The Complier Pays Principle : The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management

Author/Editor:

Luc E. Leruth ; R. Paris ; I. Ruzicka

Publication Date:

March 1, 2000

Electronic Access:

Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax policy can actually undermine it. The paper uses the arguments at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. The paper also proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs.

Series:

Working Paper No. 00/51

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

March 1, 2000

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451847109/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0512000

Format:

Paper

Pages:

28

Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org