Varieties of Monetary Reforms
May 1, 1994
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Summary
This paper surveys three types of monetary arrangements. It considers how the choice of an exchange rate regime, the degree of central bank independence, or choice of currency unions or boards depends not only on economic considerations but also on political economy considerations. In economic terms, the choice of monetary regime will depend on the policy that is best suited to reducing or stabilizing inflation. In political economy terms, the choice of monetary arrangement will ultimately depend on how independent a country wishes to be from shocks emanating from the rest of the world and the weight politicians attach to influencing economic conditions in their own country.
Subject: Central bank autonomy, Central banks, Conventional peg, Economic integration, Exchange rate arrangements, Exchange rate flexibility, Foreign exchange, Monetary unions
Keywords: adjustable peg, central bank, central bank authorities, Central bank autonomy, central bank reaction function, Conventional peg, EMU convergence criteria, Exchange rate arrangements, Exchange rate flexibility, Global, growth objective, index style ranking, inflation, inflation rate, Monetary unions, reaction function, South America, WP
Pages:
30
Volume:
1994
DOI:
Issue:
057
Series:
Working Paper No. 1994/057
Stock No:
WPIEA0571994
ISBN:
9781451967326
ISSN:
1018-5941






