no evidence that such moral hazard has recently been on the rise.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2000/168

Subject:

Emerging and frontier financial markets Financial crises Financial institutions Financial markets Financial sector policy and analysis Financial services Moral hazard Systemically important financial institutions Yield curve

English

Publication Date:

October 1, 2000

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451858259/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1682000

Pages:

39

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