Toward An Economic Theory of Multilateral Development Banking
May 1, 1993
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Summary
This paper addresses an apparent lack of economic theory in the analysis of multilateral development bank (MDB) behavior. A simple comparative statics model that is adapted from the credit union literature is used to predict potential areas of conflict, agreement, and indifference between MDB member countries, analyze lending policies against the background of distributional conflicts, and show how various institutional reforms may improve efficiency and overall member country benefits.
Subject: Capital markets, Credit bureaus, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Loans, Multilateral development institutions, Securities markets
Keywords: amount of money, capital market debt, Capital markets, capital share, Credit bureaus, decision process, Loans, MDB capital share, MDB lending, MDB management, MDB member country, MDB membership, model views MDBs, Multilateral development institutions, optimization problem, policy parameter, Securities markets, WP
Pages:
26
Volume:
1993
DOI:
Issue:
040
Series:
Working Paper No. 1993/040
Stock No:
WPIEA0401993
ISBN:
9781451845891
ISSN:
1018-5941
