The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environment Protection

Author/Editor:

Muthukumara Mani ; Per G. Fredriksson

Publication Date:

March 1, 2002

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

We develop and test a theory of the rule of law and environmental policy formation. In our model an increase in the degree of rule of law has two opposing partial effects on environmental policy: first, a greater share of policy decisions are implemented according to law; second, industry bribery efforts increase because more is at stake. Moreover, we find that an increase in corruptibility of policymakers lowers the stringency of environmental policy. The empirical findings suggest that a greater degree of rule of law raises environmental policy stringency, but the effect is lower where corruptibility is high.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2002/049

Subject:

Corruption Environment Environmental policy Environmental taxes Labor

English

Publication Date:

March 1, 2002

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451846850/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0492002

Pages:

27

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