The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environment Protection

IMF Working Papers, March 1, 2002

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Bibliographic details

• Authors: Muthukumara Mani, Per G. Fredriksson
• Published: March 1, 2002
• Series: IMF Working Papers
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451846850.001

Summary of the paper

• Develops and tests a theory of the rule of law and environmental policy formation.
• Main theoretical insight: an increase in the degree of rule of law has two opposing partial effects on environmental policy:
  • a greater share of policy decisions are implemented according to law;
  • industry bribery efforts increase because more is at stake.
• The model finds that an increase in corruptibility of policymakers lowers the stringency of environmental policy.
• Empirical finding: a greater degree of rule of law raises environmental policy stringency, but the effect is lower where corruptibility is high.

Theoretical mechanisms

• Rule-of-law increase — first partial effect:
  • More policy decisions implemented according to law, which tends to raise environmental policy stringency.
• Rule-of-law increase — second partial effect:
  • Higher stakes encourage greater industry bribery efforts, which tends to reduce environmental policy stringency.
• Corruptibility parameter:
  • Higher corruptibility of policymakers directly lowers environmental policy stringency in the model.

Empirical findings

• Empirical evidence supports that:
  • Greater degree of rule of law raises environmental policy stringency.
  • The positive effect of rule of law on policy stringency is attenuated where corruptibility is high.

Policy implications and interpretations

• Strengthening the rule of law can increase environmental policy stringency, but anticorruption measures are necessary to realize the full effect.
• Policies focused solely on procedural rule-of-law improvements may be undermined if corruptibility of policymakers remains high.
• Combining rule-of-law reforms with measures that reduce corruptibility and industry bribery incentives will better support stronger environmental protection.

The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environment Protection — Muthukumara Mani; Per G. Fredriksson; March 1, 2002; Working Paper No. 2002/049.

Content in this bundle

• The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environmental Protection - WP/02/49
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